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Worldwide agricultural commodity prices boomed from 2006 to 2011, peaking up 
65% in 2008 and 80% in 2011 (IMF, 2015). Consequently, agricultural gross production 
value expanded 25% worldwide in 2011 relative to its average in 2000-2005, and by     
25%-45% in Latin America (FAO, 2015). However, in Colombia it only increased by 10%. 
Colombia’s agricultural value exhibited this limited expansion likely due to deep 
structural problems that led to low levels of productivity growth. Colombia is a small 
trading economy, making it is a price taker in international markets (Tovar, Jaramillo, 
Maldonado, Jimenez, & Plazas, 2007). There surely was transmission of these high 
commodity prices to Colombia’s domestic prices and so incentives to increase both 
productivity and input use. This study analyses the weak performance of Colombia’s 
agriculture, conducting a long-term prospective analysis that evaluates how this was 
determined by productivity growth versus input accumulation. Productivity is the 
increase in output attributable to technical change (Domar, 1961; Jorgenson & Griliches, 




Colombia’s agricultural productivity has rarely been analyzed in economics 
literature (Atkinson, 1970; Avila, Romano, & Garagorry, 2010; Ludena, 2010; Pfeiffer, 
2003; USDA, 2015). Existing studies do not reach a consensus, and methods used to 
measure it are questionable. Accordingly, this study measures and analyzes Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity during the period 1975-2013. 
This study begins by analyzing Colombia’s agricultural context from 1975 to 2013, 
identifying six key periods between which economic conditions and policy regimes 
changed. Then it uses econometric techniques to measure aggregate and disaggregated 
crop and livestock productivity, an approach that has never been used before to measure 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity. This study finds that Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity grew on average between 0.8% and 1.3% per year from 1975 to 2013, which 
was mainly driven by livestock productivity. The three different approaches used – Cobb-
Douglas and CES production functions and Dual cost function estimation -- yielded mostly 
similar results. Productivity exhibited different trends in each identified period, and 
output value was more sensitive to productivity trends influenced by policy regimes and 
economic circumstances than by input accumulation. Also, stagnant growth of Colombia’s 
agriculture in recent decades was due to low productivity growth. In addition, it exhibited 
biased technical change according to the methods that can identify bias.  
Colombia will be able to raise its agricultural productivity in the future if it steadily 
increases R&D investment, human capital, and foreign competence in the domestic 
market. Success will depend on implementing a comprehensive policy regime that 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Agricultural Commodity Price Boom in 2006 to 2011 and Colombia's Agricultural 
Backwardness
 
Worldwide agricultural commodity prices exhibited a boom during 2006-2011. 
According to the IMF food price index, these prices increased in real terms by 65% in 2008 
and by 80% in 2011 relative to 2000-2005 (IMF, 2015), due to: i) biofuel industry 
development in the US; ii) global imbalances in some commodity markets, due to rapid 
demand expansion and low stock levels; iii) the dynamic growth of China and India 
compared to world economic growth (10% vs 4%); iv) climate change and crop diseases, 
which further worsened the already struggling output of numerous commodities; v) 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar relative to global currencies; vi) speculation in commodity 
markets; and vii) isolating trade policies as a response to higher commodity prices (Abbott, 
Hurt, & Tyner, 2008). As a result, farmers’ profits in many countries reached historical 
levels, as has happened in other commodity booms due to a substantial price 
transmission of these high prices to the domestic markets, allowing them to increase 
expenditures on land, machinery, structures, and equipment (Henderson, Gloy, & Boehlje, 





expanded by 25% during this period compared to its average levels exhibited during 2000-
2005 (FAO, 2015). 
In Colombia, however, this expansion was very moderate (see Figure 1). Its 
agricultural gross production value only increased by 10% as a result of the high 
commodity prices exhibited during 2006-2011, despite the fact that this expansion was 
more dynamic in other Latin American countries during this period: Chile (+26.1%), 
Argentina (+28.6%), Brazil (+43.6%), and Peru (+45.6%) (FAO, 2015). Also, Colombia’s 
investment in agricultural R&D, as a ratio of overall GDP, remained low over 2006-2011, 
increasing from 0.4% only to 0.7% as a result of this agricultural commodity price boom 
(Junguito, Perfetti, & Becerra, 2014). In contrast, this ratio was about 1% in other 
emerging countries and 4% in developed countries (Junguito et al., 2014). In addition, the 
area equipped with irrigation in Colombia remained around 30% of arable land over this 
period, while in Peru this ratio was close to 50% and in Chile close to 65% (FAO, 2015). All 
this evidence suggests that Colombia’s agriculture clearly lost a valuable opportunity to 
update itself and match the advancing agricultural development of other countries, 
especially in the region. Also, this reaffirms that Colombia’s agricultural sector continued 







Figure 1: Index of Agricultural Gross Production Value (Source: FAO, 2015) 
 
The problem is that Colombia’s agriculture didn’t significantly expand due to the 
agricultural commodity price booms. Accordingly, something else happened that surely 
explained this limited expansion, both then and in Colombia’s earlier history. Thus, the 
objective is to figure out this, by conducting a long-term prospective analysis.  
 Two possible issues may explain Colombia’s limited agricultural expansion. On the 
one hand, deep structural problems prevented Colombia from taking advantage of this 
boom and led Colombia to exhibit low levels of productivity. Moreover, the pass-through 
of these high commodity prices to domestic prices was partial. However, this study rules 
out this last reason as being important, because most agricultural prices in Colombia 
largely depend on international prices (Tovar et al., 2007). Accordingly, this limited 
expansion was likely due to deep structural problems, which led to low levels of 

























































1.2 Colombia’s Agricultural Productivity 
 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity has rarely been analyzed in economics 
literature, and little is known about its dynamics (Atkinson, 1970; Avila et al., 2010; 
Ludena, 2010; Pfeiffer, 2003; USDA, 2015). Also, the results of these studies do not reach 
consensus, and the methods used to measure it are questionable. Accordingly, this study 
measures and analyzes Colombia’s agricultural productivity during the period 1975-2013. 
This study begins by analyzing in detail Colombia’s agricultural context during this 
period, focusing on: i) Colombia’s agricultural performance; ii) Colombia’s agricultural 
policy; and iii) the main problems facing Colombia’s agriculture nowadays. Based on this, 
it determines six periods for the subsequent analysis based on the years for which: i) 
Colombia’s agriculture exhibited similar economic conditions; and ii) new agricultural 
policy regimes are in place. Then, this study estimates Colombia’s agricultural productivity 
growth in aggregate and disaggregated for crop production and livestock production. 
Agricultural productivity is well recognized in economics literature as a crucial indicator 
for agriculture development worldwide, because: i) this works as a permanent barometer 
of the agricultural sector’s performance; and ii) improving agricultural productivity is key 
to designing and executing more efficient agricultural policies.  
This study uses primal and dual econometric techniques to measure Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity. The idea is to use a variety of methodologies from the economics 
literature as strategy to look for more consistent results. This methodology has never 





have mainly used growth accounting or frontier techniques. It also allows us to determine 
if Colombia’s agriculture exhibited biased technical change during this period, an aspect 
that nobody has analyzed before for Colombia. In addition, this enables us to assess how 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity growth changed its trend over time relative to policy 
regimes and economic circumstances. Finally, this study identifies some elements that 
Colombia’s agricultural policy should consider to boost agricultural productivity growth in 
the coming years. 
This study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 describes Colombia’s agricultural context 
during the period from 1970 to 2014. Chapter 3 examines the importance of agricultural 
productivity worldwide and its value in designing and evaluating agricultural policy. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in this study to measure Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity. Chapter 5 describes the data used here. Chapter 6 presents the agricultural 
productivity growth estimates obtained by this study. Chapter 7 examines certain 
elements that Colombia’s agricultural policy should consider to boost agricultural 





CHAPTER 2. COLOMBIA’S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR (1970-2014) 
2.1 Introduction 
Agriculture is one of the most important economic activities in Colombia. About 40% 
of Colombia’s land has been used for agricultural purposes in recent decades Also, its GDP 
has averaged 8% of Colombia’s total GDP, and its exports account for 18% of total exports 
(DANE, 2015). Thus, agriculture is seen nowadays as one on the most important activities 
in Colombia, since its reach is not just economic. It also plays a key role into the social 
development of Colombia, as the most common source of employment in rural areas 
(COMPITE, 2008; SAC, 2011). In recent decades, agriculture employs 20% of the national 
labor force and 66% of the rural labor force (DANE, 2015). 
Colombia’s agriculture is an economic sector with promising future prospects. 
Along with Brazil, the Congo, Angola, Sudan, and Bolivia, Colombia is one of the few 
countries with the opportunity to expand their agricultural frontier (FAO, 2013). Its 
Orinoco region, similar to the Cerrado in Brazil, would allow Colombia to expand its 
farmland by 80% (between 3-5 million hectares), if Colombia improves its infrastructure 
and gives priority to developing new technologies for agricultural development in this 
region (Clavijo & Jimenez, 2011c). Thus, Colombia has the potential to become a global 





population will grow by 30% to 9,100 million people (2% per year) by 2050 (UN, 2015), ii) 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that global food production must 
increase by 70% (5% per year) to feed such a large population (FAO, 2009), and iii) 
Colombia’s agricultural GDP per capita will grow on average by 2%-4% in the next decades. 
Colombia’s  agricultural GDP is projected to grow 4%-5% annually, and its population will 
grow by only 1%-1.5% annually, according to official predictions of the National 
Department of Statistics of Colombia (DANE) and the Colombian Department of 
Agriculture (MADR) (DANE, 2015; MADR, 2014). 
However, Colombia’s agriculture has been seriously affected in recent decades due 
to lack of investment (Junguito, Perfetti, & Becerra, 2014). The discovery of two great oil 
deposits in Colombia during the 1980’s and the 1990’s (Caño Limon in 1982 and Cusiana-
Cupiagua in 1992) also transformed Colombia into an oil economy and largely directed 
investment to oil production. Consequently, tradable sectors such as agriculture have lost 
their competitiveness since then, because Colombia has been suffering serious Dutch 
Disease symptoms: i) a real misalignment of the exchange rate, which oscillated around 
15%-20% in recent years, ii) an overall economy largely supported on non-tradeable 
sectors (60% of Colombia’s overall GDP); iii) a premature de-industrialization process (i.e. 
industry GDP reduced its importance in Colombia’s overall GDP from 23% in the 1970’s to 
14% in the 2000’s); iv) export concentration in commodities (close to 70% of the total); 
and v) high NAIRU rate close to 10% (Clavijo, Vera, & Fandiño, 2013). Accordingly, 





decades and a steady loss of competitiveness, despite all these promising future 
prospects.   
The aim of this chapter is to examine Colombia’s agricultural situation during the 
period of 1970 to 2014. This chapter answers the following key questions: i) How has 
Colombia’s agricultural performance evolved during this period? ii) What policies have 
Colombia’s government adopted to promote its development, and what are their impacts? 
iii) What is the land use of the sector? iv) Which are the main products cultivated, 
produced, exported and imported by Colombia, and v) What problems does Colombia’s 
agriculture face nowadays? These questions are central to an analysis of Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity, the main topic of this study.   
  
2.2 Importance and Dynamics of Colombia’s Agriculture 
Over the last decades, Colombia’s agricultural share in total GDP has steadily 
decreased. According to the World Bank (2016), agriculture’s share in Colombia’s total 
GDP decreased from an average of 24% in the 1970’s to 18% in the 1980’s, 15% in the 
1990’s, and 6%-8% in the 2000’s. In contrast, Peru’s agricultural share fell from 16% in the 
1970’s to 8% in the 2000’s, Brazil’s from 12% to 8%, Mexico’s from 12% to 3%, and Chile’s 
from 8% to 4% (see Figure 2). Also, agricultural GDP per capita in Colombia decreased 
from US$320-350 (constant 2005 US$) in the late 1980’s to US$300 in the 1990’s and 
US$260 in the 2000’s. It is notable that these other countries experienced slight but 
steady overall growth (see Figure 3). This indicates that agriculture did not continue as 





quickly since the 1990’s, due to a “normal” structural transformation exhibited by almost 
all economies in the world. This period followed the first stage of import substitution in 
the 1980’s. However, Colombia’s economy has recently experienced a more accelerated 
transformation toward the service sector, due to effects of the Dutch Disease symptoms 
caused by the discovery of large oil deposits in 1980’s and 1990’s (Caño Limon in 1982 
and Cusiana-Cupiagua in 1992) (Clavijo et al., 2013). In addition, Colombia’s agriculture 
was seriously affected by other factors, such as the accelerated manner in which 
Colombia’s government carried out the second package of reforms associated with its 
Structural Adjustment (SA) program in early 1990’s 1 (Ocampo, 2000). This prompted a 
profitability crisis in agriculture, since this sector was unprepared for these reforms 
(mainly trade reform) as often occurs and other factors worsened this situation, as is 
explained below (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998).  
 
                                                     
1 Colombia’s Structural Adjustment program was executed in two stages. The first stage was executed immediately 
after the Latin American Debt crisis impacted Colombia in early the 1980’s. The Betancur administration (1982-1986) 
requested supervision and advice from the IMF to restore economic stability (Garay, 1998). Although Colombia did not 
receive any credit from the IMF, Colombia executed an austere policy during that time which included: i) a strong 
depreciation of the Colombian Peso against the American Dollar; ii) fiscal reform; and iii) some import restrictions. The 
second stage was executed in the early 1990’s, due to the better economic figures, and included a package of reforms 
in many areas such as: i) fiscal management; ii) foreign trade; iii) financial market; iv) exchange regime; and v) health 







Figure 2. Agriculture’s Share (%) in Total GDP  
(Source: World Bank, 2016) 
 
 
Figure 3. Agricultural GDP Per Capita (Constant 2005 US$)  









































































































































































Another reason for this loss in relevance of Colombian agriculture was its slower 
expansion since the early 1980’s. According to the World Bank (2016), its GDP growth 
averaged 4.5% in the 1970’s, but this rate decreased to 2.7% in the 1980’s, 1.5% in the 
1990’s, and 1.9% in the 2000’s (see Figure 4). In contrast, agriculture was more dynamic 
in other countries of the region (see Table 1). For instance, Brazil’s agricultural GDP 
growth stabilized at around 4% during these decades, while in Chile growth varied from 
3.5% to 4%. Likewise, in Peru growth increased gradually from 1.1% in the 1970’s to 2.5% 
in the 1980’s and almost 4% in the 1990’s and 2000’s. 
 
 
Figure 4. Agricultural GDP Growth (%) by Colombia (1970-2014)  






































































Table 1. Average Agricultural GDP Growth (%) in Latin America (1970’s-2000’s) (Source: 
estimates based on World Bank, 2016) 
  1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-14 
Argentina 3.0 0.1 4.2 1.7 
Brazil 4.0 4.0 2.6 3.7 
Chile 2.6 5.2 3.0 3.9 
Colombia 4.5 2.7 1.5 1.9 
Mexico 3.2 1.5 2.1 1.6 
Peru 1.1 2.5 4.0 3.7 
 
Junguito, Perfetti, & Becerra (2014) believe that this slowdown of Colombia’s 
agricultural GDP is due to: i) policies implemented in Colombia to boost its economic 
development that mainly focused on promoting other sectors (financial, mining, and 
utilities); and ii) lower productivity growth of Colombia’s agriculture (Ludena, 2010). This 
suggests that Colombia’s agriculture has lost importance due to its poor performance, 
lacking political support to boost the sector in the long run, and a slowdown in 
productivity. 
It is evident from Table 1 that the worst period for Colombian agriculture was the 
1990’s (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998). At this time, Colombia was unprepared to carry out trade 
reform, included in the second package of reforms of its Structural Adjustment program 
(Ocampo, 2000). As a result, Colombia’s agriculture was one of the most affected sectors, 
since: i) import taxes were removed for agriculture products from an average of 35.3% in 
1990 to 15.3% in 1992; ii) many subsidies were removed; and iii) Colombia’s government 
ceased to play an active role in the agricultural market2 (Guterman, 2007; C. F. Jaramillo, 
                                                     
2 In prior years Colombia’s government used to make frequent interventions in agricultural markets to ensure a 
minimum income to farmers. For instance, the IDEMA, a state marketing agency, had the monopoly to marketing and 






1998; Junguito, 1994; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). As if this were not enough, Colombia’s 
agriculture situation worsened even further, due to i) a severe drought in 1992; ii) a strong 
revaluation of the Colombian Peso (COP) relative to the US dollar, due to a high interest 
rate spreads (between 20-25 percentage points), decreased the competitiveness of 
Colombia’s agriculture; iii) a decline in commodity prices during the early 1990’s; iv) an 
expansion of illicit crop areas to produce drugs, and v) a crisis of its main lender “La Caja 
Agraria,” since this bank only used  38% of its resources to fund Colombia’s agriculture. 
“La Caja Agraria” exhibited serious problems in the loan approval process, due to poor 
risk assessment and general corruption that amounted to daily losses of about one billion 
pesos (BANREP, 2015; DNP, 2015; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito, 1994; Kalmanovitz & 
López, 2003; Villalba, 2002). Although the Gaviria (1990-1994) and Samper (1994-1998) 
administrations carried out many policies to promote Colombia’s agricultural recovery 
(explained later in this chapter), their efforts were insufficient (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; 
Junguito, 1994; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). Colombia’s agricultural situation worsened 
in the late 1990s; armed conflict prompted many people to leave the rural areas, and this 
significantly impact the country’s agricultural labor and investment (Alban, 2011; DNP, 
2002; FAO, 2000; Montero & Casas, 2012).  
During the 2000’s, Reina et al. (2011) argues that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited 
poor dynamism due to a misallocation of resources within the sector. His study explains 
                                                     
established quantitative restrictions for agricultural imports to protect Colombia’s agriculture from foreign competitors. 
In addition, it gave producer price support to Colombian farmers based on their average production costs (Guterman, 






that although Colombia’s government increased its expenditure on agriculture from $300 
billion Colombian pesos (COP) (constant 2010 pesos) to $1.2 trillion pesos during the 
years 2000 to 2010, almost half of these resources were given as direct subsidies to 
farmers (see Figure 5). As a consequence, Colombia failed to allocate resources to fund 
improvements in its agricultural productivity, thereby thwarting solid gains in global 
competitiveness.  
Reina et al. (2011) estimate that land development received just 20%-25% of these 
resources during the 2000’s; rural development received 15% and innovation and 
technological development received 4% (see Figure 6). That study suggests that Colombia 
hasn’t allocated resources for improving the road infrastructure between farms and cities 
or instructing small and medium farmers on new farming technologies. Also, this outlook 
has been worsened by other factors, such as: i) violence, mainly in the rural areas, due to 
armed conflict; ii) problems of land tenure due to a lack of a clear land policy and earlier 
security problems; iii) poor transportation infrastructure due to a large delay in the 
execution of infrastructure policy, and iv) lack of innovation and technological 








Figure 5. Public Expenditure in Colombia's Agricultural Sector (COP$ Billion, Constant 




Figure 6. Public Expenditure in Colombia's Agricultural Sector by Type of Program  











































2.3 Colombian Agricultural Policy from 1970 to 2015 
2.3.1 Political Economy of Agricultural Policy 
Over the last 50 years, agricultural policy has exhibited many changes in Colombia. 
However, these changes were in response mainly to five events: i) the Banco Internacional 
de Reconstrucción y Fomento - BIRP mission led by Lauchlin Currie in the 1950s; ii) the 
implementation of the model of import substitution (designed by Prebish) that 
discriminated against tradable agricultural products; iii) the second package of reforms of 
Colombia’s Structural Adjustment program executed in early 1990’s; iv) the armed 
conflict in Colombia during the period 1999-2001; and v) the Free Trade Agreement 
signed with the USA in 2006 (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito, 1994; Kalmanovitz & López, 
2003; Montero & Casas, 2012). In response, institutions such as the Sociedad de 
Agricultores de Colombia –(SAC) argue that Colombia has not designed a long term 
agricultural policy strategy for promoting agricultural growth (SAC, 2014). Also, 
agricultural policy in Colombia is seen nowadays as inefficient, since it has been designed 
to face short term problems rather than structural issues (OCDE, 2015)3.  
During the 1970s and 1980’s, agricultural policy in Colombia mainly followed the 
diagnosis and recommendations of the BIRP mission led by Lauchlin Currie. This mission 
acknowledged that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited an imbalance between the number 
                                                     
3 For instance, Colombia’s agriculture fell into crisis in 2012, and the governmental responses consisted of providing 
direct subsidies to farmers, rather than using those funds to finance productive infrastructure, equipment upgrading, 






of people living in rural areas and their productivity4. Also, Colombia’s land used was 
suboptimal, given the amount of unexploited land. BIRP’s recommendation was to design 
a tax for land owners, encouraging them to use their land, or at least force them to sell it 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003).  
Based on this diagnosis, the Pastrana (1970-1974) and Lopez (1974-1978) 
administrations focused their agricultural policy on promoting more efficient land use. 
Their aims were to raise agricultural productivity by improving land distribution, taking 
into account the country’s varied weather conditions, products and regions (Kalmanovitz 
& López, 2003). In order to do this, these administrations implemented three Acts. Act 
No. 4 (1973) established minimum productivity levels for land in Colombia with the 
objective of boosting land use5. Act No. 5 (1973) sought to increase further Colombia’s 
land use, by delegating the Fondo Financiero Agropecuario to manage many sources of 
funding for this sector. Act No. 6 (1975) reaffirmed existing property rights in the 
Colombian countryside by insisting upon the conditions for participation in contracts for 
agricultural products and other forms of land use. Both administrations believed that 
Colombia would be able to reach an expedited export expansion and accelerate urban 
development, by improving the conditions in this sector, mainly by raising agricultural 
productivity. Also, public finances would increase, since these administrations continued 
                                                     
4 While an important portion of mountain farmers used to exploit their land for producing subsistence crops only, it 
was more common that farmers in flat areas grew commercial crops or devoted their efforts to livestock grazing 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003) 
5 According to this Act, minimum productivity levels were established for each region based on its climate, ecological, 






taxing agricultural exports (mainly coffee) to collect all extraordinary gains from 
devaluations derived from emergency reforms executed by Colombia in the late 1960’s. 
In addition, the Lopez administration (1974-1978) established its agricultural policy 
with a program called Desarrollo Rural Integrado – DRI. Its aim was to coordinate actions 
and investments in the countryside to ensure integrated development, paying special 
attention to: i) production aspects, such as technical assistance; ii) agricultural funding; iii) 
agricultural product marketing; iv) infrastructure, such as rural roads, electrification and 
water supply, and v) social services, such as education and health (Vargas, 1994). The 
objective was to upgrade agricultural production and improve efficiency in rural areas 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003).  
While the Turbay administration (1978-1982) continued to strengthen this program, 
it lost importance during the early 1980’s. At the time, the program was mixed with others, 
and its administration was transferred from the National Planning Department – (DNP) to 
the Department of Agriculture – (MADR). The DRI program did not continue being the 
guideline for agricultural policy in Colombia (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). Therefore, the 
Turbay administration (1978-1982) designed its agricultural policy, including policy 
actions in areas such as: i) research; ii) marketing systems; iii) agro-industry development; 
iv) prices, and v) foreign trade. However, this administration encountered problems in 
policy execution, due largely to the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982 (Kalmanovitz & 
López, 2003).   
Under these circumstances, the Betancur administration (1982-1986) assumed 






American Debt Crisis had also affected Colombia and the main interest was to restore 
macroeconomic stability. Agricultural policy was initially considered a key part of this 
recovery, but was later ignored. This administration requested supervision and advice 
from the IMF to execute a Structural Adjustment program (Garay, 1998). Consequently, 
Colombia’s government executed an austere macroeconomic policy which included: i) a 
strong depreciation of the Colombian Peso against the American Dollar; ii) fiscal reform; 
and iii) some import restrictions. Also, resources for agricultural institutions were 
removed, as well as funds to finance development credits (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
Thus, Colombia’s agriculture did not receive much attention or promotion of its 
development during this period, due to the aftermath of Colombia’s Debt Crisis.     
This situation completely changed during the Barco administration (1986-1990). 
This administration understood that Colombia’s agriculture needed upgrades. Its 
agricultural policy focused on promoting private investment, adjusting the price system, 
raising farmer’s margins, and limiting agricultural imports with the aim to protect 
domestic production (Guterman, 2007). Also, Barco promoted coordination among 
agricultural institutions to ensure the availability of seeds, inputs, loans, technical 
assistance and marketing (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). Thereby, its goal was that 
Colombia would become self-sufficient in its food production by creating buffer stocks 
that maintain price stability. 
However, the Barco administration (1986-1990) realized that these efforts were not 
sufficient, and recognized that Colombia would benefit from the execution of the second 






problems in many areas (Junguito, 1994). It was believed that Colombia’s agriculture 
would benefit from economic openness and by allocating its inputs to exportable crops. 
Agriculture productivity would increase due to higher competence, and a market 
determined exchange rate (not overvalued) would promote agriculture exports. Also, the 
agricultural market would be more dynamic if the government removed its intervention 
policies in the sector (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito, 1994). Accordingly, the Gaviria 
administration (1990-1994) executed liberal reforms in areas such as fiscal management, 
monetary policy administration, financial markets, foreign trade, and privatization 
(Ocampo, 2000, 2004).   
The Gaviria administration (1990-1994) planned to execute this adjustment 
gradually to lessen any negative impact on Colombia’s economy. However, the 
government made the decision to accelerate this process, since the economy continued 
being highly protected from imports and there existed high uncertainty caused by the 
slow pace of tariff elimination (Guterman, 2007; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998). Import taxes for 
agricultural products were reduced from 31.5% to 15% in just two years (1990-1992), and 
almost all agricultural subsidies and regulations were removed. Also, the role of the 
Instituto de Mercadeo Agropecuario (IDEMA) 6  was reduced and limited to poor and 
isolated areas, where distance from markets, lack of infrastructure and political unrest 
deterred private sector intervention (Guterman, 2007; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998). In addition, 
                                                     






the producer price support system, based on an average of the production cost, was 
replaced by a system of minimum guaranteed prices. 
The purpose of this second package of reforms of Colombia’s Structural Adjustment 
program was to provide a neutral incentive structure for private decision makers. 
However, this was not achieved in the agricultural sector. Farmer groups claimed the 
collapse of the sector was due to these reforms, forcing the government to take further 
policy interventions. In 1991, the government introduced a price band system for 9 
agricultural commodities (wheat, barley, rice, maize, sorghum, soybean, palm oil, milk 
and sugar), covering a total of 112 products (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998). Its aim was to stabilize 
producer incomes; however, it later became a protective device, given the way the floor 
and ceiling prices were fixed. Also, the government started to again protect some 
products by using the previous licensing system (i.e. quotas, prior licensing and 
prohibition of certain imports) (Guterman, 2007).   
In any case, Colombia’s agriculture was one of the sectors most affected by these 
structural reforms. In 1992, Colombia’s agriculture entered a profitability crisis due to the 
accelerated and abrupt implementation of these reforms. Also, its situation worsened, 
due to certain factors mentioned earlier. This reaffirmed that Colombia’s agriculture was 
unprepared for this change, and showed that Colombia’s farmers depended on: i) loans 
with subsidized interest rates; ii) the purchase and sale of crops by the IDEMA, and iii) 
support prices.  
In order to solve this situation, the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) implemented 






Sector Agropecuario, hoping: i) to restore the dynamism of the agricultural sector; ii) to 
establish the foundation to capitalize upon and improve the competitiveness of this 
sector; iii) to design a policy for promoting rural development; iv) to promote sustainable 
development in the sector, and v) to upgrade the Department of Agriculture (DNP, 1994). 
The Plan included reforms in 3 areas (Junguito, 1994). In order to support farmers income: 
i) it restored the scheme of supporting prices; ii) it reintroduced the scheme of 
intervention prices; iii) it restored IDEMA’s responsibility to sell, buy, export, import, and 
store products when there existed imbalances in the agricultural market, and iv) it made 
mandatory the absorption of domestic production prior to allowing agricultural imports. 
In order to give funding to farmers: i) it allowed refinancing agricultural loans, when floods, 
droughts or other special events occur, ii) it maintained interest rate subsidies; and iii) it 
maintained the scheme that forced banks to invest in FINAGRO7 securities. In order to 
boost the sector by increasing the availability of public resources, the reforms raised 
resources for investment projects with the creation of the Incentive to Rural 
Capitalization (ICR)8, and increased the resources to fund agriculture subsidies and the 
IDEMA. In other words, the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) reinstituted many policies 
prior to the implementation of this second package of reforms of Colombia’s Structural 
Adjustment program for agriculture (Act No.101, 1993; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito, 
1994). 
                                                     
7 FINAGRO is a second-tier bank in Colombia that provides funding to agriculture through compulsory investments from 
private banks. Its aim is to offer better funding to Colombian farmers and provide access to those farmers turned away 
by private banks  (FINAGRO, 2015b). 
8 This is a capital subsidy that covers up to 40 percent of the total cost of investments in irrigation and drainage funded 






The Samper administration (1994-1998) continued these policies, though its 
agricultural policy gave increased priority to: i) promoting and supporting small farmers, 
poor farmers, and rural women; and ii) helping farmers to solve their profitability crisis by 
using trade policy instruments (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). For instance, this 
administration promoted Procurement Agreements between farmers and industries to 
ensure crop absorption (mainly of grains and oils), by giving to industrialists the chance 
to import at a preferential import tariff. The objective was to ensure for farmers the 
purchase of their crops, and control crop supply to prevent price imbalances. These 
contracts were removed in 2003, due to existing agreements between Colombia and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). Also, this administration 
introduced direct and storage subsidies on sensitive products, import quotas for certain 
cereals, and Competitive Agreements between the government and the agro-
industrialists in order to coordinate actions between farmers and manufacturers for 
certain products (cotton, rice, sorghum, milk, and oilseeds) (Guterman, 2007). In addition, 
this administration eliminated IDEMA and its monopoly in the market, and then approved 
the adoption of a Common External Tariff (CET) that unified Colombia’s price band system 
with other country-members of the Andean Community of Nations (Kalmanovitz & López, 
2003)9.  
The new price band system was called Sistema Andino de Franjas de Precios - SAFP. 
This system is in place today, and its main objective is to stabilize the import price of a set 
                                                     
9 Scandizzo & Arcos (2004) show the inefficiency of having this CET, since it was negotiated following the liberalization 






of crops characterized by marked instability in international markets10. Overall, the SAFP 
works by increasing (decreasing) the ad-valorem tariff when international prices, taken as 
reference prices, are lower (higher) than a floor (ceiling) level (see Figure 7). Also, the 
system charges the CET to the agricultural imports when the reference prices oscillate 
between floor and ceiling level (CAN, 1994)11. This system allows limiting the transmission 
of the high volatility exhibited frequently by the prices of these products in international 
markets to the prices in the domestic market.  
 
 
Figure 7. Operation of the SAFP (Source: CAN, 2015) 
 
These policies were altogether insufficient to boost Colombia’s agriculture during 
the 1990’s. As is shown above, average growth decreased from 2.7% in the 1980’s to 1.5% 
in the 1990’s (see Figure 4 and Table 1). Also, land use for crop cultivation diminished by 
                                                     
10 Crops protected by the SAFP include: i) rice; ii) barley; iii) yellow corn; iv) white corn; v) sugar; vi) soy bean; vii) soy 
oil; viii) wheat; ix) palm oil; x) milk; xi) chicken (leg-quarters); and xii) pork (Tovar et al., 2007). 
11 Ceiling price and floor price are estimated using similar methodologies. Both are calculated as the average of the last 
60 months of reference price for each product, and in the case of the ceiling price, there is an added adjustment factor; 






15.4% (800,000 hectares) during the 1990’s (see Figure 13). The Pastrana administration 
(1998-2002) focused its agricultural policy on the promotion of Colombia’s agricultural 
competitiveness, with a strategy covering 4 areas: i) investing and funding to promote 
investment in the sector; ii) technological development and agricultural health to increase 
the efficiency of farming activity; iii) marketing of agricultural products in domestic and 
external markets; and iv) rural development to encourage small farmers to participate in 
more productive ventures (Villalba, 2002). 
However, the Pastrana administration (1998-2002) could not execute all aspects of 
this policy. Colombia entered a macroeconomic crisis during the late 1990’s. Accordingly, 
this administration focused its attention on economic recovery. Also, it gave priority to 
solve the country’s worsening armed conflict (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). Colombia’s 
agricultural development did not receive much attention during this term, and the main 
achievements of this administration were: i) an expansion of the credit coverage for 
farmers with the Banco Agrario as a replacement of the Caja Agraria, and by raising the 
coverage of the Fondo Agropecuario de Garantias - FAG; ii) the introduction of forward 
contracts through the Bolsa Nacional Agrropecuaria (BNA) in order to stimulate 
investment and reduce uncertainty of agricultural activity, and iii) the promotion of 
perennial crops such as palm oil (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Montero & Casas, 2012; 
Villalba, 2002). 
Under the Uribe-I administration (2002-2006), agricultural policy followed the same 
guidelines, composed of three main components (Cano & Restrepo, 2003). First, rural 






yucca, cotton, palm, cocoa, etc. Second, the improvement of agricultural competitiveness, 
by encouraging investment, diversifying agricultural production, promoting technological 
modernization, and promoting domestic and external trade. Third, the promotion of 
specific activities, such as: i) the development of poultry production; ii) the recovery of 
cotton production; iii) the promotion of planting perennial crops (oil palm, rubber, fruits, 
and cocoa), since these crops were considered an alternative to recover Colombia’s 
agriculture and boost employment; iv) the development of fish and shrimp farming, v) the 
restocking of cattle in special areas; vi) the restructuring and recovery of the coffee sector; 
vii) the modernization of rural technical assistance services; and viii) the development of 
biofuels, among other activities. With these measures, the regime planned to promote, 
encourage, and fund rural development and food security in Colombia. Four principles 
were used as a guide: i) fairness, by promoting the poor’s access to production inputs and 
public services; ii) competitiveness, by upgrading national production, integrating new 
markets, signing regional agreements, and increasing farmers’ income; iii) sustainability, 
by promoting the appropriate use of natural resources; and iv) decentralization, by 
consolidating efficient institutions (Cano & Restrepo, 2003).  
The Uribe-II administration (2006-2010) updated this policy during its second term. 
During this period, this administration focused its agricultural policy on five pillars: i) 
opening new markets for agricultural products by signing Free Trade Agreements with 
countries like the US, and the creation of Agro Ingreso Seguro (AIS), a program designed 
to improve the competitiveness of Colombia’s agriculture and facilitate an adjustment 






agriculture to facilitate access to new markets; iii) expanding access to funding in order 
to continue boosting the sector; iv) reducing  production costs by promoting research and 
the use of transgenic seeds; and v) updating the subsidies scheme to farmers to raise 
protection against all risks (Arias, 2008). Thus, the Uribe-II administration (2006-2010) 
gave priority to the integration of new markets with this agricultural policy, by adopting 
policies with more attainable goals that would increase Colombia’s agriculture 
competitiveness.   
Recently, the Santos administration (2010-2014) designed its agricultural policy 
around 7 axes, although for the purposes of this study four are most notable given their 
special emphasis on promoting the dynamism of agricultural production. The first was to 
increase agricultural competitiveness via: i) promoting efficient use of land, water, etc.; ii) 
improving irrigation infrastructure; and iii) promoting the production and use of quality 
seeds. The second was to generate productive linkages, including transportation and 
marketing modules via: i) improving post-harvest practices; ii) promoting economies of 
scale and reducing intermediation; and iii) reducing freight costs. The third component 
was to diversify domestic and foreign markets. The fourth was to improve risk 
management by: i) promoting better land use; ii) strengthening information systems 









2.3.2 Assessment of Agricultural Policy in Colombia 
As reviewed above, Colombia has instituted a wide variety of policies to promote 
its agricultural sector from 1970-2014. Overall, these policies were designed to stimulate 
agricultural production and guarantee a minimum income level to Colombian farmers. 
Also, their implementation required an active government and constant intervention in 
many markets (agricultural products, agricultural inputs, and agricultural credit) 
(Guterman, 2007). Consequently, Colombia’s agriculture have been subject to many 
market distortions, which have limited its competitiveness in recent decades (Anderson 
& Valdés, 2008). 
While assessing Colombian agricultural policy is not the main purpose of this study, 
establishing which kind of policies have provided more distortions to Colombia’s 
agriculture is important. This allows us to identify the policies that have most limited the 
competitiveness of the sector and, therefore, have prevented Colombia’s agriculture 
from realizing strong gains in productivity. Also, this analysis will identify when 
agricultural productivity growth, the focus in this study, has been determined more by 
institutional factors rather than by market factors, such as input prices or the 
international prices of the commodities. 
This study uses the World Bank methodology, used to evaluate agricultural 
distortions worldwide, to assess agricultural policy in Colombia (Anderson & Valdés, 2008). 
This methodology includes some indicators to recognize the distortions generated by 
agricultural policy, although its main conclusions are based on the Nominal Rate of 






its price at the border, expressed as a percentage of the border price. This captures the 
effects of ad valorem tariffs, variable tariffs, restrictions on imports, and storage subsidies. 
Also, it indicates that agricultural production is highly subsidized when it is positive, 
whereas agricultural production is taxed when it is negative. As long as the NRA moves 
away from 0, agricultural policy is distorted (Anderson & Valdés, 2008). 
This analysis indicates that Colombia has executed a highly distorted agricultural 
policy during the period 1970-2014 (see Figure 8). Despite all efforts to fix these 
distortions with the execution of the second package of reforms of its Structural 
Adjustment program in the early 1990’s, Colombia’s agricultural policy largely remained 
the same. Colombia’s government continued making constant and sizeable market 
interventions to address the high dependency of farmers. Thus, Colombia’s agriculture 
has received preferential treatment in almost all trade reforms to support farmers by 
taxing exportable products and subsidizing importable products (see Figure 9). It is 
believed that these Structural Adjustment reforms, in particular the trade reform, did not 
have a significant impact on Colombia’s agricultural policy, as it only forced the 
government to shift its agricultural policy, based on an import substitution model, to a 
scheme of trade protection with an open economy model (Guterman, 2007). However, 
government intervention continued in this sector, which explains why agricultural policy 
in Colombia has been more distorted than the Latin American average since the 1990’s 








Figure 8. NRA of Colombia versus Latin America (LATAM) (%) 




Figure 9. NRA in Colombia by Exported and Imported Products  
(Source: Anderson & Valdés, 2008) 
 
Over the 1970’s, agricultural policy carried out by the Pastrana administration 
(1970-1974) and the Lopez administration (1974-1978) was largely distorted. These 
administrations taxed agricultural exports (mainly coffee) to collect all extraordinary gains 
resulting from devaluations prompted by the emergency reforms taken by Colombia in 
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additional measures to protect coffee production from volatility in the foreign market, 
since coffee exports represented about 55% of Colombia’s exports12 (J. Cardenas, 1993; 
GRECO, 2002; Ordinance No. 444, 1967). As a result, the price of agricultural products in 
the domestic market tended to be 15% lower than the border prices (see Figure 8). This 
amounted to US$770-830 (constant 2014 prices) in taxes per person engaged in 
agriculture. 
During the 1980’s, this situation changed completely. Due to the Debt crisis and a 
crisis in the world coffee market, commodity prices fell by 30%, in real terms (Dornbusch, 
1989). As a result, coffee exports decreased their share in Colombia’s exports to less than 
30% (Leibovich, 1989). Also, Colombia’s agriculture started to subsidize its imports (wheat, 
rice, maize, sugar, soybeans, and sorghum) by +52.7%, giving farmers direct support by 
covering partially cost of inputs, credit, price supports and guaranteed absorption, among 
others (see Figure 8) (Reina et al., 2011). This way, farmers received a subsidy of about 
US$250 per person engaged in agriculture.  
By the late 1980’s, the distorting effects of this policy faded. The NRA of importable 
products decreased to 26.6% and the NRA of exportable products remained at -9.2%. The 
agricultural policy of the Barco administration (1986-1990) to boost agriculture did not 
distort the sector’s valuation in the same way, since it was surely offset by the rebound 
exhibited by agricultural commodity prices in the world market at the time (IMF, 2015). 
                                                     







However, the poor dynamism of Colombia’s economy explains why this administration 
claimed that Colombia needed the execution of the second package of reforms of its 
Structural Adjustment in order to implement policies more efficiently.   
During the 1990’s, Colombia executed the second package of reforms of its 
Structural Adjustment program, but effects were not expected in the agricultural sector. 
As explained above, this sector was seriously affected due to the reforms’ accelerated 
and abrupt administration, given by Colombia’s government. Colombia’s agriculture fell 
into crisis, forcing policy makers to reverse some of these reforms under the Gaviria 
administration (1990-1994). These measures were highly distorting, and had artificially 
increased the domestic price of imports by 16.7% in the early 1990’s, by 40% in the late 
1990’s, and maintained the prices of exports close to the border prices. Also, these 
reforms had a minimal impact on improving sector competitiveness, since they promoted 
trade defense mechanisms to insulate producers from international markets. In addition, 
these measures encouraged very little creation of attractive environments for 
productivity and private investment; they did not allow Colombia to promote a 
reallocation of productive resources from imports to exports (Anderson & Valdés, 2008; 
Reina et al., 2011).  
Over the 2000’s, agricultural policy in Colombia became increasingly distorted. The 
NRA increased to 26%. It was designed with a paternalistic objective, despite its negative 
effect on Colombia’s competitiveness. The NRA of importable products reached 46.2%, 
due to Colombia’s: i) frequent suspension of the SAFP for some products (milk, corn, etc.); 






industrialists to import cheap commodities with the purchase of domestic products (corn, 
rice, soybean), and iii) introduction of the AIS to protect the products most likely to be 
affected by signing a Free Trade Agreement with the US (Jaramillo & Jimenez, 2008). 
Likewise, the NRA for exported products increased to 26%, because the government: i) 
gave price support to coffee producers, called the AGC, to help them face the downturn 
of international prices exhibited in the early 2000’s, and ii) gave special tax treatment to 
the producers of perennials (Jaramillo & Jimenez, 2008). Colombia’s policy makers 
continued designing policies to protect the sector, paying little attention to implementing 
policies with the purpose of increasing agriculture productivity. 
Although, NRA estimates for Colombia in more recent years are not yet available, 
evidence suggests that Colombian agricultural policy has continued much the same. 
Junguito et al., (2014) indicate that Colombia’s agriculture continues exhibiting the same 
bottlenecks (explained later in this chapter). Also, that study states that Colombia 
continues with problems with its current aid structures, agricultural trade policy, and the 
allocation of public sector spending. The result is an imbalance in the distribution of rural 
rents, which distorts resource allocation and inhibits the development of productive 
alternatives. In addition, the proper conditions for higher and sustainable growth have 
not been met. Colombia’s agricultural policy continually faces the same historical 







2.4 Main Facts about of Colombia’s Agriculture 
2.4.1 Land Use 
During the last two decades, land use for Colombia’s agriculture decreased from 45 
million hectares in the 1990’s to  42-44 million hectares in the 2000’s (see Figure 10) (DNP, 
2015; FAO, 2015). However, its distribution among agricultural activities has changed very 
little. Most of Colombia’s agricultural land continued being used as permanent meadows 
and pastures to feed livestock (88% of the total), followed by the land used for perennial 
crops (5%-7%) and annual crops (4%-5%) (see Figure 11). Nevertheless, land usage 
decreased to 92% of the total agricultural land in 2001. The intensification of armed 
conflict in Colombia in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s prompted many people to leave 
rural areas and this seemingly caused a reduction of about 6% in land used as permanent 
meadows and pastures. This was also a disincentive to investment (Alban, 2011; DNP, 
2002; FAO, 2000; Montero & Casas, 2012). Then, land use increased slightly to 98% in 
2012, with the recovery of the livestock sector and expansion of land used to cultivate 
perennial crops (+24%). In any case, agricultural land remains highly concentrated in the 
production of livestock, and the main change was an increase in land used to cultivate 







Figure 10. Agricultural Land Used in Colombia (Million Hectares)  




Figure 11. Land Use Distribution by Agricultural Activity  
(Source: Estimates based on DNP, 2015; FAO, 2015) 
 
Permanent meadow and pasture areas decreased by 6% during the 1990’s. This 
land diminished from 40.1 million hectares in 1990 to 37.6 million hectares in 2001 due 






























































































































































































meadows and pastures increased by 5% to 39.2 million hectares during the 2000’s as a 
result of: i) the security policy of the Uribe administration (2002-2010) (DNP, 2002, 2006); 
ii) the return of this land to its production equilibrium level, and ii) strong beef exports to 
Venezuela (Montero & Casas, 2012). This indicates that land used as permanent meadows 
and pastures exhibited a structural change between the 1990’and the 2000s, mainly due 
to the worsening armed conflict in Colombia. Notice that Colombia has not been able to 
fully recover land use levels from the 1990’s since 2001.  
 
 
Figure 12. Land Used by Permanent Meadows and Pastures (Million Hectares)  
(Source: Estimates based on DNP, 2015; FAO, 2015) 
 
 
Land used to cultivate agricultural products exhibited a “u” trend from 1990-2014 
(see Figure 13). It decreased by 15.4% in the 1990’s from 4.8 million hectares in 1990 to 
4.1 million hectares in 2000, because Colombia’s agriculture exhibited a profitability crisis 










































































































& López, 2003). However, annual crop farmers were the most affected; their land used 
declined by 37% from 2.5 million hectares in 1990 to 1.6 million hectares in 2000 (C. F. 
Jaramillo, 1998).  
This situation completely changed during the 2000’s. Land used to cultivate 
agricultural products increased by 15.3% in the 2000’s from 4.1 million hectares in 2000 
to 4.8 million hectares in 2012, since: i) openness of Colombia’s economy promoted a 
reallocation of resources toward the cultivation of perennial crops; and ii) the Uribe-I 
administration (2002-2006) carried out a set of policies to solve the security problems of 
the late 1990’s and to boost the cultivation of perennial crops (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; 
Montero & Casas, 2012). This way, land used to cultivate perennial crops rose by 24% 
from 2.5 million hectares in 2001 to 3.1 million hectares in 2012.     
 
Figure 13. Land Used by Agricultural Crops (Million Hectares)  











































































As Table 2 shows, land used to cultivate perennial crops grew by 33% during the 
2000’s, from almost 2.4 million hectares in 2002 to 3.1 million hectares in 2012. This 
growth was related to greater expansion in land used to cultivate palm oil (+144%), 
plantains (59%) and fruits (76%). Land used to cultivate palm increased from 185,165 
hectares in 2002 to 452,435 hectares in 2012, mainly due to government policy that 
encouraged the use of palm oil to produce biodiesel in Colombia (COMPITE, 2008). 
Likewise, land used to cultivate plantains increased from 280,000 hectares in 2002 to 
445,580 hectares in 2012, due to higher domestic consumption, higher demand from 
industry to produce snacks, meals and frozen plantains, and to substitute for non-
profitable activities, such as coffee in certain regions (MADR, 2005c; Montero & Casas, 
2012). In addition, land used to cultivate fruits increased from 189,410 hectares in 2002 
to 333,640 hectares in 2012, due to higher domestic and external demands and higher 
investments in this sector (ANIF, 2014; Montero & Casas, 2012). Also, it worth noting that 
land to cultivate flowers, one of the most important exportable products, remained stable 
around 6.200-6.500 hectares during this decade. Nevertheless, coffee remains the main 
perennial crop cultivated in Colombia during the last two decades, involving around 
930,000 hectares in 2012 (30% of perennial crop land), followed by palm oil, which used 
452,000 hectares (14%) in that year, plantains with 445,000 hectares (14%), and fruits 
with 333,000 hectares (11%). Thus, although coffee continues to be the main perennial 
crop cultivated in Colombia, others such as palm oil, plantains and fruit have increased 
due to higher demand, higher investments in these sectors, and governmental policies 






Table 2. Land Use for Main Perennial Crops Cultivated in Colombia (Hectares) 
(Source: DNP, 2015)  
 
  1990 1998 2002 2012 
Coffee     951,000      864,000      865,142      931,040  
Palm oil     108,040      145,026      185,165      452,435  
Plantain     390,824      393,044      280,033      445,584  
Fruits       70,843      134,278      189,408      333,637  
Yucca     223,541      184,508      171,936      230,161  
Panela Cane     213,275      222,839      257,469      239,200  
Sugar Cane     152,427      196,276      205,456      224,144  
Others     202,219      202,641      206,063      290,896  
Total  2,312,169   2,342,612   2,360,672   3,147,097  
 
In contrast, land used to cultivate annual crops fell 37% during the 1990’s, from 2.5 
million hectares in 1990 to 1.4 million hectares in 1998, due to a sharp decline in the land 
used to cultivate corn. These lands decreased by 45% over this period, from 836,900 
hectares in 1990 to 461,490 hectares in 1998, due to the profitability crisis suffered by 
Colombia’s agriculture during this period (see Table 3) (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998). Afterwards, 
land used to cultivate annual crops remained stable at around 1.4-1.6 million hectares 
during the 2000s. However, land used to cultivate corn increased by 10% to 607,800 
hectares over the period 2002-2012, and land to cultivate rice expanded by 9% to 502,000 
hectares, due to: i) government subsidies given to these products over this period; ii) 
higher commodity prices, and iii) the use of better seeds to increase yield per hectare 
(COMPITE, 2008). Thus, overall annual crop cultivation decreased during the 1990’s. 
These products were the most affected by Colombia’s agricultural crisis. Then, this 
situation improved during the 2000’s, due to the better conditions these farmers faced 






Table 3. Land Use for Main Annual Crops Cultivated in Colombia (Hectares)  
(Source: DNP, 2015)  
 1990 1998 2002 2012 
Corn 836,900 461,491 554,850 607,800 
Rice 521,100 490,833 458,758 501,971 
Potatoes 161,350 95,477 121,737 155,940 
Others 989,993 396,466 393,111 340,149 
Total 2,509,343 1,444,267 1,528,456 1,605,859 
 
 
2.4.2 Agricultural Production 
Production of agricultural crops in Colombia stagnated at around 20 million tons 
during the 1990s. Although perennial crop production increased by 28% from 10.9 million 
tons in 1990 to 13.9 million tons in 2000, annual crop production decreased by 17% from 
9.1 million tons to 7.6 million tons over this period, since these crops were the most 
affected by Colombia’s 1990s agricultural crisis (see Figure 14) (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998). Thus, 
this situation changed the composition of Colombia’s agricultural production. Perennial 
crop production increased its share of total crop production from 54% in 1990 to 65% in 
2000, while annual crop production decreased its share from 46% to 35% (see Figure 15). 
During the 2000s, agricultural crop production in Colombia resumed its dynamism 
from earlier to the 1990’s. It expanded by 12.8% during this decade, from 21.5 million 
tons in 2000 to 24.3 million tons in 2012. Production of perennial crops increased by 15.3% 
over these years, and production of annual crops remained stable at around 7.7 million 
tons. Some key factors to explain this dynamism of Colombia’s agriculture at the time 
were: i) higher investment in perennial crops with a comparative advantage; ii) the tax 






iii) the security policy implemented by the Uribe-I administration (2002-2006) to face the 
worsening armed conflict (DNP, 2002); iv) the adoption of new technology to raise the 
yield per hectare; and v) the development and usage of genetically modified seeds 
(Montero & Casas, 2012). Thus, these features allowed Colombia to expand its 
agricultural production during the 2000’s.  
 
Figure 14. Production of Agricultural Crops (Million Tons)  




Figure 15. Composition of Colombia’s Agriculture Production by Crop Type  


































































































































As Table 4 shows, perennial crop production expanded steadily by 52% from 1990-
2012. It increased from 10.9 million tons in 1990 to 16.6 million tons in 2012, due to sharp 
increases of fruit production (+200%), as well as bananas (+58%), plantains (+28%), and 
sugar (+24%). Fruit production increased from 1.2 million tons in 1990 to 3.6 million tons 
in 2012, and plantain production grew from 2.5 million tons to 3.2 million tons, due to the 
increase in the land cultivated with these products. Banana production increased from 1 
million tons in 1990 to 1.6 million tons in 2012, due to higher yield per hectare and a 
decrease in violence in producing zones (Montero & Casas, 2012). Likewise, sugar 
production increased from 1.7 million tons in 1990 to 2.1 million tons, although it then 
declined during the 2000s due to sugar cane use in ethanol production (Tovar et al., 2007). 
In addition, production of flower, which was mainly for exporting (more than 90%), 
increased from 107.000 tons in 1990 to 215.000 tons in 2012 due to: i) higher productivity 
resulting from reallocation of varieties according to climate change conditions; ii) the 
cultivation of more profitable varieties; and iii) the consolidation of new markets 
(Arbeláez, 1993; Becerra, 2009). Thus, this indicates that Colombia increased its perennial 
crop production in recent decades, although the most dynamic products (fruits and 










Table 4. Production of Main Perennial Crops Cultivated in Colombia (Tons) 
(Source: DNP, 2015)  
  1990 1998 2002 2012 
Fruits 1,172,500 2,439,974 2,577,935 3,557,680 
Plantain 2,502,168 2,560,245 2,853,907 3,202,674 
Yucca 1,939,019 1,598,166 1,834,856 2,217,949 
Sugar 1,669,386 2,200,544 2,528,756 2,077,653 
Banana 1,018,431 1,424,672 1,413,322 1,609,144 
Others* 2,576,187 3,089,479 3,313,817 3,894,052 
Total 10,877,692 13,313,080 14,522,592 16,559,152 




In contrast, the production of annual crops contracted by 36% during the 1990’s 
due to the difficulties that farmers faced during these years (see Table 5). It decreased 
from 9.1 million tons in 1990 to 5.8 million tons in 1998, mainly due to sharp drops in 
potato (-55%), corn (-36.7%), and vegetable production (-33.2%). Potato production 
decreased from 2.5 million tons in 1990 to 1.1 million tons in 1998, and vegetable 
production from almost 1.3 million tons to 860,000 tons due to severe droughts in 1991-
1994 and 1997-1998 and crops lack of technological cultivation practices (Australian 
Government, 2015; Montero & Casas, 2012). Finally, corn production decreased from 1.2 
million tons in 1990 to 770,000 tons in 1998, since farmers experienced the profitability 
crisis and were most affected by Colombia’s agricultural crisis of this period (C. F. Jaramillo, 
1998). Therefore, annual crop production declined during the 90s, mostly due to the 
profitability crisis faced by farmers, extreme climate conditions, and decreased land use.   
As was the case with land used by annual crops, production stabilized and increased 
by 5% during the 2000’s, mainly because vegetable production increased by 40.9% over 






expansion in land used (+40%), better farming practices, higher yield per hectare, and 
higher investment in research during earlier years (La Republica, 2012; SIC, 2012). 
Without these gains in production practices, annual crops production wouldn’t have 
increased, since rice production actually decreased slightly, by 6.3% to 2.3 million tons in 
2012, and corn production remained stable at around 1.1-1.2 million tons. Thus, annual 
crop production showed a solid expansion during the 2000s, but it was largely explained 
by growth in vegetable production.  
 
Table 5. Production of Main Annual Crops Cultivated in Colombia (Tons) (Source: 
DNP, 2015)  
  1990 1998 2002 2012 
Rice 2,473,237 2,604,259 2,473,731 2,317,710 
Potatoes 2,464,400 1,108,770 1,761,057 1,847,145 
Vegetables 1,284,800 858,512 1,360,386 1,916,136 
Corn 1,211,500 767,115 1,132,067 1,211,002 
Others 1,685,695 497,407 610,599 410,785 
 Total 9,119,632 5,836,062 7,337,840 7,702,778 
*This category includes the production of crops with less than 10% weight in the total production in 
2012. 
 
Finally, the production of animal products in Colombia exhibited a sharp and steady 
expansion during 1990-2012. These figures multiplied by 2 from 1.1 million tons in 1990 
to 2.3 million tons in 2012, due to rapid growth of the poultry sector (which multiplied by 
4). As Figure 16 shows, chicken production increased from 276,630 tons in 1990 to 1.1 
million tons in 2012, since: i) input prices to feed the animals (corn, sorghum and soybean) 
decreased as a result of the Structural Adjustment reforms executed during early 1990’s 






from 8kg a year in 1990 to 24kg a year in 2012 (FENAVI, 2015); and iii) the sector started 
to use more efficient practices for production (Mojica & Paredes, 2005). Likewise, beef 
production increased by 23% during the same period, from 796,000 tons in 1990 to almost 
979,000 tons in 2012, due to: i) high investments in the sector during the late 1990s; and 
ii) high volumes exported to Venezuela during the 2000s (DANE, 2015). Finally, pork 
production multiplied by 2 during the 2000s, from 116,500 tons in 1997 to 243,000 tons 
in 2012, since: i) pork production continued formalizing during this period (ANIF, 2013a); 
ii) Colombia’s population increased and per capita consumption increased from 3.3kg a 
year in 1995 to 6kg a year in 2012; iii) production ceased to be seasonal (ANIF, 2013a), 
and iv) pork production was bolstered by the drop in cereal prices. Thus, the composition 
of meat production in Colombia changed sharply in recent decades (see Figure 17). While 
beef was the most produced meat in Colombia, with a 74% share of the total in the early 
1990’s, chicken took its place in recent years with a 48% share in 2012, followed by beef 
with 42% and pork with the remaining 10%. Thus, the production of animal products in 
Colombia has increased steadily in recent decades, though it shows a change in the 








Figure 16. Production of Animal Products in Colombia (Tons)  




Figure 17. Composition of Meat Production in Colombia  

































































































































2.4.3 Value of Agricultural Production 
Colombia expanded the value of its agricultural production from US$9.8 billion 
(constant 2004-2006 prices) in 1990 to US$14.8 billion in 2013, an increase of about 50% 
(see Figure 18). Also, Colombia expanded its value per capita from US$285 in 1990 to 
US$310 in 2013. However, this expansion occurred in three different stages. Also, this 
expansion was not accompanied by a diversification of the main agricultural products of 
Colombia’s portfolio, although some new products arose and their share quickly 
increased in the value of Colombia’s agricultural production (e.g. chicken, citrus fruits and 
eggs).     
 
Figure 18. Value of Agricultural Production in Colombia                                                   
(Constant 2004-2006 Prices, US$ Billions) (Source: FAO, 2015) 
 
During 1990-1998, the value of Colombia’s agricultural production increased from 
US$9.8 billion to US$10.7 billion, due to: i) a sharp increase in poultry production (+70%), 
as a result of a decrease in the import taxes of corn and soybeans, a higher consumption 


































































(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Mojica & Paredes, 2005); ii) high performance exhibited by 
milk production, since its value increased by 38.5% over this period as a result of 
innovations in feeding and management of livestock, genetic improvements, and the 
purchase of highly productive species (MADR, 2005b); and iii) the dynamics of sugar cane 
production, which increased in value by 19% with the introduction of mechanized 
harvesting practices, the modernization of production processes and equipment and 
machinery, and its inclusion as a product covered by the SAFP (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; 
Ramirez & Garcia, 2006). However, the overall value of agricultural production changed 
little during this period (see Table 6). Beef continued to generate more value in 
agricultural production (20%) in 1998, followed by milk (17%), sugar cane (10%), and 
coffee (8%). Also, Colombia was able to expand the value of its agricultural production 
during the 90’s, despite the period’s agricultural crisis. 
 
Table 6. Value of Agricultural Production in Colombia (1990-1998)                               
(Constant 2004-2006 Prices, US$ Billions, %) (Source: FAO, 2015) 
 1990  1998 
 Value (US$ billions) %  Value (US$ billions) % 
Beef                          2,000,000  20.5%                           2,100,000  19.5% 
Milk                          1,300,000  13.3%                           1,800,000  16.8% 
Sugar cane                             912,564  9.3%                           1,100,000  10.2% 
Coffee                             907,834  9.3%                              824,013  7.7% 
Rice                             589,812  6.0%                              528,824  4.9% 
Plantains                             519,428  5.3%                              528,367  4.9% 
Chicken                             423,509  4.3%                              719,635  6.7% 
Potatoes                             415,944  4.3%                              429,921  4.0% 
Bananas                             350,240  3.6%                              427,649  4.0% 
Others                       2,352,176 24.1%                           2,285,501  21.3% 







Over the years 1998-2008, the value of Colombia’s agricultural production exhibited 
its most dynamic period. It grew by 33%, from US$10.7 billion to US$14.3 billion, mainly 
due to: i) the great dynamism that poultry and milk production continued exhibiting; their 
values expanded by 95% and 28%, respectively; ii) the dynamic of cattle production (+19% 
over this period), given large investments in new herds and technology (mainly in dual-
purpose livestock) in the late 1990’s, and higher prices of livestock in the 2000’s because 
of an export boom to Venezuela (Clavijo & Jimenez, 2010; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998); iii) the 
rapid dynamic of citrus fruit production; its value increased by 18, as a result of the 
growing demand for these products in Colombia (MADR, 2005a; Tovar et al., 2007); iv) an 
outstanding pace for cereals, due to higher agricultural prices worldwide during 2006-
2011, and the development of seeds to increase yield per hectare (COMPITE, 2008); and 
v) good performance exhibited by palm oil production; its value increased by 83% due to 
a government policy that encouraged its production as a biodiesel ingredient (COMPITE, 
2008). As a result, the value of agricultural production exhibited a more significant change 
during this period (see Table 7). Beef and milk generated the most value to agricultural 
production in Colombia; however, both lost importance during the 2000s. Chicken most 
increased its relevance from 7% in 1998 to 10%, while sugar cane production dropped 
(10% in 1998 to 8% in 2008) due to limited land expansion (ANIF, 2013b). In addition, 
citrus fruits and eggs emerged as new important products, leading to a decrease in the 
importance of more traditional products, such as coffee and potatoes. Thus, the value of 
agricultural production in Colombia was increasing during the 2000’s. Also, Colombia 






Table 7. Value of Agricultural Production in Colombia (1998-2008)                              
(Constant 2004-2006 Prices, US$ Billions, %) (Source: FAO, 2015) 
 
  1998   2008 
  Value (US$ billion) %  Value (US$ billion) % 
Beef                          2,100,000  19.5%                           2,500,000  17.5% 
Milk                          1,800,000  16.8%                           2,300,000  16.1% 
Sugar cane                          1,100,000  10.2%                           1,100,000  7.7% 
Coffee                             824,013  7.7%                              739,890  5.2% 
Rice                             528,824  4.9%                              672,365  4.7% 
Plantains                             528,367  4.9%                              697,775  4.9% 
Chicken                             719,635  6.7%                           1,400,000  9.8% 
Potatoes                             429,921  4.0%                              400,494  2.8% 
Bananas                             427,649  4.0%                              559,771  3.9% 
Eggs                             299,931  2.8%                              449,777  3.1% 
Citrus fruit                             298,356  2.8%                              351,818  2.5% 
Others                          1,687,214  15.7%                           3,128,539  21.9% 
TOTAL                       10,743,910  100.0%                         14,300,429  100.0% 
 
 
Finally, the value of Colombia’s agricultural production has almost stagnated during 
recent years, due to a new profitability crisis (Clavijo, Vera, & Jimenez, 2014). It grew by 
only 3.4%, from US$14.3 billion in 2008 to US$14.8 billion in 2013 (see Table 8), due to: i) 
domestic imbalances in some commodity markets (such as rice) for which supply was 
higher than production; ii) a sharp decrease in international prices; iii) Venezuelan market 
closures; iv) high fertilizer prices; v) climate change effects; and vi) high transportation 
cost, due to Colombia’s lagging infrastructure networks (Clavijo, Vera, & Jimenez, 2014). 
As a result, poultry and pork were among the few sectors that were improving over this 
period; these sectors experienced a sharp cut in production costs, due to the downturn 
of commodity prices and higher consumption per capita in Colombia for these meats. In 
contrast, milk, beef and rice were the most affected, resulting in a lower contribution in 






Table 8. Value of Agricultural Production in Colombia (2008-2013)                              
(Constant 2004-2006 Prices, US$ Billions, %) (Source: FAO, 2015) 
  2008  2013 
  Value (US$ billion) %  Value (US$ billion) % 
Beef                          2,500,000  17.5%                           2,400,000  16.2% 
Milk                          2,300,000  16.1%                           2,000,000  13.5% 
Chicken                          1,400,000  9.8%                           1,800,000  12.2% 
Sugar cane                          1,100,000  7.7%                           1,100,000  7.4% 
Coffee                             739,890  5.2%                              701,729  4.7% 
Plantains                             697,775  4.9%                              682,703  4.6% 
Bananas                             559,771  3.9%                              591,038  4.0% 
Rice                             672,365  4.7%                              570,957  3.9% 
Eggs                             449,777  3.1%                              553,741  3.7% 
Potatoes                             400,494  2.8%                              359,389  2.4% 
Citrus fruit                             351,818  2.5%                              294,329  2.0% 
Others                          3,128,539  21.9%                           3,733,701  25.2% 
TOTAL                       14,300,429  100.0%                         14,787,587  100.0% 
 
 
2.4.4 International Trade in Agriculture 
2.4.4.1 Agricultural Exports 
Colombia nearly doubled its agricultural exports in recent decades. Export value 
increased from US$3.6 billion in 1970 to US$6.5 billion in 2012 (constant 2014 prices) (see 
Figure 19). However, this dynamism was strongly dependent on coffee market conditions. 
Colombia exported mostly coffee for many years, and the exports of other products were 
marginal (see Table 9). Over the 1970’s-1980’s, coffee exports represented about 70%-
80% of Colombia’s agricultural exports, followed by cattle (6.0%), cotton (5.0%) and sugar 
(3.7%) in the 1970’s, and bananas (7.6%) and flowers (6.1%) in the 1980’s. During the 
1990’s, coffee exports started to decrease in importance, averaging 50%-55% of 






expanding as a result of better exchange-rate conditions and the development and 
cultivation of more productive varieties. Finally, during the 2000’s, the value of coffee 
exports continued decreasing in importance to just 30%. Flowers (21.5%), bananas, 
(12.3%) and sugar (10.9%) exports continued gaining relevance. Thus, there is no doubt 
that the change in coffee exports had a direct effect on the Colombia’s agricultural 
exports during the last decades, but this has been changing once again in recent years.  




Colombia's agricultural exports exhibited strong expansion during the 1970’s. These 
increased from US$3.6 billion in the early 1970’s to US$8.6 billion in the late 1970’s, due 
to a coffee boom caused by severe frost in Brazilian coffee regions (see Figure 19) (GRECO, 
2002). This raised coffee prices to levels close to US$3/lb (versus its historical average of 
US$1/lb), which increased the value of coffee exports from US$2.8 billion in 1970 to 
Coffee Flowers Bananas Sugar Cattle Cotton
70's 74.3% 1.5% 2.8% 3.7% 6.0% 5.0%
80's 74.1% 6.1% 7.6% 2.9% 1.0% 2.2%
90's 52.3% 14.3% 14.6% 6.9% 0.4% 0.8%
















US$7.2 billion in 1978. Hence, Colombia’s agricultural exports exhibited a boom in the 
late 1970’s, despite the fact that the coffee volume exported did not show a sharp 
increase at the time (GRECO, 2002). These volumes remained around 9-12 million bags 
(60Kg each), since these were limited by the agreed upon quotas between coffee 
exporters and importers under the International Coffee Quota Pact (ICQP) (Bohman & 
Jarvis, 1990; FEDECAFE, 2015)13.  
 
Figure 19: Colombia’s Agricultural Exports                                                                                     
(Constant 2014 Prices, US$ Billion) (Source: FAO, 2015) 
 
This situation changed in the early 1980’s. Colombia’s agricultural exports exhibited 
a downturn to almost US$5 billion in 1985, due to the Debt and coffee crises (see Figure 
19). In 1986, this drop halted temporarily, and agricultural exports increased to US$7.8 
billion, due to a new coffee boom resulting from another frost in Brazil (GRECO, 2002; 
                                                     
13 Under this Pact, coffee exporters committed themselves to regulate their exports under a system of production 
quotas, while importers committed themselves to buy it. The aim was to stabilize coffee prices worldwide (Bohman & 










































































































Leibovich, 1989). However, its effect only lasted for that year. So, Colombia’s agricultural 
exports started to fall again in 1987, reaching US$4.4 billion in 1989, since coffee prices 
continued decreasing during this period. These fell from US$2.1-2.4/lb in 1986 to US$0.7-
0.9/lb in 1989, due in part to high uncertainty about the renewal of the ICQP (IMF, 2015). 
Over the 1990’s, Colombia's agricultural exports continued losing pace. Export value 
bottomed out at US$3.9 billion in 1993, due to: i) coffee prices decreased by 30% between 
1990-1992 as a consequence of the elimination of ICQP and historically high coffee 
production in Colombia (18 million bags versus a historical average of 12 million bags); 
and ii) a real appreciation (+15%) of the Colombian Peso between 1990 and 1993 (BANREP, 
2015; FEDECAFE, 2015). Agricultural exports expanded and stabilized around US$5-6 
billion until 1997, due to the dynamism shown by flowers (6.4% yearly) and bananas 
exports (2.1%) from 1993-1997. Flowers exports increased from US$640 million in 1993 
to US$820 million in 1997, due to: i) a strong nominal depreciation (+45%) of the 
Colombian peso against the USD dollar during this period; ii) an expansion of cultivated 
area; iii) higher productivity per hectare resulting from reallocation of the varieties 
according to climate conditions; iv) the cultivation of more profitable varieties (such as 
roses); v) higher competence in the market, and vi) the consolidation of new markets 
(Arbeláez, 1993; Becerra, 2009). Likewise, banana exports increased from US$695 million 
in 1993 to US$740 million in 1997, due to: i) expansion of European consumption; ii) 
higher productivity per hectare; iii) greater abundance of unskilled labor; and iv) a strong 






Finally, Colombia's agricultural exports strongly expanded during the 2000’s. These 
increased from US$4 billion in 2000 to US$6.5 billion in 2012, due to the fact that 
agricultural commodity prices exhibited a boom during this decade; flowers and bananas 
also exhibited higher prices. Colombia’s agricultural exports successfully faced the strong 
real appreciation exhibited by the Colombian peso during this decade, since coffee export 
value increased by 92% from US$1 billion in 2002 to almost US$2 billion in 2012, due to 
in higher prices; flower exports increased by 51% from US$890 million to US$1.4 billion 
in the same period, and banana exports increased by 50% from US$530 million to almost 
US$800 million.  
2.4.4.2 Agricultural Imports 
Colombia's agricultural imports were strongly determined by the economic 
liberalization carried out in the early 1990’s. Over the 1970’s and 1980’s, before Colombia 
executed this process, imports value remained stable around US$900 million (see Figure 
20). Import substitution policies in force at that time were used to control agricultural 
imports, since importable products (cereals, livestock product, and dairy) were largely 
produced domestically and were considered as key food sources for urban centers in the 
future. These policies only allowed large imports of wheat (20-25% of the total imports) 
and limited imports of soybean oil (5.9%), tallow (5.8%), rubber (4.6), milk (4%) and barley 
(3.7%) in the 1970’s, and soybean oil (9.6%), soybeans (5.6%), rubber (4.2%) and tallow 







Figure 20. Colombia’s Agricultural Imports                                                                                     
(Constant 2014 Prices, US$ Billion) (Source: FAO, 2015) 
 
Over the 1990’s, agricultural imports exhibited a sharp increase. These increased 
from US$660 million in 1990 to almost US$2 billion, following the Structural Adjustment’s 
trade reform, which removed almost all constraints to importing agricultural products. 
Colombia’s exposure to foreign agricultural competitiveness increased suddenly, and a 
problem was the poor preparation (Illera, 2009). As a result, cereal imports expanded, 
despite the efforts to control these with the SAFP. Therefore, the lower competitiveness 
that Colombia exhibited in the cultivation of these crops was evident, since the yield per 
hectare on these crops was insufficient to offset higher imports. Wheat imports continued 
being most important (16.2% of Colombia’s agricultural imports), followed by the imports 
of maize (11.6%), soybean cake (5%), soybean oil (4.3%), soybeans (4.1%), and cotton 
(3.7%) (see Table 10). 
Finally, during the 2000’s, agricultural imports continued growing quickly in 



































































































Franjas de Precios – SAFP. These increased from US$1.8 billion in the 2000 to US$6 billion 
in the 2012, since: i) Colombia’s production of cereals was still unable to meet domestic 
demand (FENALCE, 2015); ii) agricultural commodity prices exhibited a boom during the 
period 2006-2011 (Abbott et al., 2008; Reina et al., 2011), increasing the value of these 
imports; and iii) poultry and pork industries continued expanding quickly during the 
2000’s, resulting in a steady increase in demand for feed grains. Consequently, maize 
imports became most important (18.3%) during the 2000’s, followed by the imports of 
wheat (11.4%), soybean cake (7.8%), soybean oil (5%), soybeans (4.9%), and cotton (3.2%). 
Colombia continued its dependence on cereal imports to meet this demand, despite 
farmers’ efforts to increase the yield per hectare in the production of these crops and its 
increasing domestic demand (see Table 10).    
  
Table 10. Main Importable Agricultural Products to Colombia (% of Total)  







Soybeans Cotton Barley Rubber Milk Tallow
70's 24.5% 2.6% 0.1% 5.9% 1.2% 1.7% 3.7% 4.6% 4.0% 5.8%
80's 23.6% 1.8% 0.4% 9.6% 5.6% 0.4% 3.4% 4.2% 2.6% 4.0%
90's 16.2% 11.6% 5.0% 4.3% 4.1% 3.7% 2.9% 2.5% 0.5% 2.0%














2.5 Main Problems for Colombia’s Agriculture  
It is clear that Colombia’s agriculture has exhibited sluggish and stagnant growth in 
recent decades, due to its low competitiveness. One of the main causes of this has been 
a lack of public resources for Colombia’s agriculture. In recent decades, these resources 
have just represented 0.2%-0.4% of Colombian GDP, while in other emerging markets 
have reached 1%, and in 4% developed countries (Junguito et al., 2014) (see Figure 21). 
 
 
Figure 21. Public Resources for Colombia’s Agriculture (1990-2014) (Source: Estimates 
based on: World Bank, 2016; DNP, 2015)  
 
 
In order to know what exactly has determined this situation, COMPITE (2008) 
applied the methodology of bottlenecks for growth to Colombia's agriculture sector 
(Hausmann, Rodrik, & Velasco, 2008). The approach allows us to see that Colombia’s 
agriculture exhibits a set of bottlenecks that impede its growth, such as: i) insecurity due 
to an armed conflict; ii) uncertainty of property rights; iii) inadequate infrastructure; iv) 




















































































































of these bottlenecks restrict Colombia’s agricultural growth more than others. Thus, it is 
essential to identify and analyze these bottlenecks in order to understand why Colombia’s 
agriculture has exhibited this poor performance. 
COMPITE (2008) found that the main bottlenecks that determine low investments 
in Colombia’s agriculture, and therefore cause its slow growth, are: i) low expected 
returns of projects developed in this sector, and ii) funding problems to develop projects 
in this sector. COMPITE (2008) found that each of these bottlenecks are explained by 
other factors (see Figure 22). For instance, low expected returns are mainly due to lacking 
human-capital in the sector, land misallocation, minimal exploitation of economies of 
scale, poor infrastructure (transport and irrigation), and lack of access to external markets. 
Also, funding problems are more associated with the fact that credit to Colombia’s 
agriculture is segmented and restricted (Cuevas et al., 2003). This is because agriculture 
exhibits more inherent risks for loans than do other sectors; these risks include weather, 
pests, volatile commodity prices and their high incidence in domestic prices, and volatility 
of border prices due also to changes in exchange rate. Thus, COMPITE (2008) suggests 
that Colombia’s agriculture will improve its performance in the future if its agricultural 
policy is designed to address and solve these bottlenecks. These efforts will allow 







Figure 22. Bottlenecks Present in Colombia’s Agriculture (Source: COMPITE, 2008)  
 
2.5.1 Low Expected Returns 
2.5.1.1 Low Returns 
COMPITE (2008) argues that Colombia’s agriculture exhibits low expected returns, 
due to the low returns this sector generates and problems related to land ownership. 
These low returns are due to a lack of human-capital in the sector, land misallocation, 
minimal exploitation of the economies of scale, poor infrastructure (transport and 
irrigation), and lack of access to external markets; land ownership problems are more 
attributable to violence and security problems. The following are the detailed analyses of 


















































2.5.1.1.1 Human Capital 
Colombia exhibits low levels to human-capital due to three factors (COMPITE, 2008). 
First, the low education levels of the rural communities (older than 15 years). This 
population only attend school for five years on average (the elementary school term), and 
this rate has only increased 3 years during 1970-2014 (see Figure 23). Second, a low 
enrollment in careers related to agriculture (2%), because wages in this field are typically 
low14 (see Figure 24). Third, a decline in the ratio of investment in R&D for agriculture to 
total public resources for agriculture from 28% in 2002 to 13% in 201415, due to the fact 
that government spending on direct subsidies given to farmers increased from 37% to 48% 
in this period (see Figure 25). Thus, these three factors have impeded Colombia's 
agriculture from the potential for abundant human capital that would boost its 
competitiveness (Reina et al., 2011).  
 
Figure 23. Average Years of School Attendance in Colombia (Source: DANE, 2015; DNP, 
2015) 
                                                     
14 About 65% of workers in rural areas receive less than minimum wage (COMPITE, 2008). 































































Figure 24. University Degrees Awarded by Field in 2013  
(Source: Estimates based on SNIES, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 25. Public Resources for Colombia’s Agriculture by Program Type                                    

























































































































































2.5.1.1.2 Land Use 
Colombia exhibits mainly two problems regarding its land use (COMPITE, 2008). 
Colombia exhibits land misallocation, since most of its agricultural land is used as pasture 
and forage to feed livestock. This activity used more than 30 million hectares in 2013, 
while IGAC-Corpoica estimates that this activity should only use about 10 million hectares 
(see Figure 26) (COMPITE, 2008; DNP, 2007). As a result, land used to cultivate agricultural 
products remains below its optimal usage as determined by IGAC-Corpoica (5.0 million 
hectares vs. 10.4 million hectares), as well as land for agro-forest activities (10 million 
hectares vs. 21.9 million hectares) and forests (9.9 million hectares vs. 21.9 million 
hectares). Also, 16% of Colombia’s agricultural land is overexploited in central Colombia, 
and 13% is underused mainly in the northern and eastern regions, where the majority of 
pastures are located (see Figure 27).  
 
Figure 26. Land Used versus Optimal Land Use by Activity in Colombia  


































Figure 27. Exploitation Levels of Colombia’s Land (Source: UPRA, 2014) 
 
On the other hand, land management in Colombia is inflexible. Colombian law 
doesn’t allow one person be the owner of a plot with a size greater than a Family 
Agricultural Unit (UAF)16 (Act No. 160, 1994). Accordingly, Colombian agriculture is unable 
to exploit economies of scale, since the UAFs size has been small since the 1990’s (see 
Table 11). For instance, in the Andean region (center side of Colombia), its size averages 
26 hectares; in the Caribbean region (northern), 49 hectares; in the Pacific region 
(Western), 16 hectares; and in the Amazon region (Southern), 122 hectares. Likewise, in 
the Orinoco region, where Colombia has yet to expand its agricultural frontier by about 
                                                     
16 A UAF is defined as the land needed by a farmer and their family to survive and earn a surplus, according to the agro-






3-5 million hectares, the UAFs size is about 565 hectares (Clavijo & Jimenez, 2011c). 
Although this size is the largest (in comparison to other regions according to its agro-
ecological conditions of the land), it limits large-scale agricultural production in Colombia, 
and does not make Colombia’s agriculture attractive for investment. This is significant, 
given the experience of El Cerrado in Brazil shows that Colombia would need large 
investment to develop its Orinoco region, and this investment will only arrive to Colombia 
when large-scale agriculture is allowed (Clavijo & Jimenez, 2011c).   
 
Table 11. Maximum Size of Family Farms Units (UAF) by Region in Colombia  
(Source: Resolution No. 41, 1996) 







2.5.1.1.3 Agricultural Infrastructure 
Colombia also exhibits poor agricultural infrastructure (COMPITE, 2008). Colombia 
is behind on the development of irrigation and drainage systems. In 2012, the land areas 
equipped with irrigation in Colombia represented 32% of its total arable land, while in 
Chile this land reached 62%, and in Peru 47% (see Figure 28). Also, public resources to 
increase this area has lost relevance recently in Colombia, decreasing from an average of 
16%-18% in the 1990’s and 2000’s to 3% during the period 2010-2014  (DNP, 2015). This 






(7%) and Mexico (25%), has become one of the main barriers to Colombia’s agriculture 
competitiveness.      
 
Figure 28. Ratio of Agricultural Land Equipped for Irrigation to Total Arable Land (%) 
(Source: Estimates based on FAO, 2015)  
 
COMPITE (2008) argues that Colombia’s agriculture is also affected by its outdated 
and precarious transport infrastructure. Colombia does not have an adequate multimodal 
transport infrastructure to properly connect production centers to domestic and external 
consumption centers. Consequently, agricultural products are mainly transported by 
roads, which is more costly. Moreover, Colombia’s road network is one of the most 
precarious worldwide (Clavijo, Vera, Malagon, et al., 2014)17. This delay in transport 
infrastructure development has become excessively costly for farmers, and directly 
affected their competitiveness. 
                                                     
17 WEF (2014) assessed the quality of Colombia’s roads, by giving a 2.9 grade in 2014, in a scale for which 1 means 




















































































































2.5.1.1.4 Access to External Markets 
Another factor that explains the low returns for Colombia’s agriculture is its lack of 
access to external markets. Although the value of Colombia’s agricultural exports 
increased from US$4.3 billion (constant 2014 prices) in 1990 to US$6.5 billion in 2012, its 
share of Colombia’s total exports decreased from 21.7% in 1990 to 9.4% in 2012, and its 
share in Colombia’s agriculture GDP remained almost stagnant, around 25%-30% over this 
period (see Figure 29). This is because the main agricultural exportable products were the 
same in 2012 as the early 1990’s (coffee, flowers, bananas, and sugar), although the ratio 
to total agricultural exports became more balanced (see Table 9). Also, the main 
destinations for agricultural exports was still the US (receiving 35%-40%), since Colombia 
reduced its exports to Venezuela in 2010 (a natural market)18  due to political issues 
(Jimenez, 2010). In addition, Colombia exhibited certain limitations to export agricultural 
products, due to its limited sanitary management and low competitiveness (Tovar et al., 
2007).  
                                                     
18 Venezuela used to buy 21% of the Colombia’s agricultural exports in 2008, and this country bought just 8.1% in 2012 







Figure 29. Ratio of Colombia’s Agricultural Exports to its Total Exports and Agricultural 
GDP (%) (Source: Estimates based on FAO, 2015; World Bank, 2016)  
 
2.5.1.2 Low Land Ownership 
COMPITE (2008) indicates that Colombia’s agriculture exhibits low land-ownership, 
due to higher levels of violence and serious security problems. Domestic and external 
investment in Colombian agriculture was discouraged during the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s, due to: i) a high violent crime rate, at around 60-70 per 100,000 habitants in the 
late 90’s which decreased to 35-40 in 2005-2007 (see Figure 30), but was still higher in 
comparison to the rates in Argentina (5.3) and Chile (1.9); ii) a sharp increase in 
kidnapping rates in Colombia, which increased from 1,200 people in 1994 to 3,700 people 
in 2000, and decreasing to just 520 by the 2000’s; iii) a solid increase in the number of 
illegal checkpoints managed by armed groups, so called “Pesca Milagrosas”, which 































































































































high terrorist activity, which reached 1,650 events in 2002. As a result, Colombia’s 
agriculture acquired low private investment during late 1990’s and early 2000’s.  
 
Figure 30. Violence and Security Indicators in Colombia  




2.5.2 Funding Problems 
Colombia’s agriculture also exhibits funding problems (COMPITE, 2008). The 
country’s private funding has been segmented and restricted, since agriculture exhibits 
high risks, such as climate change, pests, volatility of international prices, and the 
exchange rate (Cuevas et al., 2003). Also, private banks have avoided funding Colombia’s 
agriculture on a large scale, since: i) they were forced to forgive and refinance many loans 
to farmers during the 1990’s; ii) collateral for loans is harder to meet in rural areas, and 
iii) transaction costs tend to be higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Therefore, 
Colombia’s agriculture has received on average 6%-8% of private banking resources 
during last decade (DNP, 2014). Also, these resources are preferably given to agricultural 
Kidnapped rate
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industry rather than to farmers, since they show more solid collateral and less risk 
(COMPITE, 2008). This was the case during 2012-2014, when Colombia’s agriculture 
experienced a profitability crisis, and private funding focused its loan portfolio on 
agricultural industry (see Figure 31). Nowadays, Colombia’s agriculture is not fully funded 
by private banks. Also, Colombia’s government has been expending more public 
resources on agriculture in the form of direct subsidies for farmers. Colombia’s 
government is aware that these subsidies are the only way for some farmers to receive 
funding. 
 
Figure 31. Portfolio Composition of FINAGRO by Type of Customer  
(Source: Estimates based on FINAGRO, 2015a)  
 
 
This problem has become serious during the last decade. Although Colombia’ 
agriculture policy has in theory mainly privileged funding small farmers, these farmers 
received just 20% of the resources19. Medium and large farmers received most of these 
                                                     
19 FINAGRO classifies farmers as small, medium and large according to the value of their assets. These values are 
compared to pre-established income ranges for each category. An important issue is that these ranges change yearly, 




















resources, despite the fact that they could receive funding by private banks given their 
solid collateral (see Figure 32). As if this was not enough, FINAGRO resources haven’t been 
used to modernize Colombia’s agriculture by investing in infrastructure and equipment. 
Although FINAGRO increased its loans by almost 4 times to COP$8.1 trillion (constant 
2014 prices) during 2000-2014, these resources have been mainly used to fund livestock 
purchases (27.6%), and planting and crop renovation (26.7%) (see Figure 33 and Figure 
34). Consequently, infrastructure (11.9%) and machinery and equipment (4.1%) remain 
among the least funded areas of Colombia’s agriculture—explaining, in part, its poor 
performance during recent decades.  
 
 
Figure 32. FINAGRO’s Portfolio by Farmer Type                                                                
(Constant 2014 Prices, COP$ Millions) (Source: Estimates based on FINAGRO, 2015a) 
 




















Figure 33. FINAGRO’s Portfolio by Line of Credit                                                                                               
(Constant 2014 Prices, COP$ Millions)  
(Source: Estimates based on FINAGRO, 2015a; SAC 2015) 
 
 
Figure 34. FINAGRO Investment Loans by Type (% of Total)  
(Source: Estimates based on FINAGRO, 2015a; SAC, 2015) 
 
Finally, COMPITE (2008) indicates that although Colombia’s government, with the 
support of the Bolsa Mercantil de Colombia - (BMC)20, has been designing instruments to 
mitigate market risk, their usage is minimal. Currently, Colombia doesn’t have mature and 
                                                     



















Planting & Crop 























deep market to negotiate for commodities, and investors’ confidence has been reduced 
by the BMC. The size of this market is very small, and it has been involved in many scandals 
in recent years (World Bank, 2013). As if this were not enough, some studies indicate that 
the BMC’s potential is poor in the coming years, even in optimistic scenarios (Clavijo, 
Jimenez, & Rios, 2014)21. 
2.6 Conclusions 
In brief, this chapter indicates that Colombia’s agriculture encountered serious 
difficulties during the period 1970 to 2014. This is demonstrated by its very low 
performance in recent decades. Colombia’s agricultural GDP only grew by 1.5% on 
average in the 1990’s, and by 1.9% in the 2000’s (World Bank, 2016), due to: i) the type 
of policies implemented in Colombia to boost its economic development, mainly focused 
on promoting of other sectors, such as finance, mining, and utilities (Junguito et al., 2014); 
ii) a misallocation of resources within the agricultural sector, despite the fact that 
Colombia’s government increased its investment during the 2000’s (Reina et al., 2011); iii) 
the accelerated and abrupt implementation of the second package of reforms associated 
with Colombia’s Structural Adjustment (SA) program during the 1990’s (Ocampo, 2000), 
and iv) a significant structural transformation of Colombia’s economy toward the services 
sector by effects known as the Dutch Disease (Clavijo et al., 2013). As a result, agriculture 
did not continue as the driver for Colombia’s economy in the last decades, since its share 
                                                     
21 This study explains that even in a scenario on which traded amount in the BMC grows by 10%, this is still 
very low in comparison to the traded amount in similar entities in Latin America such as BOVESPA in Brazil 






in Colombia’s total GDP decreased steadily from an average of 24% in the 1970’s to 6%-
8% in the 2000’s and agricultural GDP per capita in Colombia declined from US$330-350 
(constant US$ of 2005) in the late 1980’s to US$260-280 in the 1990’s and in the 2000’s. 
Second, agricultural policy in Colombia has been historically designed to face short 
term problems, instead of a long term strategy for sector development (SAC, 2014). 
Colombia has carried out a wide variety of policies to promote its agricultural sector 
during the period 1970-2014. However, their execution has required an active role of the 
government as the main agent for carrying out constant interventions in different 
markets (agricultural products, agricultural inputs, and agricultural credit), to guarantee 
a minimum income level to farmers (Guterman, 2007). Consequently, Colombia’s 
agriculture has been subject to many distortions, which have limited its competitiveness 
in recent decades (Anderson & Valdés, 2008). 
Third, Colombia’s agriculture exhibits a serious lack of public resources. These 
resources have represented about 0.2%-0.4% of overall GDP in the last decades, while 
these have reached 1% in others emerging markets, and 4% in developed countries 
(Junguito et al., 2014). In addition, Colombia shows two types bottlenecks that have 
discouraged agricultural investment in recent years (COMPITE, 2008). On the one hand, 
projects developed in this sector usually have low expected returns, due to lack of human-
capital in the sector, land misallocation, little exploitation of economies of scale, poor 
infrastructure (transport and irrigation), and lack of access to external markets. On the 
other hand, Colombia’s agriculture has funding problems, because credit to this sector is 






This study determines six periods for subsequent analysis based on the findings of 
this chapter (see Table 12). Facts presented above highlight the importance of classifying 
in each period all years for which: i) Colombia’s agriculture exhibited similar economic 
conditions; and ii) agricultural policy regimes did not sharply change. For instance, the 
accelerated implementation of the second package of reforms of Colombia’s Structural 
Adjustment (SA) by Gaviria administration in the early 1990’s had a direct impact on 
Colombia’s agriculture performance. These reforms changed market conditions for 
Colombian farmers over a short period of time, which caused jointly with other factors a 
profitability crisis in this sector. Moreover, Colombia’s macroeconomic crises presented 
during the early 1980’s and in the late 1990’s are other events that cannot be ignored. 
Agricultural development did not receive much attention in both crises, and, in fact, 
Colombia’s government cut the agricultural budget to restore Colombia’s economic 
stability. Furthermore, the worsening armed conflict from the late 1990’s, the security 
policy executed by Uribe-I administration in early 2000’s, as well as the behavior of 
Colombia’s agriculture during the agricultural commodity price boom 2006-2011 are 
other factors that cannot be overlooked. Its omission for analyzing Colombia’s agriculture 
might lead to misguided conclusions. Hence, the idea with these periods in this study is 
to consider that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited structural changes during recent 
decades, and therefore agricultural productivity and/or overall performance might have 









Table 12: Main Facts about Colombia’s Agriculture during 1975-2013 
 
PERIOD MAIN FACTS 
1975-1983 
 Last term of Colombia's agriculture golden age (1950-1980) (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
 Colombia’s agriculture grew on average by 1.8% real per year (World Bank, 2016). 
 Public finances improved sharply, because government steadily taxed agricultural exports (mainly coffee), which 
represented 55% of the total, to get funding (J. Cardenas, 1993; GRECO, 2002; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
 Colombia exhibited a coffee boom due to severe frosts in Brazilian coffee regions (Garay et al., 1998) 
 Coffee prices increased from an average of US$0.60/lb. in 1970-1974 to US$1.50/lb. in 1975-1983 (FEDECAFE, 
2016). 
 The real exchange rate, Colombian Peso to US American Dollar, remained stable (BANREP, 2015; World Bank, 
2016).  
 Agricultural policy focused on promoting more efficient land use to increase agricultural productivity 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
 Agricultural policy attempted to improve agricultural productivity by: i) providing technical assistance to farmers; 
ii) improving education; and iii) promoting research (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
1983-1989 
 Colombia's economy plunged into a crisis, due to the Latin America Debt crisis (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
 Colombia’s agriculture grew on average by 3.5% real per year (World Bank, 2016). 
 Colombian Peso depreciated in real terms relative to US dollar on average by 10% per year (BANREP, 2015; World 
Bank, 2016). 
 Colombia's Government cut initially its budget for agriculture to restore fiscal balance, due to the Debt crisis 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). 
 Commodity prices fell by 30% in real terms, due to the Debt crisis (Dornbusch, 1989). 
 Agricultural policy focused on promoting private investment, adjusting the price system, raising farmer’s margins, 
and limiting agricultural imports (Guterman, 2007). 
 Agricultural policy also promoted coordination among agricultural institutions to ensure the availability of seeds, 









Table 12: Main Facts about Colombia’s Agriculture during 1975-2013 (continued)  
PERIOD MAIN FACTS 
1990-1997 
 Colombia's government accelerated the execution of the second package of reforms associated with its 
Structural Adjustment (SA) program (Ocampo, 2000).  
 Colombia’s agriculture fell into a profitability crisis, due to the accelerated and abrupt implementation of these 
SA reforms (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito, 1994; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Ocampo, 2000).   
 Colombia’s agriculture grew on average by 2.1% real per year (World Bank, 2016). 
 Colombia's agriculture experienced a severe drought in 1992 and 1997 (C. F. Jaramillo, 1998).  
 Colombian Peso appreciated in real terms relative to US dollar on average by 4% per year (BANREP, 2015; 
World Bank, 2016). 
 Colombia’s agriculture main lender, “La Caja Agraria”, fell into a crisis (Villalba, 2002).  
 Agricultural policy focused on restoring the dynamism of the agricultural sector, by reversal of many of the SA 
reforms through the "Plan de Reactivation del Sector Agropecuario" (Junguito, 1994)  
 An unstable agricultural policy, the drug traffic and a worsening armed conflict encouraged very little the 
creation of attractive environments for productivity and private investment (Kym Anderson & Valenzuela, 
2011; Reina et al., 2011).  
1998-2002 
 Colombia plunged into a macroeconomic crisis, due to a real-estate bubble (Uribe, 2008). 
 An intensification of armed conflict prompted many people to leave rural areas, and it also discouraged even 
more private investment (Alban, 2011; DNP, 2002; FAO, 2000; Montero & Casas, 2012).  
 Colombia’s agriculture grew on average by 1.9% real per year (World Bank, 2016). 
 Agricultural development did not receive much attention from the government, because it gave priority to 
address the macroeconomic crisis and solve the country’s worsening armed conflict (Kalmanovitz & López, 
2003).   
 Colombian Peso depreciated in real terms relative to US dollar on average by 8% per year (BANREP, 2015; 










Table 12: Main Facts about Colombia’s Agriculture during 1975-2013 (continued)  
PERIOD MAIN FACTS 
2003-2009 
 Uribe Administration (2002-2010) executed a security policy which restored confidence in investing in 
Colombia (DNP, 2002, 2006; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Montero & Casas, 2012) (DNP, 2002, 2006)   
 Colombia’s agriculture grew on average by 1.8% real per year (World Bank, 2016). 
 Colombia's Government multiplied 4 times the resources for promoting agriculture, but they exhibited a 
serious misallocation (Reina et al., 2011). 
 Agricultural commodity prices worldwide exhibited a boom during 2006-2011 (IMF, 2015). 
 Violence was still a problem in rural areas. 
 Annual crop farmers started to use better seeds to increase yield per hectare (COMPITE, 2008). 
 Colombia's agriculture exhibited a lack of innovation and technological development (Reina et al., 2011). 
 Colombian Peso appreciated in real terms relative to US dollar on average by 5% per year (BANREP, 2015; 
World Bank, 2016). 
2010-2013 
 Colombia’s agriculture exhibited a new profitability crisis, due to falling agricultural commodity prices 
worldwide (Clavijo, Vera, & Jimenez, 2014). 
 Agricultural commodity prices worldwide decrease by almost 5% in 2012 (IMF, 2015) 
 Fertilizer prices remained high (FAO, 2015) 
 Colombia’s agriculture was seriously affected by climate change effects (Niño/ Niña)  (Clavijo, Vera, & Jimenez, 
2014). 
 Colombian Peso appreciated in real terms relative to US dollar on average by 4% per year (BANREP, 2015; 










All these factors have surely had an impact on agricultural productivity growth in 
Colombia’s from 1970-2014. In order to estimate their significance, this study estimates 
agricultural productivity growth of Colombia’s agriculture, and includes analysis on which 
are the most important factors that explain it. The idea is to identify those elements that 
Colombia’s government should consider in their agricultural policy to boost productivity 
growth in this sector. Thereby, this study contributes to a better design of agricultural 
policy in Colombia, by identifying those elements which Colombia’s policy makers should 
work on to: i) reach higher growth and development of its agriculture; and ii) take 








CHAPTER 3. RELEVANT LITERATURE
3.1 Introduction 
Agricultural productivity has been widely analyzed worldwide, following the 
pioneering work of Solow (1957) and Griliches (1963a, 1963b, 1964). Agricultural 
productivity improvement has been well recognized as an essential source of growth, 
since it encompasses output gains attributable to technological change (Pfeiffer, 2003). 
Development economists have also stated that agricultural productivity is particularly 
critical in developing countries, by boosting their economic growth and improving their 
social conditions22 (Johnson & Mellor, 1961). In addition, studies have also shown that 
agricultural productivity is a factor that explains part of the dynamics of worldwide trade, 
by contributing to the development of comparative advantages among countries (Ball, 
Butault, San Juan, & Mora, 2010). Accordingly, agricultural productivity has been the 
focus of a significant number of studies during the last decades. 
During the 1970’s and 1980’s, economics literature concentrated on the differences 
in agricultural productivity among countries and regions, the induced innovation process 
and its effect for bolstering agricultural growth, and the factors that better explain 
                                                     
22 Agricultural productivity usually improves social conditions, by promoting: i) a substantial increase in the demand for 
agricultural products, since technical change pushes down its prices; ii) an expansion of agricultural export products; 







agricultural productivity (Hayami & Ruttan, 1970, 1971; Kawagoe & Hayami, 1983, 1985). 
These studies often based their analyses on partial productivity indices such as labor 
productivity and land productivity, which resulted in a partial understanding of 
agricultural productivity. Interest in measuring agricultural productivity by estimating 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) increased during the 1980’s, since this variable captures 
the productivity of all inputs simultaneously (Ball, 1985). Also, agricultural productivity 
was considered a major factor behind US agricultural growth during the postwar period, 
and was used to measure the economic reforms in China toward capitalism (Capalbo, 
1988; McMillan, Whalley, & Zhu, 1989).  
During the 1990’s and 2000’s, studies focused on how to relax certain assumptions 
behind methods used to estimate agricultural productivity, such as the existence of 
competitive markets and constant returns to scale (Capalbo, 1988). Also, several studies 
were conducted worldwide, mainly with a country-level focus and were used as a 
barometer: i) to monitor agriculture performance; ii) to evaluate policy actions, and iii) to 
analyze certain economic events, such as the dynamics of trade patterns. Also, other 
studies analyzed the main determinants of agricultural productivity with the objective of 
obtaining better information for designing agricultural policies.  
In order to illustrate the importance of agricultural productivity worldwide and its 
value in designing and evaluating agriculture policy, the following sections report : i) the 
most common applications of agricultural productivity in the economics literature; ii) the 
main determinants of agricultural productivity worldwide, and iii) a brief summary of such 







3.2 Most Common Applications of Agricultural Productivity Measurement 
Worldwide, agricultural productivity analysis is used to measure the impact of 
technical change on agricultural growth. In this sense, several studies have been 
developed to determine if agricultural productivity is a major factor behind agricultural 
growth. For instance, Ball, Bureau, Nehring, and Somwaru, (1997) and Ball (1985) 
measure agricultural growth in the US during the postwar period (1948-1994), reaffirming 
that agricultural productivity contributed significantly to agricultural growth during this 
period. Fan and Zhang (2002), Fan (1991), Jin, Huang, Hu and Rozelle (2002) and Lin, 1987) 
present a similar analysis for China’s agricultural sector after its transition to Capitalism 
(1976-1986). These studies conclude that institutional change and the adoption of new 
technology boosted agricultural productivity and led to more rapid agricultural growth 
(+4%). Also, Evenson, Pray and Rosegrant (1999) and Fuglie (2010) analyze the role of 
agricultural productivity in the agricultural performance of India (1956-1988) and 
Indonesia (1961-2006). These studies conclude that its effects were highly dependent on 
the Green Revolution in Indonesia, and on research and investment in extension 
programs and irrigation in India. Hence, there exists strong consensus on the importance 
of agricultural productivity.  
Due to this fact, agricultural productivity has also been the subject of analysis in 
countries where agricultural growth has stagnated. Fuglie and Rada (2013) examine the 
sub-Saharan countries (1961-2008) and conclude that low agricultural productivity was 
due to the countries’ low investment in land development, numerous armed conflicts, 







conducted a similar analysis for Western European countries using data from 1973-2002. 
They found that the agricultural sector exhibited low growth during this period due to 
withdrawals of resources in rural areas, mainly drops in labor, and not as a consequence 
of low agricultural productivity growth. These findings reaffirm that while agricultural 
growth is highly dependent on agricultural productivity, other factors contribute to its 
performance. 
Evenson and Fuglie (2009) explain that agricultural productivity often has a positive 
impact on the agricultural growth of countries that invest in R&D and are actively 
developing and adopting capital improvements. These issues allow for improved 
technology use and ensures the dissemination and transmission of such technical 
knowledge. Otherwise, improvements in extension services and education are insufficient 
to boost agricultural productivity and agricultural growth. Australia’s livestock sector is an 
apt example, since its growth has slowed since the early 1990’s due to less investment in 
R&D, among other factors (Zhao, Sheng, & Gray, 2012).    
Additionally, agricultural productivity measures have been used to analyze the 
impact of the disintegration of the USSR. Many studies have estimated the effect of this 
structural change for the agricultural sectors of the former USSR provinces, as well as 
Central and Eastern European countries (Cungu & Swinnen, 2003; Swinnen, Van Herck, & 
Vranken, 2013). These studies found that agricultural productivity exhibited a U-shape in 
all countries after this adjustment, although the duration of the decline was longer in the 
ex-USSR countries, due to the pace of reform implementation (too fast or to slow). Hence, 







Soviet countries, as well as in Central and Eastern European countries. Accordingly, this 
transition that ex-Soviet countries exhibited from Communism to Capitalism is another 
reason why Europe exhibited stagnant agricultural productivity growth during these 
previous decades.  
Despite this, European countries maintained a comparative advantage in the trade 
of agricultural products with the US. Ball, Butault, San Juan, and Mora (2010) examine this 
pattern by analyzing the competitiveness of 11 European countries with the US for the 
period 1973-2002. Their study includes the variation of the exchange rate, relative prices, 
and relative growth of agricultural productivity as control variables. This study finds that 
agricultural productivity was the most important factor in determining competitiveness 
patterns, although the exchange rate’s influence on relative input prices was also 
acknowledged. Thus, agricultural productivity is a critical consideration in developing 
comparative advantage and determining worldwide trade flows.  
Agricultural productivity has also been used to evaluate the impact of trade in 
agriculture. Fernandez-Cornejo and Shumway (1997) estimate agricultural productivity in 
Mexico over the period 1940-1990, and analyze the data for evidence on the transmission 
of technology from the US to Mexico via foreign trade. They conclude that the evidence 
exists, although agricultural productivity has also been explained by higher investment in 
research in Mexico. This study demonstrates the usefulness of using agricultural 
productivity to measure and evaluate the impact of trade and research on agricultural 







This literature review highlights the importance for each country to have a robust 
indicator of agricultural productivity. This allows one to have a reliable indicator of 
agricultural performance, as well as a valuable index for designing and executing better 
agricultural policies. This has been the case for the US, Canada and Australia in recent 
decades (Ball et al., 1997; Ball, 1985; Cahill & Rich, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012). The 
experiences of these countries suggest the importance for achieving a robust measure of 
agricultural productivity of: i) development of a good information system and ii) 
improving measurement methods. This literature also encourages the analysis of 
countries which have put in practice an agricultural policy supported by an indicator of 
agricultural productivity, with the aim to identify best practices for developing their own 
agriculture.  
Brazil’s agriculture is one of those successful cases that has been widely analyzed 
(Garcia, Teles, Valdes, & Rumenos, 2012; Rada & Valdes, 2012). Its agricultural sector has 
exhibited a sharp modernization over the last few decades, as a result of reforms that 
began in the 1970’s. Basically, its government created the “Programa de Desarrollo del 
Medio Oeste - (Polocentro)” to encourage the development of the “El Cerrado” region. 
Under this program, the Brazilian government provided: i) cheaper land to farmers; ii) 
loans and subsidies to farmers; iii) extensive resources for research; and iv) technical 
assistance to farmers and their crops through the Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (Embrapa). Embrapa carefully developed a long-term strategy for this region 
in five stages: i) elimination of excessive acidity from soils; ii) development of grass 







soybean seed; iv) implementing new planting methods for growing cereals; and v) 
strengthening integrated farming models, using soil for grain crops and cattle (Clavijo & 
Jimenez, 2011a). In addition, Brazil changed its development model from one that is 
based on import substitution to a model of economic openness. This literature concludes 
that Brazilian success relied on greater agricultural R&D investment for research, 
infrastructure improvements, and better loan access to farmers. Also, it shows the 
importance to design and execute agricultural policies with a long-term perspective. 
In summary, agricultural productivity is a crucial indicator for agriculture 
development worldwide, since: i) this works as a permanent barometer of the agricultural 
sector’s actual performance, and ii) it is key for designing and executing more efficient 
agricultural policies. Likewise, this research indicates that agricultural productivity often 
boosts agricultural performance, since: i) there exists a positive relation between these 
variables; and ii) it increases countries’ global competitiveness, by developing their 
comparative advantage. Thus, it is very important to identify the main determinants of 
agricultural productivity.  
 
3.3 Determinants of Agricultural Productivity 
Over the last decades, the importance of increasing agricultural productivity has 
been widely recognized. Potentially accessible agricultural underutilized land is unevenly 
distributed worldwide, and concentrated at about 90% in Latin America and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Brazil, the Republic of the Congo, Angola, Sudan, Argentina, Colombia and Bolivia 







frontier over the next decades (FAO, 2013). Also, the United Nations predicts that by 2050, 
the world population will grow by 30% to 9,100 million (UN, 2015). The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that global food production must increase by 
70% (5% per year) to meet those needs (FAO, 2009). Thus, increasing agricultural 
productivity is one solution to address this land constraint and this potential imbalance 
between the world’s food supply and demand.  
Several studies have analyzed agricultural productivity, and found that it usually 
depends on: i) investment in agricultural research and agricultural extension programs; ii) 
efficiency gains through the use of high quality factors, as well as more human capital23; 
iii) scale economies via trade openness 24  and higher competence in the domestic 
market 25 ; and iv) miscellaneous factors, such as weather and commodity prices 
(Suphannachart & Warr, 2012). Most research analyzed agricultural productivity using 
different proxy variables for these factors. 
Sun, Ball, & Fulginiti (2009) analyze the impact of public investment in R&D for US 
agriculture during 1980 to 2004, as well as the role of the extension service, 
transportation network, and human capital on agricultural productivity. They find that 
these factors positively impact agricultural productivity, by allowing farmers to reduce 
                                                     
23 Some studies include resource allocation as a key factor for efficiency gains. The idea is that overall productivity 
growth of an economy could increase if production factors move from sectors exhibiting low marginal productivity rates 
to sectors with higher rates (Suphannachart & Warr, 2012). However, literature has shown that this growth is due to 
factor mobilization rather productivity growth (Jorgenson, 1988).   
24 Trade openness allows any economy to develop economies of scale by expanding their market size through export 
increments (Suphannachart & Warr, 2012).  
25 Higher competitiveness usually encourages countries to develop technological improvements (Suphannachart & 







production costs. Likewise, Fan (1991), Jin (et al., 2002) and J. Y. Lin (1992) conclude that 
China increased its agricultural productivity during the transition to Capitalism with higher 
investment in agricultural research and extension services, institutional change, and the 
adoption of new technology, in particular modern machinery and more efficient fertilizers. 
Ekbom (1998) analyzed the determinants of agricultural productivity in Kenya 
during 1995-1997. This study concluded that agricultural productivity exhibits a positive 
relation with investments in soil, quality of soil conservation, human capital and credit 
availability, as well as a negative relation with farm size and distance to water and 
infrastructure (roads). Likewise, Desai & Namboodiri (1998) do similar research for India 
from 1966 to 1990. They add that agricultural productivity also depends on factors such 
as barter terms of trade, government expenditure on agricultural research and education, 
land distribution, and annual average rainfall. This study finds that public investment in 
R&D and education, land distribution, and marketing and banking infrastructure density 
boost agricultural productivity in India, while higher barter terms of trade (higher prices) 
has a negative impact. Hence, this study reaffirms the role of investment in extension 
services, irrigation systems, and crop technology as factors behind the increase in India’s 
agricultural productivity (Evenson et al., 1999).   
 These results are aligned with Kumar, Mittal, and Hossain (2008), who present a 
literature review on agricultural productivity in South Asia. They find that India’s 
agricultural productivity is not explained by the same factors as in other countries in the 
region. This study finds that agricultural productivity accelerated in Bangladesh during 







during 1974-1994, due to a change in livestock diet, the use of high-yield seed varieties 
and an increase in human capital. In Nepal, it augmented by 0.5% yearly from 1980-2000, 
but it was explained by an unknown factor. Sri Lanka’s agricultural productivity growth 
stagnated during the 80’s, due to low investment in R&D and a civil war.  
Avila, Romano, and Garagorry (2010) show that agriculture productivity in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been explained mainly by other factors. Their study 
analyzes agricultural productivity in 20 countries of this region, and finds that agricultural 
productivity strongly and positively depends upon the adoption of modern crop varieties, 
growth in literacy, and improved dietary energy26.  
Fuglie and Rada (2011) explain that these differences observed in the agricultural 
productivity of South Asia and LAC could be result of the size of the respective countries. 
In an analysis of agricultural productivity in 32 Sub-Saharan countries in Africa from 1977-
2005, they find that agricultural productivity strongly depends on national investment in 
agricultural research; however, it seems to be constrained by the size of each economy. 
Larger countries realized higher payoffs from investing in agricultural research than did 
smaller countries, by developing scale economies in research, since larger countries are 
able to afford larger research systems. In addition, Fuglie and Rada (2013) conclude that 
investment in agricultural R&D, certain economic reforms, higher farm education, and 
widespread irrigation have also been key factors in the agricultural productivity of these 
countries. 
                                                     
26 This study uses the Dietary Energy Sufficiency (DES) index (published by the FAO) to test if there is a relation between 







Clearly, there exists some consensus on the factors that contribute to agricultural 
productivity. As explained above, factors such as public investment in R&D, human capital, 
irrigation, the usage of high-yielding crop varieties, credit availability, agricultural 
extension services, etc., are some of these factors. However, there exists a widespread 
issue in many of these studies. Some of them consider determinants that are more related 
to factor (capital) accumulation than to technical change, such as labor availability, land 
use, irrigation, credit availability, total length of road network and farm size, as well as 
input reallocation across sectors (Atkinson, 1970; Ekbom, 1998; Rada & Valdes, 2012; Sun 
et al., 2009; Suphannachart & Warr, 2012; Thirtle, Piesse, & Schimmelpfennig, 2008). 
Therefore, agricultural productivity has been sometimes analyzed considering 
determinants that are not directly related to technical change. Consequently, these 
studies have likely drawn misguided conclusions about determinants that could have 
explained agricultural productivity but instead explain investment, and haven’t 
determined the factors that really explain it. 
Recently, studies have focused on analyzing the dynamic relations between these 
factors and agricultural productivity over the time. Identifying which of those factors have 
short-term effects and which have long-term effects is relevant and currently in question. 
For instance, Suphannachart and Warr (2010) analyze the determinants of agricultural 
productivity in Thailand in the short and long term over the period 1970-2006. They 
present a model in which agricultural productivity is a function of real agricultural 
expenditure on research and extension services, infrastructure (roads and irrigated areas), 







crop productivity in the short-term and the long-term, while only agricultural research 
has an impact on livestock productivity. Likewise, Ali, Mushtaq, Ashfaq, Abedullah and 
Dawson (2012) completed a similar study for Pakistan. This study finds that agricultural 
productivity is explained by macroeconomic stability and the openness of agriculture in 
the short term, while improvements in human capital and infrastructure development are 
most important in the long-term. However, they emphasize that the short term effects of 
these variables are less significant than the long term effects. 
Aside from these studies, another research interest is identifying better instruments 
that work as proxy variables to explain changes in agricultural productivity. For instance, 
Wang, Heisy, Huffman and Fuglie (2013) analyze the impact of agricultural R&D 
expenditure on agricultural productivity by distinguishing between public and private 
investment. This study recognizes that private sector expenditure on agricultural R&D has 
been growing more rapidly than public sector expenditure in the US over the last several 
years (Fuglie et al., 2011). Accordingly, they include them in an empirical model to analyze 
agricultural productivity. This study finds evidence of a complementary relationship 
between public and private agricultural research. However, the study is unable to 
estimate the separate impact of these two types of expenditure to agricultural 
productivity, due to their high collinearity.  
Indicated here is a general agreement on the factors that explain agricultural 
productivity. Also, highlighted is the importance of using proper model specification to 
capture the dynamic effects of each factor. In addition, this current research mainly aims 







and ii) analyze the dynamic relationship among these factors and agricultural productivity. 
The importance of country level studies is apparent, given that agricultural productivity 
factors vary by country. Likewise, it suggests that there is a widespread problem in this 
research related to the fact that some studies consider determinants of agricultural 
productivity that are more related to factor (capital) accumulation than to technical 
change. Thus, these research findings are potentially inaccurate. 
 
3.4 Agricultural Productivity in Colombia 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity has been considered in very few studies. Over 
the last two decades, Colombia has usually been analyzed in the context of multi-national 
studies (Bravo-Ortega & Lederman, 2004; Coelli & Rao, 2005; Fuglie, 2015; Fulginiti & 
Perrin, 1998; Trueblood & Coggins, 2003), and a couple of times at the national level 
(Atkinson, 1970; Avila et al., 2010; Ludena, 2010; Pfeiffer, 2003). Thus, little is known 
about the dynamics of agricultural productivity in Colombia, and its main determinants.    
Atkinson (1970) is the pioneering work on agricultural productivity in Colombia. This 
study analyzed trends from 1950 to 1967, in order to evaluate the impact of governmental 
policy implementation to promote industry and lessen its dependence on agriculture. 
Atkinson (1970) found that agricultural productivity growth is uneven across crops in 
Colombia and largely dependent on farms’ ability to mechanize their production practices. 
Also, large farms usually exhibit higher agricultural productivity than small farms, since 







(1970) explains agricultural productivity dynamics in terms of factors that are more 
related to a factor accumulation.  
Pfeiffer (2003) also analyzed agricultural productivity in Colombia. She does this 
jointly for other Andean countries (Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) from 1972 to 2000. 
Her aim is to evaluate if developing countries exhibited negative growth in agricultural 
productivity during that period, as found previously (Kawagoe & Hayami, 1983; Lau & 
Yotopoulos, 1989; Suhariyanto, Lusigi, & Thirtle, 2001). This study finds that Andean 
countries showed positive growth in agricultural productivity, at a pace comparable to 
the one exhibited by agricultural productivity in the US and G7 countries. Also, the main 
causes of this growth are identified as agricultural research, and the introduction of new 
technology and new products to the region.   
Avila et al. (2010) examine in detail agricultural productivity in Colombia from 1961-
2001. They identify four stages over this period: i) a take-off period in the 1960’s, due to 
the creation of the national agricultural research institute27; ii) an acceleration period 
during the 1970’s, due to the diffusion and adaptation of agricultural research, and 
greater governmental funding of agricultural research and extension programs; iii) a 
stagnant period during the 1980’s, due to Colombia’s Debt crisis; and iv) a decreasing 
period in the 1990’s, as a result of less government support of agriculture, and 
institutional changes in agricultural research, due to the execution of the second package 
of reforms of Colombia’s Structural Adjustment program. 
                                                     








Finally, Ludena (2010) supports Pfeiffer (2003), since he indicates that agricultural 
productivity grew in Latin America and Caribbean countries by an average of about 1.7% 
per year from 1961-2007. This study indicates the importance of cost saving technologies 
in the region, such as: i) genetically modified crops; ii) zero tillage; iii) global positioning 
systems (GPS); and iv) better fertilization and harvesting practices. In addition, the study 
estimates that agricultural productivity in countries with land availability, such as 
Colombia, grew an average of 2.1% annually during this period.    
This literature suggests that Colombia’s agricultural productivity has grown 
positively over the last decades, although there is not any consensus related to the 
magnitude. Factors that account for this growth include: i) agricultural research; ii) 
development and adaptation of new technology; and iii) the usage of better seeds, 
pesticides and fertilizers. Likewise, others mention the mechanization of production 




In summary, this chapter shows agricultural productivity is a key indicator of 
agriculture sector performance in any country, since it works to: i) monitor agriculture 
performance; ii) evaluate policy actions, and iii) analyze certain economic events, such as 
the dynamics of trade patterns. Thus, it is an essential indicator that should be taken into 
account when designing and executing more efficient agricultural policies. Also, 







there exists a positive relation between these variables; and ii) it allows countries to 
increase their global competitiveness by developing comparative advantages relative to 
trade partners. Therefore, it is very important to identify what are the main determinants 
of agricultural productivity.  
This chapter indicates there exists a general consensus on the main factors that 
explain agricultural productivity. These factors are primarily public investment in R&D, 
human capital, the adoption of high-yielding seed varieties and trade openness. Also, 
there exists a widespread problem in the literature: many studies consider certain factors 
more related to a factor accumulation (mainly of capital) than to a technical change. This 
emphasis might be feasible if these studies assumed that technical change is capital 
embodied or at least were interested in testing this hypothesis. However, this assumption 
is never tested by these studies.  Thus, this problem may lead to misguided conclusions 
about determinants that could have explained agricultural productivity. In addition, 
current research mainly aims to: i) determine more accurate variables to identify variables 
that explain changes in agricultural productivity; and ii) analyze the dynamic relationship 
among these factors and agricultural productivity.  
With regards to Colombia, its agricultural productivity growth has been the focus of 
very little research, and is usually analyzed in the context of multi-national studies (Bravo-
Ortega & Lederman, 2004; Coelli & Rao, 2005; Fuglie, 2015; Fulginiti & Perrin, 1998; 
Trueblood & Coggins, 2003). Colombia has been evaluated just a few times at the country-
level (Atkinson, 1970; Avila et al., 2010; Ludena, 2010; Pfeiffer, 2003). Little is known 







It is only known that Colombia exhibited positive agricultural productivity growth over the 
last decades, due to: i) agricultural research; ii) development and adaptation of new 
technology; and iii) the usage of better seeds, pesticides and fertilizers. Hence, the 
purpose of this study is to contribute to such research on Colombia, by estimating 
agricultural productivity growth of Colombia and providing an analysis of its main 
determinants. 
The next chapter reviews the most common methodologies used in the economics 
literature to estimate agricultural productivity, and the methods used by this study to 




CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGIES FOR MEASURING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
4.1 Introduction
Accurate measurement of agricultural productivity largely depends on its definition. 
This study defines productivity as all changes in production attributable to technological 
change rather than by changes in inputs (Domar, 1961; Jorgenson & Griliches, 1967; 
Solow, 1957). Thereby, it denotes productivity as the efficiency level exhibited by an 
economy to transform inputs into outputs (Diewert & Nakamura, 2002; Syverson, 2011). 
This implies that productivity changes can result from three possible factors: i) 
improvements in production practices, given a set of resources, so-called disembodied 
technical change; ii) changes in input quality, so called embodied technical change, or iii) 
introduction of new production processes or inputs (Antle & Capalbo, 1988). Thus, the 
measurement of agricultural productivity largely consists of the usage of appropriate 
methodologies to quantify these effects, being aware of all estimation problems well 
recognized by economic literature 28(Antle & Capalbo, 1988). 
 
 
                                                     
28 Antle & Capalbo (1988) explains that disembodied technical change depends strongly on the inputs level at which it 




4.2 Theoretical Framework 
Early studies used to measured agricultural productivity as the rate of output 
produced per unit of input. Productivity measures such as output per acre and per worker 
were very common in this research (Hayami & Ruttan, 1970, 1971; Kawagoe & Hayami, 
1983, 1985). Interest in measuring agricultural productivity by estimating Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) has grown in recent decades, since this allows: i) the measurement of 
productivity relative to all inputs (Ball, 1985); ii) to use a productivity concept that is 
invariant to intensity of input used (Syverson, 2011); and iii) to measure productivity 
when technological change is Hicks neutral29. Otherwise, this is a biased technological 
progress and input-specific productivity growth rates are necessary (Wu, 2012). 
Simultaneously researchers also worked toward making certain strong assumptions more 
flexible; for example: i) competitive markets; and ii) constant returns to scale (Capalbo, 
1988). It was well known that agricultural productivity measurement should be based 
largely on a valid representation of the production function, since this will allow dividing 
agricultural production into these components: i) technology; ii) production efficiency, 
and iii) scale of production (Antle & Capalbo, 1988).  
There exist three types of methodologies often used in economics literature for the 
measurement of agricultural productivity worldwide (see Table 13). The first is growth 
accounting techniques, based on the pioneering work of Tinbergen (1942), Solow (1957), 
Kendrick (1961) and Denilson (1962). Broadly speaking, these techniques assume that 
                                                     
29 Hicks (1963) defined neutral and biased technological change by whether their effects increase, remain unchanged, 




agricultural productivity is the output growth unexplained by input growth. Then, the 
measurement of agricultural productivity basically involves a simple accounting exercise, 
on which a production function is assumed and agricultural output growth, input growth 
and cost shares of each input are estimated using actual data from farmer budget. 
Subsequently, input growth is subtracted from output growth considering the cost shares 
calculated, and the residual is denoted as agricultural productivity growth. This simple 
approach for the measurement of productivity makes such techniques very attractive. 
However, these techniques rely on very strong assumptions, such as: i) competitive 
markets for both outputs and inputs; ii) constant returns to scale; iii) technical change is 
Hicks neutral; iv) input-output separability30; and v) Cobb-Douglas production function31 
(Antle & Capalbo, 1988; Diewert, 1992). Thus, this limits the scope and relevance of 
accounting results. The most common accounting techniques used in literature are: i) 
Tornqvist- Theil Index (Ball, 1985; Evenson et al., 1999; Fan & Zhang, 2002; Garcia et al., 
2012; Thirtle et al., 2008); ii) Fisher Index (Cahill & Rich, 2012; Zhao et al., 2012); and iii) 
USDA Methodology for Measuring International Agricultural Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) Growth (Evenson & Fuglie, 2010; Fuglie & Rada, 2013; Fuglie, 2010; Rada, 2013). 
The main differences are in the procedure used to aggregate the data into two general 
                                                     
30 A production function is input-output separable on inputs 𝑖 and 𝑗, when the production function can be written as 
𝐹(𝑋) = 𝑔(𝑋𝐴, 𝑋𝑛); where 𝑋𝐴 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖 , 𝑋𝑗) (Antle & Capalbo, 1988). 
31 The main difference in calculating agricultural productivity using a growth accounting technique versus using an 
econometric techniques and assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function is that growth accounting techniques cost 
shares calculate cost shares using observed accounting data, while econometrics techniques estimate these parameters 




indexes, one for output growth and other for input growth, both employed to estimate 
agricultural productivity growth. 
A second type of methodology used in economics literature for the measurement 
of agricultural productivity is frontier techniques. These techniques rely on the 
assumption that economic activities are not always located on their best practice 
frontier32 (Farrell, 1957). Thus, the measurement of agricultural productivity involves the 
estimation and posterior sum of two components: i) technical change, which captures 
shifts in the production possibility frontier when firms are efficient; and ii) efficiency 
change, which considers all movements exhibited by a firm or economic activity within its 
production possibility frontier toward a better position closer to that frontier (Sena, 2003). 
This implies that agricultural productivity measurement largely depends on a robust 
measurement of this production possibility frontier. This ensures an unbiased estimation 
for its components: technical change and efficiency change. Also, this guarantees 
credibility for these estimates in comparison to other methods. Researchers have 
developed two types of methodologies to measure this production possibility frontier: i) 
parametric techniques based on stochastic analysis, and ii) non parametric techniques 
based on lineal programming techniques such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
(Murillo-Zamorano, 2004; Sena, 2003). These methodologies allow measuring 
productivity, by analyzing where production efficiency of a firm or economic activity is 
                                                     
32 The best practice frontier is defined as the maximum output a firm can produce given a set of inputs and the state of 




located related to this frontier. In addition, these determine endogenously the returns to 
scale (Severgnini, 2010). 
The Malmquist Index is one of the most popular frontier techniques utilized in 
economics literature for the measurement of agricultural productivity. This technique 
measures agricultural productivity by comparing the position of agriculture in two 
adjacent periods with respect to a production frontier, using distance functions (Caves, 
Christensen, & Diewert, 1982). The Malmquist Index does not rely on any stochastic 
procedure to measure agricultural productivity and has the following advantages: i) to 
determine easily the main sources of productivity growth, and ii) to separate agricultural 
productivity in terms of technical change and scale components (Sena, 2003). In addition, 
it is very attractive when data is a constraint, since it only requires data from output and 
input quantities 33  (Sena, 2003). Despite this, it is well known that this methodology 
exhibits two serious problems: i) it requires a very accurate estimation of the frontier 
production function, which is not always possible to ensure due to limited available 
information and poor quality data; and ii) its results are very sensitive to the chosen 
adjacent periods, data quality and outliers, which means that this methodology cannot 
provide robust results for a sector such as agriculture, which often exhibits strong 
volatility (Thirtle et al., 2008). Nevertheless, many studies have used this methodology, 
because it does not require data for output and input prices. Also, this methodology is 
                                                     
33 This is because the methodology is based the measurement of agricultural productivity for distance functions, and 




popular among the few studies devoted to measuring and analyzing agricultural 
productivity growth in Colombia  (Ludena, 2010; Pfeiffer, 2003).  
Finally, the last type of methodology used by economics literature is econometric 
techniques (E. Berndt & Christensen, 1973). Broadly, these techniques base the 
measurement of agricultural productivity on the usage of econometric methods to 
estimate a production function or its dual (Antle & Capalbo, 1988). For this purpose, these 
techniques rely on economic theory, which establishes that productivity can be measured 
directly from a given functional form of the production function (so-called primal 
techniques) or indirectly from the cost function (so-called dual techniques). The main 
advantages are that econometric techniques allow relaxing certain assumptions required 
by accounting techniques. For instance, Antle & Capalbo (1988) explain that production 
can be estimated without assuming Hicks neutral technical change or returns to scale. 
Also, these techniques allow one to estimate confidence intervals around the estimates. 
In addition, it is not necessary to assume a particular form for the production function, 
although that is necessary to estimate biased technical change. However, these 
techniques assume a production function with input-output separability, as do growth 
accounting techniques. Also, these techniques require aggregating the input data into a 
few general indexes, in order to have sufficient degrees of freedom to run the estimation 
and to avoid multicollinearity problems. In addition, these techniques assume 




accounting techniques34. In brief, these techniques estimate productivity growth with 
fewer assumptions. Also, these have been successfully used by many studies devoted to 
analyzing agricultural productivity (Cungu & Swinnen, 2003; Fan, 1991; Sun et al., 2009).  
Table 13 presents a summary of research conducted to measure agricultural 
productivity worldwide, based on: i) the theoretical framework followed by the USDA to 
design its Methodology for Measuring the International Agricultural Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) Growth (USDA, 2016); and ii) the book “Productivity Growth in 
Agriculture: an International Perspective” (Fuglie, Wang, & Ball, 2012). This table also 












                                                     




Table 13: Studies on Agricultural Productivity Growth Worldwide 
Author Method* Country-Region Period 
World       
Ball, 1985 GAcT-TT USA 1948-1979 
Fernandez-Cornejo & 
Shumway, 1997 GAcT-TT Mexico 1940-1990 
Evenson et al., 1999 GAcT-TT India 1956-1987 
Fan & Zhang, 2002 GAcT-TT China 1952-1997 
Suphannachart & Warr, 2012 GAcT-TT Thailand 1970-2006 
Thirtle et al., 2008 GAcT-TT UK 1983-2005 
Garcia et al., 2012 GAcT-TT Brazil 1970-2006 




Fuglie, 2010 GAcT-USDA Indonesia 1961-2006 
Rada, 2013 GAcT-USDA India 1980-2008 
Fuglie & Rada, 2013 GAcT-USDA Sub-Sahara Africa 1961-2005 
Cahill & Rich, 2012 GAcT-F Canada 1961-2006 
Zhao et al., 2012 GAcT-F Australia 1977-2009 
Tong, Fulginiti, & Sesmero, 
2012 F-M  & F-SA China 1993-2005 
Rada & Valdes, 2012 F-SA Brazil 1985-2006 
Fan, 1991 
E-Pr China 
1965, 1970, 1975, 
1976-1986 
J. Y. Lin, 1992 E-Pr China 1970-1987 
Cungu & Swinnen, 2003 E-Pr 
Central and Eastern 
Europe Countries 
1992-1999 
Cungu & Swinnen, 2003 








   ` 
Colombia    
Pfeiffer, 2003 F-M Andean Countries 1972-2000 
Ludena, 2010 
F-M 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1961-2007 
Avila et al., 2010 
GAcT-TT 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 1960-2001 
Methods: GAcT-TT: Growth Accounting Techniques - Tornqvist - Theil Index; GAcT-USDA: Growth Accounting 
Techniques - USDA; GAcT-F: Growth Accounting Techniques - Fisher Index; F-SA: Frontier Techniques - Stochastic 
Frontier Approaches; F-M: Frontier Techniques - Malmquist Index; E-Pr: Econometric Techniques - Primal; and E-DC: 




4.3 Measurement of Agricultural Productivity 
This study uses econometric techniques to measure agricultural productivity in 
Colombia. As explained above, econometric techniques make the fewest assumptions, 
and therefore imply more robust results. These techniques have also been successfully 
used by many studies devoted to analyzing agricultural productivity in the USA, China and 
Russia (see Table 13). In addition, almost all studies carried out for Colombia have used 
either growth accounting techniques, such as the Tornqvist - Theil Index, which generates 
results that require very strong assumptions and are very sensitive to the sample period 
and the data quality; or frontier techniques such as the Malmquist Index, which requires 
a very accurate estimation of the frontier production function and does not provide 
robust results for a sector such as agriculture (see Table 13). 
To this end, this study estimates agricultural productivity in Colombia using both 
primal and dual econometric techniques. The idea is to use a variety of methodologies 
from the economics literature as strategy to look for more consistent results. For the 
primal techniques, this study experimented with the following functional forms of the 
production function: i) Cobb-Douglas; and ii) Constant Elasticity of Substitution – CES. This 
allows for analyzing the consistency of the estimates by assuming different possibilities 
for the production behavior of Colombia’s agriculture. Also, this permits the consideration 
of different degrees of elasticity of substitution among inputs and incorporates technical 
change in different ways. In addition, the CES production function potentially captures 
biased technical change (Wu, 2012). For the dual techniques, this study assumes a trans-




differentiable function. The main advantage for doing this is to avoid the necessity of 
assuming a particular functional form for the production function. Also, dual techniques 
potentially allow measuring scale effects. 
Agricultural productivity in Colombia is estimated as an aggregate and also 
disaggregated for crops and livestock, because their respective production processes are 
quite different. Also, overall agricultural productivity is estimated as a weighted average 
between crop and livestock productivity. This allows one to calculate a more reliable 
estimate for Colombia’s agricultural productivity, since this represents more closely the 
different dynamics exhibited by crop productivity and livestock productivity. In addition, 
I include dummy variables in all models for the periods established in Chapter 2, in order 
to consider in this analysis that Colombia’s productivity growth exhibited structural 
changes during the last several decades (see Table 12). Thus agricultural productivity 
might have been determined by particular circumstances in each period, and technical 
change might have varied over time. Results will show this is indeed a relevant 
consideration.   
Below, I describe in detail the estimation of Colombia’s agricultural productivity 
using both types of econometric techniques. First, the primal methods for each assumed 






4.3.1 Primal Techniques 
4.3.1.1 Cobb-Douglas Production Function    
The measurement of agricultural productivity in Colombia, assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function, assumes that technical change is not biased (Wu, 2012). Its 
assumed unitary elasticity of substitution does not permit identifying when an economic 
activity exhibits biased technical change. Thus, this functional form has this limitation and 
assumes that technological change is Hicks-neutral.  
Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function with four inputs (i.e. 







𝜃                                                (1) 
where 𝑄𝑡 is total agriculture output in period 𝑡, 𝐴𝑡 is agricultural productivity measured 
as Total Factor of Productivity (TFP) in period 𝑡, 𝐾𝑡 is the stock of capital in agriculture in 
period 𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 is labor hired by agriculture in period 𝑡, 𝐹𝑡 is fertilizer used by agriculture in 
period 𝑡, and 𝑆𝑡 is animal feed employed by agriculture in period 𝑡. Also, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝜃 
are the cost shares of capital, labor, fertilizer and animal feed used by agriculture in period 
𝑡 , respectively, when the following strong assumptions are satisfied: i) perfect 
competition; ii) firms maximize their profits; iii) perfect information; and iv) constant 
returns to scale in period 𝑡. This means one must impose the restriction that 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 + 
𝜃  = 1. Otherwise, these parameters are only the marginal effect of each input on 





Now, assuming that TFP grows at a constant rate equal to 𝑔 , 𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴0𝑒
𝑔𝑡 , this 








𝜃                                                         (2) 
By taking natural logarithms, this production function can be written as:  
 ln (𝑄𝑡) = ln (𝐴0) + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝛼ln (𝐾𝑡) + 𝛽ln (𝐿𝑡) + 𝛾ln (𝐹𝑡) + 𝜃ln (𝑆𝑡)            (3) 
Now, by iterating one period backward using this expression and by subtracting one 




) = 𝑔 + 𝛼 ln (
𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 ln (
𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡−1
) + 𝛾 ln (
𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑡−1
) + 𝜃 ln (
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
)                              (4) 
Therefore, agricultural productivity growth can be calculated as:    
𝑑𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑔 + 𝑒𝑡 = ln (
𝑄𝑡
𝑄𝑡−1
) − 𝛼 ln (
𝐾𝑡
𝐾𝑡−1
) + 𝛽 ln (
𝐿𝑡
𝐿𝑡−1
) + 𝛾 ln (
𝐹𝑡
𝐹𝑡−1
) + 𝜃 ln (
𝑆𝑡
𝑆𝑡−1
)          (5) 
where 𝑒𝑡 is the residuals component from the estimation.  
This implies that agricultural productivity growth, measured as TFP, is a residual 
variable defined as the output growth in period 𝑡 not explained by input growth in period 
𝑡. Thereby, TFP captures all productivity gains exhibited by Colombia’s agriculture (e.g. 
technical change, organizational improvements, etc.). 
The same theoretical basis is followed when using growing accounting techniques 
to measure TFP. The only difference is that econometric techniques use input data to 
estimate a model of a production function such as in this case, while growth accounting 
techniques use budget data to estimate cost shares (in this specification 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 and 𝜃) 




This study uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate equation 3, which yields 
the average growth of technical change (𝑔) and allows one to measure TFP growth based 
on equation 5. The Durbin Watson index was also used to test for the possible presence 
of serial autocorrelation among residuals, which is a common problem when using time 
series data. When this problem was detected, the model is estimated including the right 
hand side variable (in this case, the output) lagged one period as another regressor. 
The results of this model are compared to the results obtained by replicating the 
USDA methodology of accounting techniques (USDA, 2016). The aim is to analyze the 
robustness of their TFP index estimate for Colombia, and to determine if Brazil’s cost 
shares--used by the USDA to measure agricultural TFP for Colombia--look similar to those 
obtained using Colombia’s data. Large differences in 𝛼 , 𝛽 , 𝛾  and 𝜃  from cost shares 
indicate a lack of robustness in the TFP index measured by the USDA. 
4.3.1.2 Constant Elasticity of Substitution – CES Production Function 
The measurement of agricultural productivity when the elasticity of substitution is 
non-unitary is crucial, since it allows for the analysis of cases with biased technical change 
(Wu, 2012). The problem is that the elasticity of substitution and technical change cannot 
be identified simultaneously from time series data (Diamond, McFadden, & Rodrigues, 
1978). Thus, many studies have imposed particular functional forms, such as the CES, and 
established certain assumptions, such as perfect competence, in order to solve this 




This study follows the approach developed by Klump, McAdam, & Willman (2007b) 
and Leon-Ledesma, McAdam, & Willman (2011) for the measurement of productivity. This 
relies on the following normalized structure of a nested CES production function in cases 
with four inputs and technical change35. This way, one estimates the technical change 
associated with each input and the elasticity of substitution among them simultaneously. 
In this case, primary inputs for agriculture (capital and labor) are allocated in the first nest, 























     (6) 
 
where 𝑄𝑡 is agricultural output in period 𝑡, 𝐾𝑡 is stock of capital in agriculture in period 𝑡,  
𝐿𝑡 is labor hired by agriculture in period 𝑡, 𝐹𝑡 is fertilizer used by agriculture in period 𝑡, 
and 𝑆𝑡 is animal feed used by agriculture in period 𝑡. Also, the efficiency level of capital is 
denoted by 𝐸𝐾𝑡, efficiency level of labor by 𝐸𝐿𝑡, efficiency level of fertilizer by 𝐸𝐹𝑡, and 
efficiency level of animal feed by 𝐸𝑆𝑡. In addition, the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor (i.e. for inputs in first nest) is 𝜂, between fertilizer and feed (i.e. inputs 
in second nest) is 𝜁, and between nests is 𝜎. 
                                                     
35 This production function is normalized in order to ensure that all parameters share the same fixed point, and that 




To circumvent problems related to the Diamond-McFadden Impossibility Theorem 
(Diamond et al., 1978), this study assumes the following functional forms for efficiency 
growth exhibited by each input based on Klump, McAdam, & Willman (2011): 
𝐸𝐾𝑡 = 𝐸𝐾0𝑒
𝛾𝐾(𝑡−𝑡0)                                         (7a) 
𝐸𝐿𝑡 = 𝐸𝐿0𝑒
𝛾𝐿(𝑡−𝑡0)                                  (7b) 
𝐸𝐹𝑡 = 𝐸𝐹0𝑒
𝛾𝐹(𝑡−𝑡0)                                    (7c) 
𝐸𝑆𝑡 = 𝐸𝑆0𝑒
𝛾𝑆(𝑡−𝑡0)                                  (7d) 
where efficiency growth exhibited by each input is denoted by 𝛾𝑖, and 𝑖 corresponds to 𝐾, 
𝐿, 𝐹 , and 𝑆. Also, initial efficiency levels (𝐸𝑖0) are defined as the corresponding ratio 
between output and each input in period 𝑡 = 0 . Thereby, the initial efficiency levels 








































𝜎−1                                 (8d) 
where 𝑄0  is total output of agriculture in the initial period, 𝐾0  is stock of capital in 
agriculture in the initial period, 𝐿0 is labor hired by agriculture in the initial period, 𝐹0 is 
fertilizer used by agriculture in the initial period, and 𝑆0 is animal feed used in the initial 
period. Also, the distribution parameter between nests is denoted by 𝛼, within the first 




Therefore, the nested CES production function for Colombia’s agriculture can be 
written as the following expression, substituting equations (7) and (8) in equation (6):   
 







































            (9) 
From this, the measurement of agricultural productivity in Colombia consists of a 
typical profit maximization problem, with this functional form assumed for the production 
function. Also, each equation derived from this optimization is normalized and 
linearized36 (i.e. the functional form on the nested CES production function, and the first 
order conditions). In addition, this optimization is solved assuming that Colombia’s 





, its mark-up in equilibrium is 1 + 𝜇 =
𝜀
1−𝜀
, and its income is 𝑄𝑡 = (1 + 𝜇)(𝑅𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝑊𝑡𝐿𝑡 + 𝑓𝑃𝑡𝐹𝑡 + 𝑠𝑃𝑡𝑆𝑡), where real returns 
to capital are denoted by 𝑅𝑡, wage paid for labor by 𝑊𝑡, fertilizer price by 𝑓𝑃𝑡, and animal 
feed price by 𝑠𝑃𝑡.   
                                                     
36  This study uses natural logarithms for the linearization, and uses the geometrical mean for the normalization 













































}                  (10) 




































]                   (11) 




































]                   (12) 
ln(𝑓𝑃𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛 [



































]                    (13) 




































]                    (14) 
 
In econometric terms, this system of equations is estimated using Iterative Feasible 
Generalized Non-Linear Least Squares (IFGNLS) as recommended by Kreuser, Burger, & 




elasticity of substitution biased towards unity often exhibited when this system of 
equations is estimated as a Seemingly Unrelated Regression model (SUR) (Luoma & Luoto, 
2011). This study estimates parameters for technical change 𝛾𝑖  and elasticities of 
substitution (𝜎, 𝜂, and 𝜁) simultaneously from this optimization. It estimates this system 
of equations under two scenarios: i) Hicks-neutral technical change (𝛾𝐾 = 𝛾𝐿 = 𝛾𝐹 =
𝛾𝑆 = 𝛾 ); and ii) biased technical change ( 𝛾𝐾 ≠ 𝛾𝐿 ≠ 𝛾𝐹 ≠ 𝛾𝑆 ). Also, it measures 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity growth, denoted by TFP, as the actual output growth 
in period 𝑡  not explained by input growth in period 37. In addition, it determines the 
presence of biased technical change by testing the following hypotheses: 
 
 𝐻0: γ𝑖 − γ𝑗 ≥  0  Technical change is augmenting input 𝑖 relative to input 𝑗.           
 𝐻𝑎: γ𝑖 − γ𝑗 <  0   Technical change is augmenting input 𝑗 relative to input 𝑖.     
      
This study follows a similar procedure for the measurement of crop and livestock 
productivity. However, it considers a nested CES production function with only one nest 
and an extra input, because it is assumed that crop and livestock production depends 
strongly on three inputs only in both cases. For crops, it assumes that these inputs are 
capital, labor and fertilizer. Thus, it considers two possible forms for this nested CES 
production function: i) primary inputs (labor and capital) in the nest and fertilizer as an 
extra output (see equation 15); and ii) capital related inputs (capital and fertilizer) in the 
                                                     
37 Input growth is estimated as the growth of the predicted output, keeping inactive the time trend component (in this 




nest, and labor as an extra input (see equation 16). For livestock, the establish inputs are 
capital, labor and animal feed. Hence, it also considered two possible forms for this nested 
CES production function: i) primary inputs (labor and capital) in the nest and animal feed 
as an extra output (see equation 17); and ii) capital-related inputs (capital and animal feed) 

























































                            (18) 
This implied that the measurement of crop and livestock productivity in Colombia 
involves a slightly different profit maximization problem. The main changes involve a 
different form for the initial linearized and normalized production function (equation 10), 
three first order condition equations only, and a different form for the first order 
condition estimated for the input considered as extra in each case. For instance, the 
following is the system of equations estimated to measure crop productivity in the 
                                                     





scenario for which primary inputs (labor and capital) are included in the nest and fertilizer 
is considered as an extra output. The system of equations is equivalent in structure for 
































}                                                            (19) 




































]         (20) 




































]          (21) 





















                                                                                                                                                        (22) 
4.3.2 Dual techniques 
In some respects, the measurement of agricultural productivity through dual 
techniques is simpler than using primal methods39. Antle & Capalbo (1988) indicate that 
dual functions, such as a cost or profit function, are valid alternatives to represent the 
                                                     
39 The measurement of productivity depends on prices, which are usually easier to collect than quantities 




multi-product function and to define technical change. The effects of technical change 
can then be perceived and quantified through a reduction in cost or an increase in profits, 
given an output and a set of input prices.  
Capalbo (1988) explains the intuition behind the usage of cost functions to estimate 
technical change by starting with a general form of the cost function, such as the following: 
𝐶 = 𝑔(𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛, 𝑄, 𝑡)                                                                      (23) 
where 𝐶 is the total cost in agriculture, 𝑛 are inputs demanded, 𝑤𝑖 is the price of input 𝑖, 
𝑄 is the output of agriculture, and 𝑡 is a time trend variable.  























                                                                   (24) 
By employing Shephard’s Lemma (
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝑥𝑖), multiplying and dividing the first term 
by input prices (𝑤𝑖) and the second by output (𝑄), and by defining for all variables ?̇? =
𝜕𝑎 𝜕𝑡⁄
𝑎
, this expression can be written as:  
?̇? = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑤𝑖̇
𝑛
𝑖 + 𝜖𝐶𝑄?̇? + ?̇?                                                                            (25) 
where ?̇? = 
𝜕𝑔 𝜕𝑡⁄
𝐶









Now, by rearranging the terms, this expression is equal to:    
−?̇? = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑤𝑖̇
𝑛
𝑖 + 𝜖𝐶𝑄?̇? − ?̇?                                                                     (26) 
Capalbo (1988) explains that this expression defines the rate of technical change 
(−?̇?) as an index of the rate of change exhibited by input prices  (∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑤𝑖̇
𝑛
𝑖 ) plus a scale 




technical change (−?̇?) is also related to productivity growth (𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ ), by using as starting 
point the following expression for the cost function:  
𝐶 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖                                                                                   (27) 


















𝑖                                                                       (28) 
By multiplying and dividing the first term by the demand for inputs (𝑥𝑖) and the 
second by input prices (𝑤𝑖), as well as assuming that 𝑠𝑖 is equal to 
𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝐶
, this expression 
can be written as:  
?̇? = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑥?̇?
𝑛
𝑖 + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑤𝑖̇
𝑛
𝑖                                                                              (29) 
Rearranging the terms of this expression yields:  
−∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑥?̇?
𝑛
𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑤𝑖̇
𝑛
𝑖 − ?̇?                                                                         (30) 
Substituting this expression in equation 26 and rearranging terms yields:  
−?̇? = 𝜖𝐶𝑄?̇? − ?̇?                                                                                           (31) 
where ?̇? is equal to ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑥?̇?
𝑛
𝑖 .  
For the multiple output-case, where agriculture minimizes the cost of producing 𝑗 
outputs using 𝑖 inputs, Capalbo (1988) indicates this equivalent expression:  
−?̇? = ∑ 𝜖𝐶𝑄𝑗 𝑄𝑗̇ − ?̇?                                                                                       (32) 
Thus, by using the conventional definition of productivity growth, which establishes 
that is the growth not explained by input growth (𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ = ?̇? − ?̇?), and substituting this 




𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ = −?̇? + (1 − ∑ 𝜖𝐶𝑄𝑗 )?̇?,        where ∑ 𝜖𝐶𝑄𝑗 ≠ 1                      (33) 
Hence, productivity growth (𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ ) exhibits a negative relation with shifts in the 
cost function and scale effects, but also a positive relation to output growth. Also, the 
measurement of productivity growth relies on the quantification of shifts in production 
and cost-output elasticities (𝜖𝐶𝑄) (Capalbo, 1988). 
This study measures agricultural, crop, and livestock productivity in Colombia by 
estimating these components assuming a trans-log form for the cost function. This 
functional form is a second-order approximation of an arbitrary twice-continuously 
differentiable cost function, which exhibits three main strengths: i) it is a flexible 
functional form; ii) it does not established restrictions on the substitution possibilities 
among inputs, and iii) it allows that scale economies can vary based on the output level 
(Kant & Nautiyal, 1997; Varian, 1978). Also, it has been used successfully by other studies 
in which the cost generating dynamic structure was unknown (Binswanger, 1974b; 
Christensen & Greene, 1976; Clark & Youngblood, 1992; Kant & Nautiyal, 1997; Sun et al., 
2009).     
The trans-log functional form assumed in this study for the cost production function 
can be written as: 





𝑖 + ∑ β𝑖𝑗ln𝑤𝑖𝑡ln𝑤𝑗𝑡𝑖 +








2 + ∑ β𝑖𝑡ln𝑤𝑖𝑡T𝑖 +




where 𝐶𝑡  are the production costs in Colombia’s agriculture in period 𝑡 , 𝑄𝑡  is the 
agricultural output in period 𝑡, 𝑤𝑖𝑡  is the price of input 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝑇 is a time trend 
variable that captures technology change, and inputs 𝑖  for estimating agricultural 
productivity are capital (𝐾𝑡), labor (𝐿𝑡), fertilizer (𝐹𝑡) and animal feed (𝑆𝑡), for crops 
productivity 𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 and 𝐹𝑡, and for livestock productivity 𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡. 
Cost share functions for input 𝑖 , which correspond to its optimal demand, are 




= 𝛼𝑖 + β𝑖𝑖ln𝑤𝑖𝑡 + ∑ β𝑖𝑗ln𝑤𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗 + β𝑖𝑄lnQ𝑡 + β𝑖𝑡T + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   (35) 
since Shepard’s Lemma establishes that  
𝜕𝐶
𝜕𝑤𝑖
= 𝑥𝑖 . This implies that the cost share 














= 𝑆𝑖.   
The estimation of equation (34) and equations (35) becomes a system of 𝑖 + 1 
equations, for which there exists an implied truncation error due to the fact that the cost 
function is a second order approximation (Christensen & Greene, 1976). This implies that 
this error is transmitted across the residuals of each cost share function, which formed 
clearly a system of a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). However, this study 
estimates this system of equations including only 3 of the 4 cost share equations in each 
run, since the sum of all cost share functions is 1 and estimating all four cost share 
equation can result in a singular covariance matrix. Also, this system of equations was 
estimated by using Iterative Feasible Generalized Non-Linear Least Squares (IFGNLS), 




invariant regardless which equation is dropped (Greene, 2012). In addition, prices and 
quantities are normalized to 1 in 1995, which is the mid-point year of the sample, as 
economic literature suggested (Capalbo, 1988). 
 The following restrictions were included in the estimation to ensure that the 
corresponding production function is well behaved (Antle & Capalbo, 1988; Kant & 
Nautiyal, 1997): i) coefficients are the same in the cost function and cost share equations; 
ii) coefficients are symmetric among equations; iii) ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 1; ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑄𝑖 = 0; and iv) ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑖 =
∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑖 = ∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑖 ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝑖 = 0𝑗 . Also, own price elasticities are calculated for all inputs in 
order to evaluate the cost function estimated, by using the following expression. This is 
equivalent to calculating these elasticities using the Allen partial elasticities of 
substitution (AES) using equation (34) and equation (35) (Binswanger, 1974a)40: 
𝜖𝑊𝑋 = 𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 1 +
β𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑖𝑡
                           (36) 





= −?̇? = −(𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑇 + ∑ β𝑖𝑡ln𝑊𝑖𝑖 + β𝑄𝑡lnQ)                                (37) 
                                                     

















. Then, using that 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡
= 𝜖𝑊𝑋 and 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑡
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡

















where the basic assumption is that costs decrease due to technology improvements. 𝛼𝑡 
is the constant technical change, 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑇 is the acceleration rate of the technical change, 
∑ β𝑖𝑡ln𝑊𝑖𝑖  is the input bias and β𝑄𝑡lnQ is the scale bias. Therefore, pure technical change 
is equal to −(𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑡𝑇), which corresponds to the rate of reduction in overall costs due 
to a technical innovation holding constant the scale production effect. Also, scale 
augmenting technical change is measured by -β𝑄𝑡lnQ, which is the rate of reduction in 
costs due to a technical innovation that is exhibited along with changes in output.  
Technical change should be calculated using the following expression when the 
production function behind a trans-log cost function is non homothetic (Antle & Capalbo, 
1988): 
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) denotes the scale effect of technical change.   
In addition, the hypotheses to test for biased technical change are the following, 
which are in terms of input-saving, since these test the rate of change in cost shares due 
to technical change (
𝜕𝑆𝑖
𝜕𝑇
= 𝛽𝑡𝑖).      
 
𝐻0: β𝑖𝑡 < β𝑗𝑡  Technical change is input 𝑖–saving and input 𝑗-using.           
𝐻𝑎: β𝑖𝑡 ≥ β𝑗𝑡   Technical change is input 𝑗-saving and input 𝑖-using.     




The cost-output elasticity, crucial in the decomposition of productivity growth 




= 𝛼𝑄 + ∑ β𝑖𝑄ln𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑄𝑄 ln𝑄 + β𝑄𝑡T                                (39) 
Thus, an estimable expression for productivity growth (𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ ), based on equation 
33, is:  
𝑇𝐹𝑃̇ = −?̂̇? + (1 − 𝜖𝐶?̂?)?̇? + 𝜀                                                  (40) 
where −?̂̇?  is the shift estimated for the cost function due to technical change (see 
equation 37), 𝜖𝐶?̂? is the cost-output elasticity estimated (see equation 39) and 𝜀 are the 










The underlying data used in this study primarily come from FAOSTAT, World Bank 
and USDA (FAO, 2015; USDA, 2015; World Bank, 2016). In order to expand the dataset for 
Colombia’s agriculture, this study uses data from the National Department of Statistics of 
Colombia (DANE), the Central Bank of Colombia (BANREP), and the International Fertilizer 
Industry Association (IFA) (BANREP, 2015; DANE, 2015; IFA, 2016). This allowed us to build 
a historical database for Colombia’s’ agriculture from 1975-2013 based on existing data 
availability. This database includes the value of Colombia’s agricultural output 
(aggregated and disaggregated by crops and livestock), and quantities and prices of inputs 
such as labor, capital, fertilizer, and animal feed. The construction of each variable 
included in this database is explained in detail below.
 
5.1 Output 
The value of agricultural production corresponds to the total gross production value 
released yearly by FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). FAO compiles these data by multiplying the 
gross production in physical terms by output prices at the farm gate (FAO, 2015)41. In the 
case of Colombia, this figure encompasses the value of production for 85 crops and 
                                                     









livestock commodities. Also, this ensures the usage of accurate data for the value of 
aggregate agriculture production, as well as for value of production of crops and livestock. 
These data are used as they are released: annually (per calendar year) and in 2005 
international dollars. FAOSTAT releases these data in this currency unit in order to 
facilitate comparisons across analysis about productivity at the country level. The aim is 
to avoid the need to use exchange rates by assigning a single price to each commodity. 
Accordingly, one metric ton of any commodity has a unique price worldwide regardless 
where is produced (FAO, 2015).     
For crops, the data correspond to crop category reported by FAOSTAT. This includes 
data for all harvested production in Colombia, sold in the market and consumed by the 
producers, multiplied by their producer prices (FAO, 2015). This also includes data for 74 
crop products. For livestock, the data source is FAOSTAT as well, and corresponds to its 
livestock category, including production of eleven animal products, such as cattle meat, 
poultry meat, pork meat, milk, etc., multiplied by their producer prices.  
 
5.2 Inputs 
5.2.1 Capital Stock 
Capital stock used in this study corresponds to Colombia’s gross capital stock 
released yearly by FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). This is calculated as the sum of individual 
physical assets held by Colombian farmers (FAO, 2015). Also, this dataset includes data 








livestock (i.e. fixed assets and inventory), machinery, and structures for livestock. This 
allows for the present study to disaggregate the capital stock for crops and for livestock.  
Crops capital stock compiles the value of gross capital in plantation crops42 and land 
development (FAO, 2015). Livestock capital stock encompasses the value of livestock 
fixed assets, livestock inventory, and in structures for livestock. FAO also releases figures 
for capital stock in machinery and equipment (FAO, 2015). However, this includes assets 
that can be owned by either activity, such as tractors. Accordingly, this study divides this 
stock for crops and livestock--using their respective shares in the total value of agricultural 
production--in order to consider this capital stock in both cases.   
Capital stock data is only available from 1961-2007. Accordingly, this study updated 
it for more recent years based on net investment flows to Colombia’s agriculture (DANE, 
2015). This allowed for an estimation of capital stock for Colombia’s agriculture in terms 
of aggregate, crops, and livestock figures for the period covered by this study (1975-2013). 
This study used the data as they are released: annually (per calendar year) and in 2005 
international dollars.  
This study also estimates the cost (input price) of capital. To this end, we relied on 
the definition from cost benefit analysis, which considers the cost of capital as the 
opportunity cost for investing in a particular asset (Campbell & Brown, 2003). Therefore, 
its measurement is the sum of the real interest rate plus the depreciation rate for 
agricultural assets. The real interest rate is calculated as the difference between the 
                                                     








nominal interest rate and inflation. This nominal interest rate corresponds to a traditional 
passive interest rate in Colombia, also known as DTF43, since there is not an official 
interest rate for agriculture credit in Colombia, and these are often indexed to this 
interest rate. In addition, agricultural credits are often subject to a subsidy according to 
the type of farmer (i.e. small, medium, or large), which (for this study and other research) 
corresponds to a deduction of 5 percentage points from this interest rate (Illera, 2009; C. 
Jaramillo & Jimenez, 2008)44. Finally, the depreciation rate for agriculture is taken from 
Pombo (Pombo, 1999). Pombo calculated the average depreciation rates exhibited by 
capital for all economic activity in Colombia.   
 
 
5.2.2 Farm Labor and Wages 
Farm labor data used in this study correspond to the total number of people (male 
and female) economically active in Colombia’s agriculture, as released by the USDA for 
the years 1961-2012 (USDA, 2015). This study updated these data for the last decade 
(2001-2013) using available, more accurate data from national sources (DANE, 2015). 
Basically, it used the USDA data as a starting point, and then, using the farm labor growth 
reported by these sources, predicts the farm labor for the last decade. This study uses 
these data as they are released: annually (per calendar year).  
                                                     
43 DTF corresponds to a Fixed Term Deposit Rate in Colombia. 
44 Corresponds to a weighted average of percentage points commonly deducted for small farmers credits (-8pp) and 
for medium and large farmers credits (-4pp), taking into account that credits for small farmers historically represent 
25% of agricultural credits, while credits for medium and large farmers account for the remaining 75%. These 
percentage points deducted are the ones that Colombian bank have usually deducted to farm credits by farmer type 








For crops and livestock, labor data are primarily estimated in this study based on 
data reported by Barrientos & Castrillón (2007). This study reveals these data 
disaggregated for Colombia. However, it does so for the period 1993-2005 only. 
Accordingly, this study uses the data of that study as a starting point to estimate the labor 
data for crops and livestock before and after its scope (i.e. for periods 1975-1993 and 
2006-2013). To this end, the present study uses their average trend within the sample. 
This trend exhibited a good fit, and enables this study to make a robust prediction. In 
crops its R2 was 0.98, and in livestock it was 0.72. Thus, this study used these average 
trends to estimate labor data for crops and livestock. However, these estimations yield 
labor data slightly different from the USDA. Therefore, this study calculates labor shares 
for crops and livestock based on the predicted data, and then multiplied these shares by 
the USDA data. This allowed this study to predict the labor data for crops and livestock 
coherent with the USDA data45.   
Farm labor wages are derived implicitly from annual national accounts (DANE, 
2015). These data reveal the total payroll paid by each sector in Colombia to generate 
sectoral GDP. Thus, this study takes the value paid by agriculture in current pesos, and 
estimates the average wage paid per employee by dividing this value by total farm labor. 
Then, this amount is converted into 2005 American dollars, by: i) dividing this value by 
the annual average Colombian exchange rate of peso-US American dollars (BANREP, 
                                                     
45 I’m aware that this procedure implies imposing exactly the same volatility of aggregated agricultural labor on labor 
in crops and livestock. However, this is considered one of the most straightforward ways to estimate labor data for 









2015); and ii) dividing this value by the GDP deflator for US$ prices with the base year 
2005 (FAO, 2015).    
It is worth indicating that these wages may be underestimated. These values only 
represent half of the official minimum wage for rural areas in Colombia, and it does not 
include non-monetary payments (i.e. food, housing, etc.) commonly received by farmers 
in developing countries. This figure also does not differentiate labor by skills, since it is 
only an average wage, as indicated above. In addition, it is assumed that this wage is 




Fertilizer quantities correspond to the total amount of major nutrients (N+P2O5+K2O) 
demanded and applied to land by farmers in Colombia, released yearly by IFA (IFA, 2016). 
These data include all compound products derived from nitrogen (N), phosphate (P), and 
potash (K), such as Urea, Ammonium sulphate, Ammonium nitrate, Ammonium 
phosphate, and Potassium sulphate, among others. This study uses these data as these 
were released: annually (per calendar year) and in metric tons. 
Fertilizer prices are estimated by this study based on FAOSTAT, DANE and BANREP 
(BANREP, 2015; DANE, 2015; FAO, 2015). The reason for this is that there is no historical 
database that compiles these prices in Colombia for the period covered by this study 
(1975-2013). Available data is for recent years (AGRONET, 2014). Thus, this study 








indicator46. This price is reported annually (per calendar year) by FAOSTAT in current 
Colombian pesos and per metric ton for the period 1961-2002. However, the data exhibit 
some missing values for the 1990’s, which are approximated in this study using the annual 
average Producer Price Index (PPI) of fertilizers, released monthly by BANREP since the 
early 1990’s and by DANE in recent years (BANREP, 2015; DANE, 2015). Also, this price 
was estimated up to 2013 following the same procedure. Then, this current price is 
converted to 2005 American dollars by: i) dividing this value by the annual average 
Colombian exchange rate of peso-US American dollars (BANREP, 2015); and ii) dividing 
this value by the GDP deflator for US$ prices with the base year 2005 (FAO, 2015). 
 
5.2.4 Animal Feed 
Animal feed quantities used in this study come from FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). These 
correspond to the total crop and animal products used for feeding animals. FAOSTAT 
reports these quantities in the Commodities Balance Sheet. This study uses these data as 
they are released: annually (per calendar year) and in metric tons.  
Animal feed price is derived from FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). This study estimates this 
price implicitly and as a weighted average. It takes the producer prices of crop and animal 
fish products used for feeding animals reported by FAOSTAT, and calculates the value of 
each feed using their quantities. Then, it estimates the total value of these products for 
each year. Finally, this total value is divided by the total product quantity to calculate an 
                                                     








average price per metric ton of animal feed for each year. Since this figure is in current 
Colombian pesos, it is the converted to American dollars, by: i) dividing this value by the 
annual average Colombian exchange rate peso-US American dollar (BANREP, 2015); and 









CHAPTER 6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION     
6.1 Introduction 
This study uses primal and dual econometric techniques for the measurement of 
agricultural productivity in Colombia. The objective is to use a variety of methodologies 
from the economics literature as strategy to look for more consistent results. For primal 
techniques, this study experiments by assuming the following functional forms of the 
production function: i) Cobb-Douglas; and ii) Constant Elasticity of Substitution – CES. For 
dual techniques, this study uses a trans-log cost function. In addition, this study estimates 
the productivity of Colombia’s agriculture in aggregate, and also disaggregated for crops 
and livestock.  
This chapter presents the results obtained by this study in two sections. In the first, 
it reports in detail the results obtained for agricultural productivity in Colombia, using 
each econometric method. In the second, it compares these results across techniques by 
focusing on the decomposition of agricultural output growth between input accumulation 
and productivity growth during the period 1975-2013. In parallel, it also analyzes changes 
in agricultural productivity over time, and how they relate to agricultural policy and 









6.2.1 Primal Techniques 
6.2.1.1 Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
6.2.1.1.1 Total Agriculture 
The model based on assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant 
returns to scale for Colombia’s agriculture as an aggregate shows an excellent fit. Its R2 is 
0.984, and its Root Mean Square Error (Root MSE) is 0.034 (see Table 14, column 1). Also, 
this model does not show heteroskedasticity, since it is estimated assuming robust 
standard errors, as for all models in this chapter. In addition, it does not show serial 
autocorrelation, since its Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 1.6547. This model is not robust, 
however. Its estimates change significantly when technical change, for instance, is 
calculated for specific periods (see Table 14, column 2 and column 3). Also, specification 
changes lead to different coefficient estimates. 
The results of this model indicate that Colombia’s agriculture as an aggregate did 
not exhibit technical change during the period 1975-2013, when it is assumed constant 
over time (see Table 14, column 1). Agricultural productivity measured as TFP did not 
grow over this period. These results contradict USDA’s productivity estimates for 
Colombia’s agriculture, which predict that Colombia’s agricultural productivity grew on 
average by 1.4% over this period (USDA, 2015). There are two possible reasons for this 
                                                     
47 The rule of thumb for testing serial autocorrelation establishes that if the Durbin Watson Index (DW) is lower (higher) 
than 2, then this indicates possible positive (negative) serial autocorrelation among residuals. Also, if the DW index is 








discrepancy. On the one hand, the USDA estimates agricultural TFP for Colombian 
agriculture as a residual variable using an accounting technique, including the cost shares 
from Brazil’s agriculture, and assuming that these are similar in both countries (USDA, 
2016). However, this study finds that these cost shares (or production function coefficient 
estimates) are very different48 (see Table 14, column 1). The labor cost share in Colombia 
is on average 7%, whereas in Brazil it is 42% (USDA, 2015). The Colombian capital cost 
share is 21.5%, while in Brazil it is 40.7%. The fertilizer cost share in Colombia is 30.2%, 
while in Brazil it is 10.8%; Colombian animal feed cost share is 41.3%, while in Brazil it is 
6.5%. These differences are due to the fact that agriculture in these countries is very 
different. In Colombia, the cost share of intermediate inputs (i.e. fertilizers and animal 
feed) is higher than the cost share of primary inputs (i.e. labor and capital) (72% and 28% 
of the total costs, respectively). In contrast, the cost of primary inputs in Brazil constitutes 
almost all agricultural costs (83% of the total). Moreover, since the USDA uses an 
accounting technique for measuring Colombia’s agricultural TFP, this might be biased due 
to omitting important regressors unrelated to productivity. 
This study also estimates this model considering that technical change might have 
varied across periods established in Chapter 2 (see Table 14, column 2). To this end, six 
dummy variables were included for each period in the initial specification, as well as 
another six time-trend variables interacted with these dummy variables. The aim was to 
                                                     
48  It is worth noting that estimated coefficients are marginal cost shares, not average cost shares. Also, these 
coefficients are not equal to marginal cost shares if the strong assumptions listed in detail in Chapter 4 do not hold. In 








examine the conclusion that agricultural productivity in Colombia did not grow during the 
period 1975-2013, by estimating a more appropriate specification in which technical 
change varies over time. Also, this approach might sweep out potential serial 
autocorrelation issues, by estimating a period specification which might break the 
correlation across residuals.  
This revised model also shows an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.994, and its Root MSE is 
0.025, which is slightly better than the initial model (see Table 14, column 2). Also, this 
model does not show serial autocorrelation, since its Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 2.33. 
In addition, this model is estimated with no constant in order to include a dummy variable 
for all periods. 
This specification is considered the most appropriate to analyze technical change 
by periods. This allows the pace of technical change to have varied over time, and it might 
have exhibited a different starting point in each period. However, this presents a problem 
for this study. Almost all time trend variables are not statistically significant, except for 
the technical change exhibited in the period 1975-1983, when it grew on average by 1% 
per year, and the technical change in the period 1998-2002, when it rose on average by 
2.5% per year. This might suggest that this specification could have removed important 
information, because the inclusion of 12 dummy variables in a sample of only 39 
observations might have captured correlated effects. Therefore, this study uses an 
alternative specification, in which it includes only six time-trend variables by period in the 
model. This corrects the problem explained above and does not affect seriously the model, 








This alternative model shows an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.992, and its Root MSE is 
0.025 (see Table 14, column 3). Also, this model does not show any econometric problems, 
and its Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 2.15. Its results show that Colombia’s agriculture 
as an aggregate exhibited continuous technical change during the period 1975-2013 (see 
Table 14, column 3). This varied between 0.5% and 0.9% per year. Also, agricultural 
productivity measured as TFP grew on average 0.6% per year over this period. Thereby, 
this contradicts our initial conclusion, which shows that Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity had not grown over this period. However, this model exhibits a problem with 
estimating the input cost shares. It estimates that the cost share of labor is negative (-
8.1%), although it is not statistically significant. This might suggest that Colombia’s 
agriculture exhibited labor surplus during this period. Also, this might explain the 
significant differences regarding all inputs cost shares when these are estimated assuming 
constant technical change over time. This model estimates that the capital cost share is 
75.2%, whereas this figure was only 21.5% assuming constant technical change; this 
model also estimates that the fertilizer cost share is only 20% while it was 30.2% assuming 
constant technical change; and this also estimates that the animal feed cost share is only 








Table 14: Cobb-Douglas Production Function of Colombia’s Agriculture 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Outputt) Log(Outputt) Log(Outputt) 
Log(Labort) 0.0700 -0.189 -0.0811 
 (0.109) (0.213) (0.144) 
Log(Capitalt) 0.215* 0.918*** 0.752*** 
 (0.117) (0.265) (0.193) 
Log(Fertilizert) 0.302*** 0.114 0.199*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0835) (0.0400) 
Log(Animal Feedt) 0.413*** 0.158 0.130 
 (0.0522) (0.102) (0.0829) 
Technical Change  -0.00224   
 (0.00236)   
Technical Change − (1975 − 1983)  0.0104** 0.00691* 
  (0.00496) (0.00354) 
Technical Change − (1984 − 1989)  0.00925 0.00457* 
  (0.00881) (0.00233) 
Technical Change − (1990 − 1997)  -0.00108 0.00694*** 
  (0.00619) (0.00228) 
Technical Change − (1998 − 2002)  0.0246** 0.00749*** 
  (0.00885) (0.00237) 
Technical Change − (2003 − 2009)  0.00202 0.00861*** 
  (0.00804) (0.00259) 
Technical Change − (2010 − 2013)  0.00996 0.00499** 
  (0.00931) (0.00204) 
Intercept Technical Change − (1975 − 1983)  -1.445  
  (2.789)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1984 − 1989)  -1.445  
  (2.750)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1990 − 1997)  -1.239  
  (2.768)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1998 − 2002)  -1.830  
  (2.855)  
Intercept Technical Change − (2003 − 2009)  -1.171  
  (2.596)  
Intercept Technical Change − (2010 − 2013)  -1.577  
  (2.601)  
Constant 6.316***  0.484 
 (1.243)  (2.006) 
Observations 39 39 39 
Root MSE 0.034 0.025 0.025 
R-squared1 0.984 0.994  0992 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because STATA 
software does not report 𝑅2 for constraint regressions like these. This study estimates these regressions imposing a 









The model for crop production, assuming constant returns to scale, also shows a 
good fit. Its R2 is 0.897 and its Root MSE is 0.066 (see Table 15, column 1). This model does 
not exhibit econometric problems either, since an initial serial autocorrelation problem 
among residuals was solved by including the crop output lagged one year as another 
regressor 49 . In addition, this model is also not robust. All coefficients change when 
technical change is calculated for specific periods (see Table 15, column 2 and column 3). 
The results of this model indicate that crop production exhibited a negative rate of 
technical change (-0.8% per year) during the period 1976-201350, when it is assumed 
constant over time (see Table 15, column 1). Crop productivity measured as TFP 
decreased on average about -0.8% per year during this period. This result is consistent 
with the null growth exhibited by Colombia’s agricultural TFP as an aggregate, when I 
assume constant technical change over time. In addition, primary inputs explain on 
average about 91% of costs in crop production (i.e. labor costs are 43.6% and capital costs 
are 47.3%); whereas intermediate inputs (i.e. fertilizer costs) determine the remaining 9%. 
                                                     
49 The initial DW Index was 0.46, which indicated positive serial autocorrelation among residuals. Once the dependent 
variable is lagged and included in the model, this problem is solved according to the alternative DW test. This study 
uses this test, since the Durbin h test (i.e. the most appropriate for cases with lagged variables) cannot be calculated 
due to a negative value within the square root of its formula. Thus, the alternative DW test allows testing for serial 
autocorrelation in these cases, by regressing the current residuals on the lagged residuals, lagged dependent variable, 
and all independent variables. Thereby, serial autocorrelation is tested by assessing the statistical significance of the 
lagged residuals coefficient.       
50 The results are reported for the period 1976-2013, since the model lost one observation in the estimation in order to 








This fertilizer cost share estimate is somewhat low given recent evidence, although it is 
not statistically significant51.  
This study also estimates this model considering that technical change might have 
varied across periods (see Table 15, column 2). To this end, six dummy variables were also 
included for each period in the initial specification, as well as another six time-trend 
variables interacted with these dummy variables. The objective is to examine the 
conclusion that crop productivity decreased during the period 1976-2013, as well as to 
sweep out the serial autocorrelation of the model.  
This revised model shows an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.982 and its Root MSE is 0.032, 
which is slightly better than the initial model (see Table 15, column 2). Also, this model 
does not show any econometric problems, and its Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 2.07. 
In addition, it is estimated with no constant in order to include a dummy variable for all 
periods. However, this specification could have also removed important information due 
to the inclusion of 12 dummy variables into the model, as in the aggregate model. This 
might have affected the estimation of the model, since it yields some implausible results. 
For instance, technical change growth is close to 5% per year in the period 1998-2002. 
Historical evidence explains that Colombia’s economy experienced a serious economic 
crisis in this period: armed conflict worsened, many people in rural areas left their farms 
due to the violence, and economic policy encouraged very little the creation of an 
attractive environment for productivity growth and private investment during this period 
                                                     
51 On average, based on crop budget data, the cost share of fertilizer in total production costs varied between 10% and 








(Alban, 2011; DNP, 2002; FAO, 2000; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Montero & Casas, 2012). 
Thus, this study also uses an alternative specification for crop production, including only 
the six time-trend variables by period in the model.  
This alternative model also exhibits an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.969, and its Root MSE 
is 0.039 (see Table 15, column 3). This model does not exhibit any econometric problems, 
and its Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 1.94. Its results indicate that crop production did 
not exhibit technical change during the period 1976-2013 at a 10% level of statistical 
significance (see Table 15, column 3). Technical change might have decreased in crop 
production on average by -0.6% with a probability of 80%, which is consistent with the 
negative technical change estimated by the model assuming constant technical change. 
In addition, this model estimates a different cost structure for crop production. It 
estimates that the capital cost share is 72.2%, whereas it was only 47.3% assuming 
constant technical change; it estimates that the labor cost share is 9.1% and not 
statistically significant at 10%, while it in fact was 43.6% assuming constant technical 
change; and it also estimates that fertilizer cost share is 18.6%, while it was 9.2% assuming 









Table 15: Cobb-Douglas Production Function of Colombia’s Crops 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Outputt) Log(Outputt) Log(Outputt) 
Log(Outputt−1) 0.483*   
 (0.251)   
Log(Labort) 0.436*** -0.114 0.0915 
 (0.141) (0.146) (0.176) 
Log(Capitalt) 0.473*** 0.890*** 0.722*** 
 (0.144) (0.174) (0.160) 
Log(Fertilizert) 0.0916 0.224*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0885) (0.0714) (0.0443) 
Technical Change  -0.00841*   
 (0.00441)   
Technical Change − (1975 − 1983)  0.00649 0.000981 
  (0.00922) (0.00706) 
Technical Change − (1984 − 1989)  -0.00714 -0.00613 
  (0.00731) (0.00477) 
Technical Change − (1990 − 1997)  0.00338 -0.00264 
  (0.00450) (0.00306) 
Technical Change − (1998 − 2002)  0.0471*** -0.000816 
  (0.0128) (0.00299) 
Technical Change − (2003 − 2009)  0.00566 0.00415 
  (0.00383) (0.00336) 
Technical Change − (2010 − 2013)  0.0109 0.000196 
  (0.0171) (0.00299) 
Intercept Technical Change − (1975 − 1983)  0.324  
  (1.695)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1984 − 1989)  0.388  
  (1.657)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1990 − 1997)  0.253  
  (1.600)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1998 − 2002)  -0.858  
  (1.858)  
Intercept Technical Change − (2003 − 2009)  0.376  
  (1.503)  
Intercept Technical Change − (2010 − 2013)  0.0255  
  (1.623)  
Constant -6.759  1.819 
 (5.819)  (1.474) 
Observations 38 39 39 
Root MSE 0.066 0.032 0.039 
R-squared1 0.897 0.982  0.969 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because STATA 
software does not report 𝑅2 for constraint regressions like these. This study estimates these regressions imposing a 










The model for livestock production, assuming constant returns to scale, also 
presents an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.977 and its Root MSE is 0.052 (see Table 16, column 1). 
This model does not show econometric problems, and livestock output lagged one year 
is included as another regressor in the model in order to solve an initial serial 
autocorrelation problem52. In addition, this model is not robust. Its coefficients change 
sharply when technical change is calculated for specific periods (see Table 16, column 2 
and column 3).  
The results of this model indicate that livestock production shows better results in 
terms of technical innovation in comparison to crop production during the period 1976-
2013 (see Table 16, column 1). Livestock production exhibits a statistically significant 
technical change of 1.1% per year over this period. Therefore, livestock productivity 
measured as TFP grew on average by 1.1% per year during this period, versus the null 
growth exhibited by overall agricultural productivity. In addition, primary inputs explain 
on average about 83% of cost in livestock production (i.e. capital costs 63.7% and labor 
costs 19.2%), while intermediates inputs (i.e. animal feed costs) determined the 
remaining 17.1%53. Thus, livestock production was intensive in primary inputs in Colombia, 
mainly in capital.   
                                                     
52 Initial DW was 0.94, which indicated positive serial autocorrelation among residuals. Once the dependent variables 
is lagged and included in the model, this problem is solved according to the alternative DW test. The lagged residuals 
coefficient in that test is not statistically significant. This study also experienced problems calculating the Durbin h in 
this case. 
53 This low cost share of animal feed in the total livestock production reaffirms the fact that Colombia’s livestock 
production is land extensive (DANE, 2015). This means that pastures are used mainly to feed livestock rather than 








This study also estimates this model considering that technical change might have 
varied across periods. To this end, six dummy variables were also included for each period 
in the initial specification, as well as another six time-trend variables interacted with these 
dummy variables. The objective is to confirm that livestock productivity increases over 
the period 1976-2013 and to determine their variation across certain periods defined 
above. Also, it may sweep out the serial autocorrelation of the model.  
This model exhibits an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.993 and its Root MSE is 0.034 (see 
Table 16, column 2). Also, this model does not show any econometric problems, and its 
Durbin Watson (DW) is 2.38. In addition, it estimated with no constant in order to include 
a dummy variable for all periods.  
The results of this model confirm that livestock production exhibited technical 
change during the period 1975-2003, but it indicates that it was not continuous over time. 
Technical change grew on average by 1.2% per year during the late 1970’s, by 3.5% per 
year after the Latin America debt crisis in the 1980’s, by 1.8% per year in the late 1990’s, 
and by 2% annually in more recent years. Therefore, these results seem somewhat larger 
versus the 1.1% technical change estimated when this is assumed constant over time.  
This study also estimates an alternative specification for livestock production, 
because this model might have been affected by the inclusion of 12 dummy variables, 
similar to the aggregate model. This alternative model shows an excellent fit. Its R2 is 
0.991, and its Root MSE is 0.036 (see Table 16, column 3). Also, this model does not exhibit 
any econometric problems, and its Durbin Watson statistic (DW) is 1.64. Its results 








period 1976-2013 (see Table 16, column 3). This varies between 1.2% and 2% per year, 
rather than 1.1% per year, when it is estimated assuming constant technical change. 
Thereby, livestock productivity measured as TFP grew on average 1.6% per year over this 
period. However, this model also exhibits a problem estimating the input cost shares. It 
estimates that the cost share of labor is negative (-3.1%), although it is not statistically 
significant. This might suggest that livestock production exhibited labor surplus during 
this period. Also, this might indicate an incorrect estimation of all cost shares, which can 
explain the significant differences relative to cost shares estimated by assuming constant 
technical change over time. This model estimates that the cost share of capital is 92.7%, 
whereas it was 63.7% assuming constant technical change over time; and this estimates 
that the cost share of animal feed is 10.4% and not statistically significant, while it was 









Table 16: Cobb-Douglas Production Function of Colombia’s Livestock 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log(Outputt) Log(Outputt) Log(Outputt) 
Log(Outputt−1) 0.469**   
 (0.215)   
Log(Labort) 0.192* 0.0413 -0.0311 
 (0.106) (0.137) (0.117) 
Log(Capitalt) 0.637*** 0.771*** 0.927*** 
 (0.163) (0.156) (0.168) 
Log(Animal Feedt) 0.171 0.188 0.104 
 (0.113) (0.146) (0.153) 
Technical Change  0.0112*   
 (0.00584)   
Technical Change − (1975 − 1983)  0.0124* 0.0119** 
  (0.00619) (0.00565) 
Technical Change − (1984 − 1989)  0.0346*** 0.0169*** 
  (0.00947) (0.00361) 
Technical Change − (1990 − 1997)  0.00900 0.0195*** 
  (0.00791) (0.00552) 
Technical Change − (1998 − 2002)  0.0177* 0.0201*** 
  (0.00957) (0.00524) 
Technical Change − (2003 − 2009)  0.0200 0.0195*** 
  (0.0162) (0.00601) 
Technical Change − (2010 − 2013)  0.0204** 0.0155** 
  (0.00931) (0.00564) 
Intercept Technical Change − (1975 − 1983)  -1.009  
  (1.628)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1984 − 1989)  -1.216  
  (1.619)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1990 − 1997)  -0.789  
  (1.662)  
Intercept Technical Change − (1998 − 2002)  -0.938  
  (1.606)  
Intercept Technical Change − (2003 − 2009)  -1.017  
  (1.649)  
Intercept Technical Change − (2010 − 2013)  -1.165  
  (1.512)  
Constant -9.726*  -2.639 
 (5.502)  (1.747) 
Observations 38 39 39 
Root MSE 0.052 0.034 0.036 
R-squared1 0.977 0.993 0.991 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because STATA 
software does not report 𝑅2 for constraint regressions like these. This study estimates these regressions imposing a 









6.2.1.2 CES Production Function 
6.2.1.2.1 Total Agriculture 
The model based on assuming a CES production function with Hicks neutral 
technical change for Colombia’s agriculture shows an excellent fit for the output equation, 
but a very poor fit for input inverse demands, with the exception of the capital inverse 
demand. The R2 for the output equation is 0.95, and for capital inverse demand, it is 0.98. 
However, the R2 is just 0.02 for labor inverse demand, 0.09 for fertilizer inverse demand, 
and 0.06 for animal feed inverse demand (see Table 17). This model also does not exhibit 
heteroscedasticity, but it does present serial autocorrelation across the residuals54. I tried 
to fix this problem by including each dependent variable lagged one period as another 
regressor in their respective equations, as in the Cobb-Douglas case, but this procedure 
was ineffective. Then, I attempted to solve this problem by estimating a specification for 
which technical change might have varied over time. This had been effective to sweep 
out serial autocorrelation in the Cobb-Douglas case. However, this procedure was also 
ineffective. This model continued exhibiting serial autocorrelation. This study then 
employed the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, which fixed the problem but severely 
impacted the model’s estimation results. STATA software failed to estimate all elasticities 
of substitution, probably due to collinearity across variables. Therefore, this study reports 
the model without fixing serial autocorrelation, since: i) the technical change coefficient, 
                                                     
54 The DW index is 1.39 for capital inverse demand, 0.70 for labor inverse demand, 0.88 for fertilizer inverse demand, 
0.66 for animal feed inverse demand, and 0.41 for the output function. This indicated positive serial autocorrelation 








which is the most important result from this model, is robust, changing only marginally 
when the serial autocorrelation is corrected; and ii) STATA is able to estimate all 
elasticities of substitution without any problem.  
The results of this model indicate that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited technical 
change of almost 1.3% per year during 1976-2013 55  (see Table 17). Agricultural 
productivity measured as TFP grew on average 1.3% per year over this period. This result 
contradicts the null growth estimated by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function 
and constant technical change, and it is twice the productivity growth calculated by 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function but estimating a time-varying specification 
for technical change (0.6% per year). However, this result is close to the average 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity estimated by the USDA (1.4% per year) (USDA, 2015).  
This model also shows that Colombia’s agriculture varies its usage between primary 
and intermediate inputs due to changes in prices. The overall elasticity of substitution 
between nests (𝜎) is 1.3. Also, Colombia’s agriculture used apparently fixed proportions 
of capital and labor during this period, since the elasticity of substitution between primary 
inputs (𝜂) is not statistically significant at 10%. However, this elasticity of substitution 
between capital and labor (𝜂) is 2.8 and is statistically significant at 30% (see Table 17)56. 
In addition, fertilizer and animal feed usage were very sensitive to prices, since the 
elasticity of substitution between them ( 𝜁) is 1.9 and statistically significant at 1%. Since 
                                                     
55 The results are reported for the period 1976-2013, since the model lost one observation in the estimation. 
56 This elasticity of substitution may have been estimated imprecisely due to the serial autocorrelation issue, because 








these intermediate inputs are generally used by different agricultural activities (i.e. 
fertilizers in crops and animal feed in livestock), this reaffirms the importance of 
disaggregating the measurement of agricultural productivity into crops and livestock, as 
is done in the next section. 
Table 17: CES Production Function of Colombia’s Agriculture Assuming Hicks Neutral 
Technical Change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Technical 
Change 
𝜎 1 𝜂 2 𝜁 3 
     
 0.0128*** 1.259*** 2.834 1.916*** 
 (0.000679) (0.0795) (2.661) (0.609) 
     
Observations 38 38 38 38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
       
Equations Obs Parms 𝑅2* 
Log(Capitalt) 38 3 0.978 
Log(Labort) 38 3 0.022 
Log(Fertilizert) 38 3 0.091 
Log(Animal Feedt) 38 3 0.064 
Log(Outputt) 38 4 0.954 
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1 is the overall elasticity of substitution between nests. 
2 is the elasticity of substitution between primary inputs (i.e. capital and labor). 
3  is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs (i.e. fertilizer and animal feed). 
  
 
In order to test for the possible presence of biased technical change, this study 
relaxes the assumption that Colombia’s agriculture exhibits Hicks-neutral technical 
change. This also yields a model with an excellent fit for Colombia’s agricultural 








demands (see Table 18). The R2 for the output equation and for capital inverse demand 
are still 0.96 and 0.98, respectively; whereas for labor inverse demand the R2 increases 
slightly to 0.03, for fertilizer inverse demand it rises to 0.17, and for animal feed demand 
it falls to 0.02. Also, this model does not exhibit heteroscedasticity, but it presents serial 
autocorrelation across the residuals as in the previous model57. I followed the same 
procedure to fix it, which was also ineffective. I again tried the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, 
which fixed the problem, but it severely impacted all model coefficient estimates. STATA 
software failed to estimate all elasticities of substitution, probably due to collinearity 
across variables. It yields implausible estimates for technical change. Therefore, this study 
reports the model without fixing serial autocorrelation, since: i) the technical change 
coefficients, which are the most important results from this model, are robust, changing 
only marginally when the serial autocorrelation is corrected; and ii) STATA is able to 
estimate all elasticities of substitution without experiencing any estimation problem. 
The results of this model indicate that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited biased 
technical change during the period 1976-2013. This was capital-augmenting relative to all 
inputs, since technical change exhibited by capital grew on average by 4.1% per year over 
this period. Technical change exhibited by the others inputs is not statistically significant 
(see Table 18). Also, these results show that Colombia’s agricultural production tended to 
behave similarly to a Cobb-Douglas production function, since the overall elasticity of 
                                                     
57 The DW index is 1.49 for capital inverse demand, 0.89 for labor inverse demand, 0.97 for fertilizer inverse demand, 
0.70 for animal feed inverse demand, and 0.43 for output function. This indicated positive serial autocorrelation among 








substitution (𝜎) is 0.94, the one between primary inputs (𝜂) is 0.88, and the one between 
intermediate inputs is ( 𝜁) is 0.97. Therefore, this reaffirms that Colombia’s agriculture 
varies their input usage with changes in prices. Also, Colombia’s agriculture exhibited 
biased technical change, which was capital-augmenting.  
Table 18: CES Production Function of Colombia’s Agriculture Assuming Biased Technical 
Change 













Animal Feed 𝜎 1 𝜂 2 𝜁 3 
                
 0.0408* -0.0264 0.170 -0.252 0.942*** 0.882*** 0.969*** 
 (0.0247) (0.143) (1.147) (0.241) (0.0773) (0.241) (0.0926) 
        
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
        
         
  Equations Obs Parms 𝑅2*    
Log(Capitalt) 38 4     0.976     
Log(Labort) 38 4     0.027     
Log(Fertilizert) 38 4     0.169     
Log(Animal Feedt) 38 4     0.018     
Log(Outputt) 38 7     0.963     
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1 is the overall elasticity of substitution between nests. 
2 is the elasticity of substitution between primary inputs (i.e. capital and labor). 
3 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs (i.e. fertilizer and animal feed). 
 
 
In order to obtain more robust results, this study estimates crop and livestock 









The model for crop production, assuming a CES production function, also begins by 
considering that crop production shows Hicks-neutral technical change, and also relaxes 
this assumption in the second part of this section to determine the possible presence of 
biased technical change. This model assumes that crop production is mainly explained by 
inputs, such as capital, labor, and fertilizer. In addition, this was estimated under two 
specifications: i) primary inputs (i.e. capital and labor) in the only nest of this function, 
and fertilizer as the extra input; and ii) capital-related inputs (i.e. capital and fertilizer) in 
the nest, and labor as the extra input. The second specification exhibited a better fit. 
Accordingly, this study only reports the results of that model.    
This model shows an excellent fit for the crop production equation, but a very poor 
fit for input inverse demands (see Table 19). The R2 for the output equation is 0.92, for 
capital inverse demand it is 0.60, for labor inverse demand it is 0.01, and for fertilizer 
inverse demand is 0.05. This model also exhibits serial autocorrelation across the 
residuals as in the aggregate agriculture model58. I followed the same strategy to address 
this as with the aggregate model, but it was ineffective. For instance, STATA software 
failed to estimate all parameters when I considered a specification on which technical 
change might have varied over time, and the serial autocorrelation was not swept out like 
is in Cobb-Douglas case. This was only possible by using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, 
which also severely impacted the estimation of coefficients in the model. Therefore, this 
                                                     
58 The DW index is 0.81 for capital inverse demand, 0.57 for labor inverse demand, 0.74 for fertilizer inverse demand, 








study again reports the model without fixing the serial autocorrelation, because in this 
case: i) the technical change coefficient, which is the most important result from this 
model, is robust, changing only marginally when the serial autocorrelation is corrected; 
and ii) STATA software is able to estimate all elasticities of substitution without 
experiencing any estimation problem. 
The results of this model indicate that crop production in Colombia exhibited 
technical change of 0.8% per year during 1976-2013 (see Table 19). Crop productivity 
measured as TFP grew on average by 0.8% over this period. Therefore, crop productivity 
largely explains the low technical change exhibited by Colombia’s agriculture as an 
aggregate during this period.  
This model also shows that crop production sharply adjusted its usage among inputs 
due to changes in prices. The overall elasticity of substitution (𝜎) is 1.7 (see Table 19). 
However, this is less between capital and fertilizer, since the elasticity of substitution 
between these inputs (𝜂) is 1.1. Therefore, input usage in Colombian crop production was 













Table 19: CES Production Function of Crop Production Assuming Hicks Neutral Technical 
Change 
  (1) (2) (3)   
VARIABLES 
Technical 
Change 𝜎 1 𝜂 2   
          
 0.00808*** 1.718*** 1.126***   
 (0.00298) (0.319) (0.101)   
      
Observations 38 38 38   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
      
  Obs Parms *𝑅2 
Log(Capitalt) 38 3 0.598 
Log(Labort) 38 2 0.008 
Log(Fertilizert) 38 3 0.045 
Log(Outputt) 38 3 0.923 
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1  is the overall elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest (i.e. capital and fertilizer) and labor. 
2  is the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest. 
 
This study also relaxes the assumption of Hicks neutrality in technical change for 
crop production. This yields a model with better fit, although it is still poor for input 
inverse demands (see Table 21). The R2 for the output equation decreases to 0.88, for 
capital inverse demand it increases to 0.79, for labor inverse demand it stays around 0.01, 
and for fertilizer inverse demand it rises to 0.32. This model also exhibits serial 
autocorrelation across the residuals as in the case of the aggregate agriculture model59. I 
followed the same strategy to fix it as with the aggregate model, but it was ineffective. 
Then I used the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, which fixed the problem, but also severely 
                                                     
59 The DW index is 1.04 for capital inverse demand, 0.75 for labor inverse demand, 0.84 for fertilizer inverse demand, 








impacted the model’s estimation. Therefore, this study reports the model without fixing 
the serial autocorrelation. 
The results of this model reaffirm that crop production experienced technical 
change during the period 1976-2013. This was capital-augmenting relative to all inputs, 
since technical change exhibited by capital grew on average by 3.9% per year, whereas 
technical change exhibited by labor decreased at an average rate of 4.2% per year and 
technical change exhibited by fertilizers is not statistically significant (see Table 21). This 
study tests statistically the difference among the technical change coefficients found for 
each input to confirm this conclusion, by using a Chi-Square test for testing this hypothesis. 
The results show that there is a statistically significant difference between technical 
change exhibited by capital and labor (see Table 20). Also, these indicate there is not a 
statistically difference between technical change coefficients found for capital and 
fertilizer; however, there is a statistically significant difference between technical change 
coefficients exhibited by fertilizer and labor. Therefore, this reaffirms that crop 
production exhibited biased technical change during the period 1976-2013, and this 
technical change was capital-augmenting.  Also, this decreasing labor productivity might 
reaffirm that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited a surplus of labor as indicate the results in 
the Cobb-Douglas case. 
 
 








Table 20: Test of Differences among Technical Change Estimates Exhibited by Inputs in 
Crop Production 
  Capital Labor Fertilizers 
Capital    
    
Labor 12.23   
 0.0005***   
Fertilizers 0.29 4.05  
  0.5894 0.0442**   
P - values in parentheses 
*This is a symmetric matrix.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This model also shows that crop production tended to behave similarly to a Cobb-
Douglas production function. The overall elasticity of substitution (𝜎) is 0.79, and the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and fertilizer (𝜂) is 0.85 (see Table 21). 
 
Table 21: CES Production Function of Crops Production Assuming Biased Technical 
Change 










Fertilizer 𝜎 1 𝜂 2 
            
 0.0387*** -0.0417*** 0.0677 0.792*** 0.847*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0104) (0.0497) (0.0635) (0.0589) 
      
Observations 38 38 38 38 38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
        
  Obs Parms *𝑅2   
Log(Capitalt) 38 4 0.787   
Log(Labort) 38 2 0.011   
Log(Fertilizert) 38 4 0.324   
Log(Outputt) 38 5 0.875   
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1 is the overall elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest (i.e. capital and fertilizer) and labor. 









The model for livestock production, assuming a CES production function, also 
initially considers that livestock production exhibits Hicks-neutral technical change, and 
also relaxes this assumption in the second part of this section. This model assumes that 
livestock production mainly depends on capital, labor, and animal feed. It was also 
estimated under two specifications: i) primary inputs (i.e. capital and labor) in the only 
nest of this function, and animal feed as the extra input; and ii) capital-related inputs (i.e. 
capital and animal feed) in the nest and labor as the extra input. The second specification 
exhibited a better fit. Therefore, this study only reports the results of that second model.    
This model shows good fit (see Table 22). The R2 for the output equation is 0.98, for 
capital inverse demand it is 0.97, and for labor inverse demand it is 0.63. This fit is poor 
for animal feed inverse demand, which exhibits an R2 of 0.19. This model also exhibited 
the same problem of serial autocorrelation experienced by the model estimated for 
aggregate agriculture and for crops. However, it was possible to fix it using the Cochrane-
Orcutt procedure without affecting the coefficients estimation. Therefore, this study 
reports the model with the serial autocorrelation problem corrected in this case60.  
                                                     
60 The initial DW was 1.44 for capital inverse demand, 0.89 for labor inverse demand, 0.85 for animal feed inverse 
demand, and 0.56 for output function. This indicated a positive serial autocorrelation problem among residuals of each 
equation. Since the DW index cannot be used in a model when lagged variables are included, as in this case due to the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, this study uses a more general test, the Breusch-Godfrey Test (BG-Test), to confirm that 
the serial autocorrelation was removed. Its null hypothesis established that there is no evidence of serial 
autocorrelation, whereas its alternative hypothesis indicates that there is. This study estimates the BG-Test for each 
equation once the Cochane-Orcutt procedure was applied, and in all cases there was no evidence of serial 
autocorrelation. These are the p-values of the BG-Test for each equation: 0.75 for the capital inverse demand equation, 
0.34 for the labor inverse demand equation, 0.54 for the animal feed inverse demand equation, and 0.36 for the output 








The results of this model indicate that livestock production exhibited technical 
change of 2.2% per year during 1978-2013 61  (see Table 22). Livestock productivity 
measured as TFP grew on average by 2.2% over this period. Therefore, livestock 
productivity was the stronger driver of agricultural productivity in Colombia, since crop 
productivity only grew on average by 0.8% per year in recent decades, as found in the 
previous section. 
The overall elasticity of substitution (𝜎) is 3.9 (see Table 22). Also, the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and animal feed (𝜂) is also 3.9, which implies that livestock 
farmers in Colombia strongly substituted pastures for animal feed based on price 










                                                     
61 The results are reported for the period 1978-2013, since the model lost 3 observations in estimation, mainly due to 








Table 22: CES Production Function of Livestock Production Assuming Hicks Neutral 
Technical Change 
  (1) (2) (3)   
VARIABLES 
Technical 
Change 𝜎 1 𝜂 2   
          
 0.0223*** 3.906*** 3.860***   
 (0.00123) (0.729) (0.820)   
      
Observations 36 36 36   
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
      
  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 𝜌1 3 𝜌2 3 𝜌3 3 𝜌4 3 
          
 0.000729 0.467*** 0.805*** 0.362*** 
 (0.00973) (0.0379) (0.0299) (0.0575) 
     
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
    
  Obs Parms *𝑅2 
Log(Capitalt) 36 4 0.972 
Log(Labort) 36 3 0.625 
Log(Animal Feedt) 36 4 0.186 
Log(Outputt) 36 4 0.976 
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1 is the overall elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest (i.e. capital and animal feed) and labor. 
2 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest. 
3 each 𝜌 corresponds to the specific first order autocorrelations coefficients. 
 
 
Once this study relaxes the assumption of Hicks neutrality in technical change for 
livestock production, it estimates a model with a somewhat worse fit than the initial 
model. The R2 for the output equation and capital inverse demand are still 0.98, but for 
labor inverse demand it decreases to 0.56, and for animal feed inverse demand it falls to 








since an initial problem was solved by using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure without 
affecting the estimated coefficients. Therefore, this study reports this model with the 
serial autocorrelation problem corrected62. 
The results of this model indicate that livestock production in Colombia exhibited 
biased technical change during the period 1978-2013. This is animal feed-augmenting 
relative to labor and capital, since technical change exhibited by animal feed grew on 
average by 5.8% per year over this period, technical change of labor increased on average 
by 3.3% per year, and technical change of capital rose on average by 1.8% per year. This 
study tests statistically the difference among these technical change coefficients 
estimated for each input using also a Chi-Square test. The results reaffirm this conclusion, 
showing that there is a statistically significant difference between the technical change 
exhibited by animal feed relative to technical change exhibited by capital and labor. Also, 
it shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the technical change 
exhibited by capital and labor (see Table 23). Therefore, this reaffirms that livestock 
production exhibited biased technical change during the period 1978-2013, and this was 
animal-feed augmenting.   
 
                                                     
62 The initial DW was 1.68 for capital inverse demand, 1.07 for labor inverse demand, 0.75 for animal feed inverse 
demand, and 0.55 for output function. Since the DW index cannot be used in a model when there are lagged variables 
included, as in this case due to the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, this study uses the BG-Test. This indicates that there is 
no evidence of serial autocorrelation in any equations. These are the p-values of the BG-Test for each equation: 0.43 
for the capital inverse demand equation, 0.29 for the labor inverse demand equation, 0.68 for the animal feed inverse 








Table 23: Test of Differences among Technical Change Estimates Exhibited by Inputs in 
Livestock Production 
  Capital Labor Animal Feed 
Capital    
    
Labor 1.88   
 0.1708   
Animal Feed 8.25 4.52  
  0.0041*** 0.0336**   
P - values in parentheses 
*This is a symmetric matrix.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The overall elasticity of substitution (𝜎) is 2.2 (see Table 24). Also, the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and animal feed (𝜂) is also 2.1, which confirms that livestock 










Table 24: CES Production Function of Livestock Production Assuming Biased Technical 
Change 










Animal Feed 𝜎 1 𝜂 2 
            
 0.0181*** 0.0327*** 0.0585*** 2.253*** 2.128*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00970) (0.0126) (0.344) (0.327) 
      
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
        
  (6) (7) (8) (9)   
VARIABLES 𝜌1 3 𝜌2 3 𝜌3 3 𝜌4 3   
            
 -0.00761 0.426*** 0.727*** 0.507***   
 (0.00896) (0.0372) (0.0331) (0.0747)   
       
Observations 36 36 36 36   
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
        
  Obs Parms *𝑅2     
Log(Capitalt) 36 5 0.971   
Log(Labort) 36 3 0.558   
Log(Animal Feedt) 36 5 0.043   
Log(Outputt) 36 6 0.979   
      
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1 is the overall elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest (i.e. capital and animal feed) and labor. 
2 is the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the nest. 










6.2.2 Dual Techniques  
6.2.2.1 Cost function – Trans-Log 
6.2.2.1.1 Total Agriculture 
The dual cost model for Colombia’s agriculture as an aggregate, estimated assuming 
linear homogeneity in prices and symmetry among parameters, exhibits an excellent fit 
in all equations (see Table 26). The R2 exhibited by all equations are in the range 0.80-
0.99. This model does not present heteroscedasticity, because it is estimated assuming 
robust errors. Also, an initial serial autocorrelation problem was corrected using a version 
of the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure for a system of equations with invariant parameters (E. 
R. Berndt & Savin, 1975) 63 . In addition, this model initially predicted positive price 
elasticities for certain inputs. This was corrected by imposing curvature restrictions at the 
point of the approximation of this cost function64 (Diewert & Wales, 1987; Ryan & Wales, 
2000) 65 . However, this model exhibits multicollinearity problems, since: i) it is very 
demanding to estimate 16 parameters at a time only using 38 observations66; ii) crucial 
variables such as the value of production and the time trend exhibit correlation of 
approximately 98%, and iii) all variables were included lagged one period to solve the 
                                                     
63 This method basically assumes that the correlation term included in the Cochrane Orcutt procedure (𝜌) is the same 
across equations, maintaining all such parameters invariant.  
64 It refers to the year in which input prices and output are equal to one once normalized. In this study, this year is 
1995, the mid-point of the sample.   
65 This required imposing the following constraints: 𝛽𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖
2, and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 = −𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗. 
66 The model estimates 29 parameters in total but only 16 at a time, because the cost share variables sum to one, and 
the residuals across equations add to zero. This means that the estimation of the complete system of equations at once 
will result in a singular error covariance matrix. Therefore, one should omit one equation of the system for its 
estimation, and the parameters of that equation are calculated based on the restrictions imposed on this system of 








serial autocorrelation problem. Accordingly, all standard errors are large and may be 
overestimated. In any case, this study uses all these parameters for estimating Colombia’ 
agricultural productivity, since multicollinearity does not affect the statistical properties 
of parameters. This problem primarily yields large standard errors, which might 
incorrectly determine that a parameter is not statistically different from zero. 
This study calculates the own price elasticities for all inputs in order to evaluate the 
estimated cost function. All elasticities in the constrained model are negative (as they 
must be), showing that this cost function is well behaved (see Table 25). Also, capital is 
the least sensitive input to changes in prices, whereas fertilizer is the most sensitive. 
However, it is important to emphasize that these elasticities are highly sensitive to the 
variability in the cost share of each input. Accordingly, this study estimates these 
elasticities using the mean of the cost share of each input.       
Table 25: Price Elasticities of Input Demand on the Cost Function for Overall Agriculture 
 𝜀𝑘𝑘 𝜀𝑙𝑙 𝜀𝑓𝑓 𝜀𝑠𝑠 
Without Imposing Curvature Restrictions 
0.0124 -0.1435*** -0.3507*** -0.2457*** 
(0.00954) (0.05121) (0.0684) (0.1014) 
Imposing Curvature Restrictions 
-0.0409*** -0.1428*** -0.8840*** -0.2136*** 
(0.00991) (0.01887) (0.06202) (0.04964) 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of this model indicate that agricultural productivity in Colombia, 
measured as TFP, grew on average by 1.4% per year during 1975-2013. These results 
coincide with the estimates by assuming a CES production function (+1.3%), and with the 








effects rather than by a large reduction in production cost due to technical change. The 
scale effects contributed to this TFP estimation with an average growth of 2.4% per year. 
However, the overall technical change component (i.e. pure technical change, scale 
production technical change, and biased technical change) subtracted 1% per year from 
this TFP, mainly due to a decrease exhibited by pure technical change (-1%). 
This model also shows that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited slightly biased 
technical change in recent decades. This was labor-saving and fertilizer-saving, relative to 
capital and animal feed, since the cost shares of both inputs decreased by 0.01% per year 
due to technical change. Also, this was capital-using and animal feed using, since their 
cost shares increased by 0.01% annually due to technical change (see Table 26, column 
25 to column 28). Therefore, technical change in Colombia’s agriculture tended to 
improve slightly more the marginal productivity of labor and fertilizers relative to 
productivity exhibited by the other inputs.  
This study was unable to test statistically the difference between technical change 
coefficients exhibited across all inputs since the standard errors of all parameters are 
large, as explained above. Also, it was not possible to test the homotheticity of the dual 
production function related to this cost function due to this problem. Accordingly, I 
assumed that this production function is homothetic to estimate the technical change 
exhibited by all inputs. However, those estimates should be corrected by a scale effect in 
the case that this production function was not homothetic as explained in Chapter 4. This 
implies larger technical change exhibited by all agricultural inputs. Colombia’s agriculture 








their cost shares decreased on average by 2.4% and 3.4% per year, respectively, due to 
technical change. Also, Colombia’s agriculture was capital and labor using, since their cost 
shares increased on average by 0.3%, and 0.7% per year, respectively.     
This model also estimates that, at the point of approximation of this cost function, 
the cost share of capital is almost 80%, the cost share of labor is 12.8%, the cost share of 
fertilizer cost is 1.6%, and the cost share of animal feed is 5.9% (see Table 26, column 2 
to column 5). This also predicts that the cost share of capital will increase by 1.6%, the 
cost share of labor will rise by 1.1%, the cost share of fertilizer will expand by 0.2%, and 
the cost share of animal feed will increase by 0.6%, if their own prices increase by 10% 
(see Table 26, column 7, column 11, column 14, and column 16). Moreover, this model 
estimates that the cost share of capital is mainly sensitive to variations in the price of 
labor, decreasing on average by 1.0% if the price of labor increases by 10% (see Table 26, 
column 8 to column 10). Also, the cost share of labor will also decrease by 1.0% if the 
price of capital increases by 10%. In addition, the cost share of fertilizer and the cost share 
of animal feed will vary marginally due to changes in the prices of other inputs. Finally, 
this model estimates that the cost share of capital will decrease by 0.5% and the cost 
share of labor will diminished by 0.3% if Colombia’s agricultural production increases by 
10% (see Table 26, column 17 to column 20). In, contrast, the cost share of fertilizer will 












Table 26: Trans-Log Cost Function of Colombia’s Agriculture (1975-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)     
VARIABLES 𝛼0 𝛼𝑘 𝛼𝑙 𝛼𝑓  𝛼𝑠 𝜌 
1     
 23.88*** 0.798*** 0.128*** 0.0156*** 0.0589*** 0.666***     
  (0.0109) (0.00699) (0.00295) (0.00126) (0.00386) (0.0622)     
            
            
Elasticities: Price to Input Shares 2          
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
VARIABLES 𝛽𝑘𝑘  𝛽𝑘𝑙  𝛽𝑘𝑓  𝛽𝑘𝑠 𝛽𝑙𝑙  𝛽𝑙𝑓  𝛽𝑙𝑠 𝛽𝑓𝑓  𝛽𝑓𝑠 𝛽𝑠𝑠 
 0.1612*** -0.1021*** -0.0124*** -0.0470*** 0.1116*** -0.0020*** -0.0075*** 0.01536*** -0.0009*** 0.05543*** 
  (0.00734) (0.00252) (0.00101) (0.00311) (0.00302) (0.00017) (0.00052) (0.00126) (0.00001) (0.00388) 
             
             
Elasticities: Output to Total Cost & Input Shares           
  (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)       
VARIABLES 𝛽𝑘𝑄  𝛽𝑙𝑄  𝛽𝑓𝑄  𝛽𝑠𝑄  𝛼𝑄 𝛼𝑄𝑄       
 -0.0493 -0.0291 0.0122 0.0662* -0.210 -1.962       
  (0.0634) (0.0323) (0.0135) (0.0343) (0.184) (2.385)       
             
             
Elasticities: Technical Change to Total Cost & Input Shares           
  (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)     
VARIABLES 𝛼𝑡 𝛼𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝑘𝑡  𝛽𝑙𝑡  𝛽𝑓𝑡  𝛽𝑠𝑡  𝛽𝑄𝑡      
 0.0110*** 0.000241 0.000102 -0.000112 -0.0001     0.0001  0.0237     
  (0.00414) (0.00122) (0.00129) (0.000684) (0.000268) (0.000760) (0.0535)     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




    
             
Equation Obs Parms 𝑅2*         
Log(Total Cost(t)) 38 16 0.997         
Cost Share of Capital (t) 38 6 0.951         
Cost Share of Labor (t) 38 6 0.966         
Cost Share of Fertilizer(t) 38 6 0.793       
 
 
Cost Share of Animal Feed(t) 38 6 0.920         
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. 
The reason is the form this software calculates the R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1  corresponds to the specific first-order autocorrelation coefficient. 









The dual cost model for crop production shows an excellent fit in all equations 
(see Table 28). The R2 exhibited by all equations range from 0.93-0.99. This model does 
not present econometric problems. Also, this model was estimated by imposing curvature 
restrictions at the point of approximation to ensure that it is concave in inputs prices, and 
thereby all input price elasticities are negative (Diewert & Wales, 1987; Ryan & Wales, 
2000). However, this model predicted implausible figures for crop productivity. It yields 
that crop productivity had grown on average by 9.2% per year during the period 1975-
2013. Therefore, this study reports the model without imposing these restrictions, 
because that model yields more plausible results, and all input price elasticities are 
negative. However, this model also exhibits multicollinearity problems, which means that 
all standard errors are large and may be overestimated. In any case, this study uses all 
these parameters to estimate crop productivity, since multicollinearity does not affect 
their statistical properties, as explained above. 
As in the aggregate case, this study also calculates the own price elasticities for all 
input demands used in crop production to evaluate the cost function estimated. These 
are negative for all inputs (as they must be), regardless if curvature restrictions are 
imposed on the cost function (see Table 27). Therefore, these elasticities indicate that this 
cost function is well behaved. In addition, these elasticities show that capital is the least 
sensitive input to changes in prices, whereas labor is the most sensitive input without 








restriction is imposed. In this case, it is also important to mention that these elasticities 
are also highly sensitive to the variability in the cost share of each input.  
Table 27: Price Elasticities of Input Demand on the Cost Function for Crops Production 
 𝜀𝑘𝑘 𝜀𝑙𝑙 𝜀𝑓𝑓 
Without Imposing Curvature Restrictions 
-0.0289*** -0.1663*** -0.1074 
(0.00777) (0.03053) (0.09521) 
Imposing Curvature Restrictions 
-0.021 -0.0823** -0.7273*** 
(0.02690) (0.04387) (0.12288) 
Standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The results of this model indicate that crop productivity, measured as TFP, exhibited 
marginal growth (+0.1% per year) during the period 1975-2013. These results reaffirm the 
TFP estimated by the Cobb-Douglas function for crops, which indicates that crop 
productivity did not grow over this period. However, this contradicts the TFP estimated 
by assuming a CES production function for crops, which indicates that crop productivity 
increased on average by 0.8% per year. A large scale effect was crucial in this growth 
rather than a strong reduction in the costs of production due to technical change. This 
scale effect contributed to expanding crop TFP with an average growth of 1.9% per year, 
whereas the overall technical change component subtracted 1.8% per year from this TFP, 
due again to a decrease exhibited by the pure technical change term (-1.5% per year) over 
this period. 
This model also shows that crop production exhibited biased technical change in 
recent decades. This was capital-saving relative to all inputs, since the cost share of capital 
decreased by 0.5% per year due to technical change. Also, this was labor-using and 








to technical change and the one of fertilizer rose on average by 0.1% per year for this 
reason (see Table 28, column 19 to column 21). Therefore, technical change in crop 
production improved more the marginal productivity of capital than the productivity 
exhibited by labor and fertilizer. Hence, technical change in crop production tended to be 
biased toward capital relative to labor and fertilizer. 
This study also assumed that the dual production function related to this cost 
function is homothetic to estimate the technical change exhibited by all inputs. However, 
those estimates should be corrected by a scale effect in case this production function is 
not homothetic, as explained in the aggregate model. Thereby, crop production 
continued being capital-saving, and also became fertilizer-saving, because their cost 
shares decreased by 0.4% per year, respectively, due to technical change. In addition, 
crop production continued being labor-using, since the cost share of labor increased by 
0.9% per year due to technical change.  
This model also estimates that, at the point of approximation of this cost function, 
the cost share of capital is 57.3%, the cost share of labor is 37.6%, and the cost share of 
fertilizer is 5.1% (see Table 28, column 2 to column 4). This also predicts that the cost 
share of capital will increase by 2.4%, the cost share of labor will increase by 1.8%, and 
the cost share of fertilizer will rise by 0.7% if their own prices increase by 10% (see Table 
28, column 6, column 9, and column 11). Furthermore, it estimates that the cost share of 
capital is also mainly sensitive to variations in the price of labor, decreasing on average 
by 1.7% if the price of labor increases by 10% (see Table 28, column 7 to column 8). Also, 








In addition, the cost share of fertilizer will vary marginally due to changes in the prices of 
capital and labor. Finally, this model shows that the cost share of capital and the cost 
share of labor will increase by 0.3% per year if crop production increases by 10%, while 
the cost share of fertilizer will decrease by 0.6% per year if this happens (see Table 28, 
column 12 to column 14). 
Table 28: Trans-Log Cost Function of Colombia’s Crop Production (1975-2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
VARIABLES 𝛼0 𝛼𝑘 𝛼𝑙 𝛼𝑓  𝜌 
1  
 22.36*** 0.573*** 0.376*** 0.0510*** 0.684***  
  (0.0200) (0.00553) (0.00784) (0.00645) (0.0667)  
       
Elasticities: Price to Input Shares       
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES 𝛽𝑘𝑘  𝛽𝑘𝑙  𝛽𝑘𝑓  𝛽𝑙𝑙  𝛽𝑙𝑓  𝛽𝑓𝑓  
 0.236*** -0.169*** -0.0664*** 0.174*** -0.00418 0.0705*** 
  (0.00375) (0.00808) (0.00637) (0.0131) (0.00792) (0.00834) 
       
Elasticities: Output to Total Cost & Input Shares      
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)  
VARIABLES 𝛽𝑘𝑄  𝛽𝑙𝑄  𝛽𝑓𝑄  𝛼𝑄 𝛼𝑄𝑄  
 0.0300 0.0325 -0.0625 -0.0437 0.355  
  (0.0377) (0.0662) (0.0587) (0.225) (4.320)  
       
Elasticities: Technical Change to Total Cost & Input Shares     
  (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
VARIABLES 𝛼𝑡 𝛼𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝑘𝑡  𝛽𝑙𝑡  𝛽𝑓𝑡  𝛽𝑄𝑡  
Constant 0.0149*** 0.00001 -0.00505*** 0.00401*** 0.00104 -0.0224 
  (0.00384) (0.00125) (0.000658) (0.00141) (0.00126) (0.0701) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
      
 Obs Parms 𝑅2*   
Log(Total Cost(t)) 38 16 0.992   
Cost Share of Capital(t) 38 6 0.994   
Cost Share of Labor(t) 38 6 0.987   
Cost Share of Fertilizer(t) 38 6 0.925   
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 
1 corresponds to the specific first order autocorrelation coefficient. 










The dual cost model for livestock production shows an excellent fit as well (see 
Table 30). The R2 exhibited by all equations ranges from 0.83-0.99. This model does not 
present econometric problems. Also, it initially predicted positive price elasticities for 
certain inputs, which was corrected by imposing curvature restrictions on this cost 
function at their point of approximation, as in the aggregate model (Diewert & Wales, 
1987; Ryan & Wales, 2000). However, this model also exhibits multicollinearity problems, 
which implies that all standard errors in the model are large and possibly overestimated. 
In any case, all parameters were used for making inferences regarding livestock 
production, since the multicollinearity problem does not affect their statistical properties.  
This study also calculates the own price elasticities for all inputs used by livestock 
production to evaluate the estimated cost function. All elasticities in the constrained 
model are negative (as they must be), showing that this function is well behaved (see 
Table 29). Also, capital is the least sensitive input to changes in prices, while animal feed 
is the most sensitive input. In addition, these elasticities are also highly sensitive to the 
variability in the cost share of each input.  
Table 29: Price Elasticities of Input Demand on the Cost Function for Livestock 
Production 
 𝜀𝑘𝑘 𝜀𝑙𝑙 𝜀𝑠𝑠 
Without Imposing Curvature Restrictions 
0.0328*** -0.0899 -0.2697*** 
(0.01367) (0.11691) (0.06972) 
Imposing Curvature Restrictions 
-0.0257** -0.0635 -0.2038*** 
(0.01197) (0.07269) (0.04681) 
Standard errors in parentheses  










The results of this model indicate that livestock productivity, measured as TFP, grew 
on average by 2.0% per year during 1975-2013. These results are close to those obtained 
by assuming a CES production function (+2.2%), and are somewhat higher than those 
yielded by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function (+1.6%). A large scale effect was 
also crucial, rather than a strong reduction in the costs of production due to technical 
change. The scale effect contributed to livestock TFP with an average growth of 2.3% per 
year, whereas the technical change component deducted on average 0.3% per year from 
this TFP, due to a reduction in the scale-augmenting of technical change.  
This model also shows that livestock production exhibited biased technical change. 
This was labor-saving, as well as capital-using and animal feed-using, since the cost share 
of labor decreased by 0.5% per year due to technical change, whereas the cost share of 
capital increased by 0.4% per year, and the cost of share of animal feed rose by 0.1% per 
year. Thus, technical change in livestock production tended to improve more the marginal 
productivity of labor. Hence, technical change in livestock production has been biased 
toward labor relative to capital and animal feed.  
As in the crops model, this study assumed that the dual production function related 
to this cost function is homothetic to estimate the technical change exhibited by all inputs. 
However, those estimates should be corrected by a scale effect in case this function is not 
homotethic. This implied that livestock production was capital-using, labor-using, and 
animal feed-using, since their cost shares increased by 0.1%, 2.1%, and 0.7% respectively 








This model also estimates that, at the point of approximation of this cost function, 
the cost share of capital is 85.4%, the cost share of labor is 6.9%, and the cost share of 
animal feed is 7.8% (see Table 30, column 2 to column 4). This also predicts that the cost 
share of capital will increase by 1.3%, the cost share of labor will rise by 0.6% and the cost 
share of animal feed will increase by 0.7% if their own prices increase by 10% (see Table 
30, column 6, column 9, and column 11). Besides, it estimates that the cost share of 
capital is sensitive to variations in the price of labor and animal feed, decreasing on 
average by 0.6%-0.7% if the price of any of these inputs increases by 10% (see Table 30, 
column 7 to column 8). Also, the cost share of labor will also decrease by 0.6% if the price 
of capital increases by 10%. In addition, the cost share of animal feed will also decline by 
0.7% if the price of capital increases by 10%. Finally, this model shows that the cost share 
of capital will decrease by 1.1% per year, the cost share labor will increase by 0.6% per 
year, and the cost share of fertilizer will rise by 0.4% per year if Colombia’s livestock 










Table 30: Trans-Log Cost Production Function of Colombia’s Livestock Production (1975-
2013) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
VARIABLES 𝛼0 𝛼𝑘 𝛼𝑙 𝛼𝑠 𝜌 
1  
 23.64*** 0.854*** 0.0687*** 0.0777*** 0.692***  
  (0.0140) (0.00955) (0.00535) (0.00479) (0.0743)  
       
Elasticities: Price to Input Shares 2      
  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES 𝛽𝑘𝑘  𝛽𝑘𝑙  𝛽𝑘𝑠 𝛽𝑙𝑙  𝛽𝑙𝑠 𝛽𝑠𝑠 
 0.127*** -0.059*** -0.066*** 0.064*** -0.005*** 0.0717*** 
  (0.00984) (0.00462) (0.00081) (0.00539) (0.00053) (0.00484) 
       
Elasticities: Output to Total Cost & Input Shares      
  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)  
VARIABLES 𝛽𝑘𝑄  𝛽𝑙𝑄  𝛽𝑠𝑄  𝛼𝑄 𝛼𝑄𝑄  
 -0.111 0.0667 0.0448 0.118 0.973  
  (0.0856) (0.0551) (0.0381) (0.148) (1.939)  
       
Elasticities: Technical Change to Total Cost & Input Shares     
  (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
VARIABLES 𝛼𝑡 𝛼𝑡𝑡 𝛽𝑘𝑡  𝛽𝑙𝑡  𝛽𝑠𝑡  𝛽𝑄𝑡  
 0.00166 0.00178 0.00395* -0.00494*** 0.000992 -0.0327 
  (0.00447) (0.00176) (0.00221) (0.00146) (0.00101) (0.0575) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
       
       
       
Equation Obs Parms 𝑅2*   
Log(Total Cost(t)) 38 13 0.997   
Cost Share of Capital(t) 38 5 0.869   
Cost Share of Labor(t) 38 5 0.825   
Cost Share of Animal Feed(t) 38 5 0.923   
*𝑅2 is estimated as the square of the correlation between the actual value and the predicted value, because 
STATA software reports a wrong index for each equation. The reason is the form this software calculates the 
R-square index for NLSUR models. 












6.3.1 Comparison across Results 
In the previous section I described the main results obtained while estimating 
agricultural productivity in Colombia during the period 1975-2013. Overall, these results 
give special emphasis to four aspects: i) what was agricultural productivity growth in 
Colombia, measured as TFP and assuming Hicks-Neutral technical change, in aggregate 
and also disaggregated for crops and livestock during this period; ii) whether or not 
Colombia’s agriculture exhibited biased technical change during this period; iii) whether 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity growth varied over time across periods established 
in Chapter 2; and iv) the contribution of scale effects to Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity. This section aims to analyze these results by comparing the results across 
techniques. This analysis begins by comparing agricultural productivity estimated by all 
techniques to evaluate the consistency of the results. Then, it focuses on the 
decomposition of agricultural output growth between input accumulation and 
productivity growth during the period 1975-2013. In parallel, it also analyzes changes in 
agricultural productivity over time, and how those fluctuations relate to the economic 
circumstances exhibited by Colombia’s agriculture during this period. It is worth 
remembering that agricultural productivity, measured as TFP, is estimated by assuming a 
Cobb-Douglas production function and as CES production function as the output growth 
not explained by input accumulation growth 67 . Furthermore, under the dual-cost 
                                                     
67 For the Cobb-Douglas, in Chapter 6 I calculate agricultural productivity using the alternative specification for which 








approach, agricultural productivity is measured as the sum of shifts in the cost function 
due to technical change plus a scale effect, as Chapter 4 explains in detail.   
 
6.3.1.1 Agricultural Productivity 
A comparison of all results across techniques show high consistency among them 
(see Table 31). Overall, this allows one to draw the conclusion that aggregate agricultural 
productivity in Colombia grew on average between 0.6% and 1.4% per year during the 
period 1975-2013. In particular, the CES and dual-cost techniques predict that it grew on 
average by 1.3 and 1.4% per year, respectively, aligned with the USDA’s prediction (1.4%). 
The Cobb-Douglas technique predicts agricultural productivity in Colombia only grew on 
average by 0.6% per year. Also, this comparison shows that these aggregate estimates of 
agricultural productivity might be biased upwards/downwards, since these are calculated 
as an aggregate and without linking these changes to crop productivity and livestock 
productivity differences. Accordingly, this study calculates agricultural productivity as a 
weighted average, using the estimates for crop productivity and livestock productivity 
and as weights the shares of crop and livestock production value in total agricultural 
production value. This exercise suggests that aggregate agricultural productivity 
estimated by the Cobb-Douglas technique is downward biased, because it predicts an 
average growth close to 0.6% per year versus the 0.8% per year when it is estimated as a 
weighted average. Likewise, this calculation indicates that aggregate agricultural 








an average growth of about 1.4% per year versus the 0.9% per year when it is estimated 
as a weighted average. Therefore, this suggests that agricultural productivity grew 
between 0.8% and 1.3% per year in Colombia during 1975-2013. Also, it indicates that it 
is more appropriate to use this weighted average for agricultural productivity, since it 
more closely represents different dynamics exhibited by crop productivity and livestock 
productivity. Hence, this study uses this estimated weighted average for Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity growth for the rest of this analysis.   
 
Table 31: Average Agricultural Productivity in Colombia from 1975-2013 
 Cobb-Douglas CES Dual Cost 
Aggregate 0.6% 1.3% 1.4% 
Weighted Average 0.8% 1.3% 0.9% 
Crops 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 
Livestock 1.6% 2.2% 2.0% 
 
All techniques also predict that agricultural productivity in Colombia was mainly 
driven by livestock productivity. This grew on average at a rate between 1.6% and 2.2% 
during the period 1975-2013, probably due to: i) more efficient production practices in 
the poultry sector; ii) higher investments in new herds and technology (mainly in dual-
purpose cattle) in the late 1990’s; and iii) introduction of innovations for feeding and 
management of livestock, genetic improvements, and the purchase of highly productive 
species in the milk sector (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; MADR, 2005b; Mojica & Paredes, 
2005). In contrast, crop productivity expansion is unclear over this period. By assuming a 








average crop productivity growth was zero. However, by assuming a CES production 
function, crop productivity grew on average by 0.8% per year, which is still low.  
Historical evidence suggests crop productivity would have been low during the 
period 1975-2013, because farmers experienced difficult conditions: i) agricultural budget 
cuts during the 1980’s Latin American debt crisis; ii) a profitability crisis after Colombia 
executed the second package of reforms of its Structural Adjustment in the early 1990’s; 
iii) extreme weather conditions (i.e. severe droughts and severe floods); iv) misallocation 
of resources for agricultural promotion; v) decreased investment due to armed conflict; 
vi) lack of public resources for promoting Colombia’s agriculture competitiveness, and vii) 
the segmented and restricted funding for Colombian farmers (Cuevas et al., 2003; C. F. 
Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito et al., 2014; Junguito, 1994; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Reina 
et al., 2011). However, some crops are exceptions and seemingly exhibited higher levels 
of productivity during this period, for example: i) sugar cane, due to the introduction of 
mechanized harvesting practices, the modernization of production processes and 
equipment and machinery; ii) flowers, due to a reallocation of the varieties according to 
climate conditions; iii) banana, due to cultivating more productive varieties; and iv) 
recently cereals and vegetables  due to better farming practices, higher investment in 
research and development of genetically modified seeds (Arbeláez, 1993; Becerra, 2009; 
COMPITE, 2008; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; La Republica, 2012; Montero & Casas, 2012; 
Ramirez & Garcia, 2006; SIC, 2012). 
A correlation matrix across the results when estimating agricultural productivity 








correlation matrix is calculated by taking the annual predictions of agricultural 
productivity from all techniques for the period 1975-2013, and then calculating the 
correlation among them. Overall, this correlation across predictions varies between 70% 
to 95%. The highest is between the agricultural productivity predicted by assuming a CES 
production function and the dual-cost approach (+94%), whereas the lowest is between 
the agricultural productivity predicted by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function 
and the dual-cost approach (73%). Also, the range of agricultural productivity estimates 
is small. All techniques predict that agricultural productivity grew on average between 
0.8% and 1.3% between 1975 and 2013, crop productivity increased between 0% and 
0.8%, and livestock productivity rose between 1.6% and 2.2% (see Table 31). Therefore, 
these results indicate that all techniques broadly predict similar estimates of agricultural 
productivity. Also, these reaffirm that there is high consistency across agricultural 
productivity estimates from all techniques.   
 
Table 32: Correlation Matrix among Agricultural Productivity Estimates by Technique 
  Cobb-Douglas CES Dual-Cost 
Cobb-Douglas 1.000   
CES 0.818 1.000  
Dual-Cost 0.734 0.943 1.000 
 
 
A simple graphical analysis across agricultural productivity estimates reaffirms this 
conclusion (see Figure 35). This shows that all techniques predict similar estimates for 








exhibit slightly different smoothed trends (see Figure 36). This study removed the cyclical 
component from each annual TFP estimate by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter 68  to 
estimate their smoothed trend, and found that: i) not all estimates of agricultural 
productivity exhibit exactly the same turning points (mainly the Cobb-Douglas prediction), 
and ii) each estimate shows a different magnitude in growth peaks and falling periods. 
Accordingly, each technique predicts that agricultural productivity grew on average at a 
somewhat different pace per year, as explained above (see Table 31). 
 
Figure 35: Agricultural Productivity Growth in Colombia Predicted by Technique 
 
                                                     
68 This study estimated this smoothed trend for all agricultural productivity estimates using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
by assuming a parameter 𝜆= 6.25, recommended in the literature for yearly series and used by the USDA to calculate 




































































































Figure 36: Smoothed Trend of Agricultural Productivity in Colombia Predicted by 
Technique 
 
*This figure uses smoothed data obtained from the Hodrick-Prescott filter  
 
This evidence suggests that estimates of agricultural productivity predicted in this 
study are consistent across techniques. Also, these estimates do not exhibit large 
differences among them. Therefore, this study uses these estimates to analyze the drivers 
of Colombia’s agricultural growth during the period 1979-2013: agricultural productivity 
growth or input accumulation growth. To this end, this study carries out analysis for the 
periods established in Chapter 2, for which: i) Colombia’s agriculture exhibited similar 
economic conditions; and ii) agricultural policy regimens did not sharply change (see 
Table 12). 
During the period 1979-1983, Colombia’s agricultural output grew on average by 
1.8% per year. This low growth was due to low agricultural productivity, which did not 
grow at all when it is measured assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function (see Figure 




































































































CES production function, and grew marginally (+0.1% per year) using the dual-cost 
technique. Therefore, this indicates that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited low growth in 
this period, due to very low productivity and the negative impact of the Latin American 
Debt crisis on Colombian agriculture69 (Kalmanovitz & López, 2003). Also, this shows that 
agricultural output was mainly supported by input accumulation growth, which grew on 
average around 2% per year during this period.  
 
Figure 37: Decomposition of Growth Exhibited by the Value of Agricultural Production, 
When TFP growth is Measured Using a Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
 
                                                     
69 Due this crisis, Colombia’s agriculture did not receive much attention and promotion for its development in this 
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Figure 38: Decomposition of Growth Exhibited by the Value of Agricultural Production, 




Figure 39: Decomposition of Growth Exhibited by the Value of Agricultural Production, 
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In the period 1984-1989, agricultural output increased its average growth to 3.5% 
per year in Colombia. All techniques indicate that agricultural productivity was crucial for 
this higher growth, since they predict that agricultural productivity grew on average 
between 2.2% and 2.7% per year during this period. This shows that Colombia’s 
agriculture increased its growing pace in the late 1980’s, due to: i) agricultural policy 
executed during the Barco administration, which focused on promoting private 
investment, adjusting the price system, raising farmer’s margins, limiting agricultural 
imports, etc., ii) higher commodity prices; iii) a mini-boom exhibited by coffee production; 
and iv) probably all productivity innovations carried out by farmers to overcome the early 
1980’s crisis (Guterman, 2007; IMF, 2015; Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Reina et al., 2011). 
Also, this shows that input accumulation growth reduced its contribution to agricultural 
growth during this period, and productivity growth became its main driver.  
By the period 1990-1997, agricultural output exhibited a slowdown in Colombia. It 
only grew on average by 2.1% per year, mainly due to lower productivity growth (see 
Figure 37, Figure 38 and Figure 39). All techniques predict that agricultural productivity 
growth diminished its pace during this period. By assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, it is estimated that productivity reduced its average growth from 2.4% per year 
in the late 1980’s to 0.7% per year from 1990-1997. By assuming a CES production 
function, productivity reduced its growth from 2.7% per year to 1.4% per year, and by 
using the dual-cost approach, this rate fell from 2.2% per year to 1.0% per year. Also, all 
techniques indicate that input accumulation growth did not exhibit a significant change, 








crisis exhibited by Colombia’s agriculture during the early 1990’s directly impacted 
productivity. Thereby, Colombia’s agricultural growth decreased during this period, 
mainly due to lower productivity growth rather than by a lower input accumulation 
growth.  
During the period 1998-2002, agricultural output growth slightly reduced to 1.9% 
per year (see Figure 37, Figure 38 and Figure 39). Less input accumulation growth explains 
this slowdown. By assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for the measurement of 
agricultural productivity, input accumulation growth decreased from 1.4% per year during 
1990-1997 to 0.3% per year, although this was partially offset by an increase in 
agricultural productivity from 0.7% to 1.6% per year. By assuming a CES production 
function, input accumulation growth diminished from 0.7% to 0.4% per year, whereas 
agricultural productivity continued growing around 1.4%-1.5% per year. In addition, using 
the dual-cost approach, this slower growth was due to a slight decrease in agricultural 
productivity from 1.0% to 0.9% per year, and another decrease in the input accumulation 
growth from 1.1% to 1.0% per year. Therefore, all techniques indicate that agricultural 
productivity stagnated during this period and farmers diminished input accumulation, 
probably due to the macroeconomic crisis and worsening armed conflict experienced by 
Colombia during this period. As explained in Chapter 2, these factors impeded the 
Pastrana administration (1998-2002) from executing its agricultural policy, which had 
been designed with a great emphasis on promotion of agricultural productivity 








During 2003-2009, agricultural output grew on average around 1.8% per year (see 
Figure 37, Figure 38 and Figure 39). Colombia’s agriculture continued stagnating during 
this period, growing at the same pace of the 1990’s. All techniques indicate that slower 
agricultural productivity growth during this period is what explains the lower growth 
exhibited by Colombia’s agricultural output. By assuming a Cobb-Douglas production 
function, agricultural productivity fell on average by -0.4% per year during this period, and 
therefore agricultural growth was supported by higher input accumulation growth (2.2% 
per year). According to the dual-cost approach, agricultural productivity decreased its 
average growth to 0.5% per year during this period, reaffirming that agricultural growth 
was driven by higher input accumulation growth (+1.3%). In addition, using a CES 
production function, agricultural productivity decreased slightly to 1.0% per year, 
whereas input accumulation growth increased to 0.8%. Therefore, these results show that 
the agricultural policy implemented by Uribe-I administration (2002-2006) and Uribe-II 
administration (2006-2010) promoted more input accumulation growth among farmers 
rather than agricultural productivity. This could have been the result of the 
administration’s misallocation of resources for promoting the agriculture, poor 
transportation infrastructure, and a lack of innovation and technological development to 
improve agricultural productivity (Reina et al., 2011). In addition, these administrations 
executed an agricultural policy for which the priority was to give direct subsidies to 
farmers rather than use these resources as investments for promoting agricultural 








Finally, agricultural output has rallied in Colombia in recent years. Over 2010-2013, 
agricultural output grew on average by 2.4% per year (see Figure 37, Figure 38 and Figure 
39). All techniques indicate that this was due to an increase in agricultural productivity 
growth. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, agricultural productivity growth 
increased sharply from -0.4% per year in the period 2003-2009 to 0.9% per year in 2010-
2013. Using a CES production function, agricultural productivity increased from 1.0% to 
1.4% per year during this period. Using the dual-cost approach, agricultural productivity 
rose from 0.5% to 1.2% per year. This indicates that Colombia’s agriculture expanded 
recently, due to improvements in productivity. Also, it seems that the Santos 
administration’s (2010-2014) distinct approach to agricultural policy was crucial for this 
outcome.   
This analysis shows that estimates of agricultural productivity predicted in this study 
are consistent across techniques. Also, it indicates that agricultural productivity has been 
a crucial factor in determining agricultural output growth in Colombia in recent decades, 
especially during periods of stronger growth. Therefore, agricultural policy in Colombia 
must give priority to boosting productivity, since this is a crucial factor in promoting 
agricultural growth. To this end, this study identifies certain elements that Colombian 
agricultural policy should consider to promote agricultural productivity in the next 
chapter. The objective is to determine the factors that best explain agricultural 








CHAPTER 7. DETERMINANTS OF COLOMBIA’S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY 
7.1 Introduction
Many studies have analyzed the main determinants of worldwide agricultural 
productivity growth, as explained in Chapter 3 (Avila et al., 2010; Desai & Namboodiri, 
1998; Ekbom, 1998; Evenson & Fuglie, 2010; Evenson et al., 1999; Fan, 1991; Fuglie & 
Rada, 2011, 2013; Jin et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2008; Rada & Valdes, 2012; Sun et al., 
2009; Thirtle et al., 2008). Overall, these studies have found that agricultural productivity 
is largely explained by four determinant types: i) investment in agricultural research and 
agricultural extension programs; ii) efficiency gains through the use of high quality factors, 
as well as more human capital; iii) scale economies via trade openness and higher 
competence in the domestic market; and iv) miscellaneous factors, such as weather and 
commodity prices (Suphannachart & Warr, 2012). Thus, there is an overall consensus in 
economics literature on the determinant types that explain worldwide agricultural 
productivity growth.  
A common issue in this literature is that some studies consider determinants that 
are more related to factor (capital) accumulation than to technical change (see Chapter 
3). It is common to find determinants in these studies such as labor availability, land use, 








across sectors, as candidates for explaining agricultural productivity (Atkinson, 1970; 
Ekbom, 1998; Rada & Valdes, 2012; Sun et al., 2009; Suphannachart & Warr, 2012; Thirtle 
et al., 2008). Therefore, agricultural productivity has been sometimes analyzed 
considering determinants that are not directly related to technical change. Consequently, 
these studies have likely drawn misguided conclusions about determinants that could 
have explained agricultural productivity but instead explain investment, and haven’t 
determined the factors that really explain it. 
Recent research continues to focus on designing better instruments to explain 
agricultural productivity (Wang et al., 2013). Also, it has become important to analyze the 
relations between these determinants and agricultural productivity over time. The 
objective has been to identify the factors that exhibit short-term effects on agricultural 
productivity and those with more long-term effects (Ali et al., 2012; Suphannachart & 
Warr, 2012). These studies emphasize that agricultural development boosts economic 
growth and improves social conditions (Johnson & Mellor, 1961). Accordingly, the 
identification of determinants that better explain agricultural productivity is crucial for 
better design of agricultural policy that boosts agricultural development. 
This chapter aims to identify the elements that Colombia’s agricultural policy should 
consider to boost agricultural productivity. It uses agricultural productivity estimates from 
the previous chapter, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function70, to test whether 
those determinants suggested by economics literature, such as the typical drivers of 
                                                     








agricultural productivity, exhibit a direct impact on Colombia's agricultural productivity. 
It worth highlighting that this analysis could not evaluate many key determinants, due to 
lacking data for the entire sample period (1975-2013).   
 
7.2 Methodology 
Economics literature indicates that there are two possible approaches to analyze 
the determinants that explain agricultural productivity (Evenson & Fuglie, 2010; Evenson, 
Landau, & Ballou, 1987; Schimmelpfennig, Thirtle, van Zyl, Arnade, & Khatri, 2000). On 
the one hand, there is an integrated approach, in which conventional inputs (i.e. labor, 
capital, land, etc.) and non-conventional factors (i.e. investment in R&D, human capital, 
patent development, etc.) are directly inputted in a single specification of a production 
function, cost function, or profit function. On the other hand, there is a “two-stage” 
approach, in which agricultural productivity is initially estimated, considering only 
conventional inputs in a first stage. Then, results are used to analyze the impact of non-
conventional factors on agricultural productivity in a second stage.  
The integrated approach is the most direct way to identify the main determinants 
of agricultural productivity, since all parameters are estimated simultaneously (Evenson 
et al., 1987; Schimmelpfennig et al., 2000). However, this approach exhibits certain 
problems that make the “two-stage” approach an appropriate alternative. For instance, 
collinearity problems are very common in the integrated approach because all factors, 








factors usually exhibit common trends (Evenson & Fuglie, 2010). Also, the results derived 
from using this approach are usually not robust, because high correlations among 
conventional and non-conventional factors cause these results to exhibit high sensitivity 
to changes in model specification (Evenson & Fuglie, 2010). In addition, the sample size is 
not always sufficient to ensure robust results using an integrated approach, because the 
loss of degrees of freedom is significant given the number of variables included in the 
model (Schimmelpfennig et al., 2000). Therefore, some studies suggest that the “two-
stage” approach most appropriately manages these difficulties (Evenson & Fuglie, 2010; 
Schimmelpfennig et al., 2000).  
This study uses the “two-stage” approach to identify the main determinants of 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity. This allows us to concentrate our analysis on the 
relation between non-conventional factors and agricultural productivity, since the 
relation between conventional factors and agricultural productivity is analyzed in the 
previous chapter. Also, this enables us to avoid the typical econometric problems 
associated with an integrated approach. In addition, many studies have successfully 
followed this approach to determine the relation among these non-conventional factors 
and agricultural productivity for countries such as Mexico, Brazil, India, South Africa, and 
the UK (Evenson & Fuglie, 2010; Fernandez-Cornejo & Shumway, 1997; Rada & Valdes, 
2012; Schimmelpfennig et al., 2000; Sun et al., 2009; Thirtle et al., 2008).     
This study also acknowledges that all determinants that might explain Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity could, in fact, exhibit a cumulative effect over time. The 








period, and then start to decline thereafter. Accordingly, it is assumed that current 
agricultural productivity is explained by the cumulative effect of changes exhibited by 
these determinants in prior years rather than a particular change at a specific (short) time 
in one of these factors. This is a common approach used to analyze the impact of R&D 
investment in productivity. The idea here is to use this approach to analyze the impact of 
other determinants of Colombia’s agricultural productivity (Alston, Chan-Kang, Marra, 
Pardey Philip, & Wyatt, 2000; Huffman & Evenson, 2006; Thirtle et al., 2008). 
Three common methods exist to estimate these model types, commonly known in 
economics literature as distributed-lag models (Alston et al., 2000; Thirtle et al., 2008). 
One method is the Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) approach, in which a set of 
constraints are imposed to ensure that model’s lagged coefficients follow a polynomial of 
degree 𝑃. From this, a weights structure is derived for each independent variable 𝑥𝑡 that 
is lagged in a model (e.g. in this case, all determinants that explain agricultural 
productivity). Thereby, any shock exhibited by a lagged variable 𝑥𝑡−𝑖  on a dependent 
variable 𝑦𝑡  (e.g. Colombia’s agricultural productivity) can be modeled using the PDL 
approach, because this allows one to assign different weight structures to all lagged 
variables according to the degree 𝑃 chosen for the polynomial (Almon, 1965; Fair & Jaffee, 
1975). Also, it avoids the collinearity issue that often arises when this type of model is 
estimated by only considering lags of variables 𝑥𝑡 in the model specification. However, 
this approach’s main issue is that it requires a careful and accurate selection of the 
model’s lag-length and the degree of the polynomial 𝑃. Otherwise, all coefficients in the 








Another method is the Trapezoidal Lag Distribution approach, which is a specific 
functional form of distributed-lag models. This is often used to analyze the impact of 
research on agricultural productivity (Huffman & Evenson, 2006). Basically, this is a 
predetermined lag structure used to model the impact of investment in agricultural 
research on agricultural productivity, which establishes the following weight structure: i) 
there is no impact on agricultural productivity during the first two years; ii) the weight of 
impact for each lagged variable increases linearly during the following seven years; iii) 
these weights then remain constant for 6 years; and iv) these weights decrease linearly 
to zero over 20 years. One problem with this approach is that its lag structure is designed 
specifically to model the impact of investing in research on agricultural productivity. 
Accordingly, it might not show a good fit for the weight structures of other determinants 
and in this study might also not fit Colombia’s patterns, which could vary from those of 
other countries. Another issue is that this approach demands a large sample size. This 
requires an extensive data history for all determinants (35 periods), which poses a serious 
problem when used with a small sample, as in this study.     
Finally, a third method is to calculate a simple moving average for all lagged 
variables over a specific period of time 𝑃. Then, these moving averages of all variables 𝑥𝑡 
are regressed on a dependent variable 𝑦𝑡 to measure their cumulative impact. This is the 
approach used in this study, because: i) it is a simple method to implement and evaluate 
the effects of all lagged determinants on Colombia’s agricultural productivity without the 
need to include all 𝑥𝑡 variables lagged for many periods, which would imply a significant 








iii) it is appropriate for small and/or large samples; and iv) it allows for conducting 
sensitivity analyses to determine the potential effect of changing the lag length of factors 
on agricultural productivity.      
7.2.1 Model 
The model used in this study for identifying the main determinants of agricultural 
productivity in Colombia assumes that it is mainly impacted by four determinant types: i) 
investment in agricultural research and agricultural extension programs; ii) efficiency 
gains through the use of high quality factors, as well as more human capital; iii) scale 
economies via trade openness and higher competence in the domestic market; and iv) 
miscellaneous factors, such as weather and commodity prices. Thereby, this model 
assumes that Colombia’s agricultural productivity (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡) is a function of these four types 
of determinants (𝑤𝑖𝑡), and each is proxied by a set of 𝑗 variables (𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ): 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡 =  𝑓 (𝑤1𝑡(𝑧1𝑗𝑡⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑⃑  ⃑), 𝑤2𝑡(𝑧2𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑⃑⃑  ⃑), 𝑤3𝑡(𝑧3𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑⃑⃑  ⃑), 𝑤4𝑡(𝑧4𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑⃑⃑  ⃑)) + 𝜀𝑡                       (41) 
where 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡 is an index of Colombia’s agricultural productivity with base year 1975=100, 
calculated using the agricultural productivity growth estimates from the previous chapter, 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function and a time-varying specification, as well as 
estimated as a weighted average between crop productivity and livestock during the 
period 1975-2013. Also, each determinant type (𝑤𝑖𝑡)  is identified with at least one 
variable (𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡,) in order to ensure good model identification. In addition, this model is 
estimated using moving averages for all variables (𝑀𝐴(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ )𝑝) with lag length 𝑝, in order 








An extended structure of this model can be written as: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡 =  𝑓 (𝑤1𝑡(𝑀𝐴(𝑧1𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑)𝑝),𝑤2𝑡(𝑀𝐴(𝑧2𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑)𝑝),𝑤3𝑡(𝑀𝐴(𝑧3𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑)𝑝), 𝑤4𝑡(𝑀𝐴(𝑧1𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑)𝑝)) + 𝜀𝑡      (42) 
where the moving average for each variable 𝑗 and each determinant type 𝑖, denoted by 
(𝑀𝐴(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ )𝑝), is: 
𝑀𝐴(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ )𝑡−𝑝 = ∑
(𝑧𝑖𝑗⃑⃑ ⃑⃑  ⃑)𝑡−𝑘
𝑝
                 𝑝𝑘=1                                   (43)   
This study estimates equation 42 using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), since this 
method allows us to estimate the marginal effect of the moving average calculated for 
each variable with lag length 𝑝 on Colombia’s agricultural productivity (𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑡). It is worth 
noting that this study conducted a sensitivity analysis to determine the optimal lag length 
to be considered in the estimation of the moving average calculated for each determinant. 
This sensitivity analysis involves regressing the moving average several times for each 
variable (𝑀𝐴(𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑡⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ ⃑⃑ )𝑝 ) on Colombia’s agricultural productivity (𝑇𝐹𝑃), changing the lag-
length considered each time. This exercise is carried out separately for each variable. The 
lag-length for all moving averages are integers between 1 and 10 years, given the sample 
size. The criterion for selecting the optimal lag-length 𝑝 for the moving average of each 
variable is the lag for which: i) the model exhibits the highest R2; ii) the coefficient of the 
moving average variable is statistically significant, and; iii) the coefficient magnitude (i.e. 
its returns in terms of agricultural productivity) is the highest. The Durbin-Watson index 
was estimated in all models to test for the possible presence of serial autocorrelation. 








to address it. This procedure is the most efficient to correct for serial autocorrelation in 
small samples (Rao & Griliches, 1969).  
The variables considered by this study are explained below in detail. 
 
7.2.2 Variables  
Many variables have been considered by the economics literature to identify the 
main determinates of worldwide agricultural productivity. The interest in designing better 
instruments, as well as data availability, undoubtedly explains this wide portfolio of 
variables. Data availability was a strong limitation to selecting and ruling out many 
variables in this study. In any case, based on this literature, which is reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 3, this study uses the following variables to identify the four determinant types 
that may have impacted Colombia’s agricultural productivity during the period of 1975-
2013.  
1. Research investment: investment in agricultural R&D and agricultural 
extension programs are the most common variables used in economics literature 
to identify this determinant type (Desai & Namboodiri, 1998; Evenson & Fuglie, 
2010; Evenson et al., 1999; Fernandez-Cornejo & Shumway, 1997; Fuglie & Rada, 
2011; Sun et al., 2009). Studies show that a direct, positive, and strong causal 
relation exists between these variables and agricultural productivity. All such 
studies have found that higher investment in agricultural R&D and/or agricultural 
extension programs increases agricultural productivity. Therefore, investment in 








This study only includes agricultural R&D investment in the model, because 
there is no available data on Colombian investment in agricultural extension 
programs. Data on agricultural R&D investment corresponds to the public 
agricultural R&D expenditure released by Beintema, Romano, and Pardey (2006) 
for the period 1970-1996 and by the DNP (2015) for the period 1997-2013. 
Beintema, Romano, and Pardey (2006) compiled these data by collecting this R&D 
expenditure from Colombia’s federal governmental agencies, non-profit 
institutions, and higher education agencies. That study releases these data as a 
ratio of Colombia’s agricultural GDP. The DNP (2015) does some data compilation 
from recent decades, reporting yearly public expenditure for improving 
Colombia’s agriculture competitiveness. The DNP (2015) releases these data in 
nominal Colombian Pesos.  
This study built the variable of total investment in Colombian agricultural 
R&D for the period 1975-2013, by using Colombia’s agricultural GDP in current 
pesos to implicitly derive investment in agricultural R&D compiled by Beintema, 
Romano, and Pardey (2006) for the period 1970-1996. Then, I appended these 
data to the series released by the DNP (2015) for the period 1997-2013. Finally, 
these data are converted into 2005 Colombian pesos, by dividing this value by the 
Consumer Price Index of Colombia with the base year of 2005 (World Bank, 2016).  
2. Efficiency gains: human capital, total length of the road network, and area 
equipped with irrigation are the most frequently-used variables to identify this 








et al., 2009; Suphannachart & Warr, 2012). These studies show that agricultural 
productivity exhibits a positive relation to these three factors. Productivity 
improves when a country increases the length of their road networks, exhibits 
more area equipped with irrigation, and increases human capital. However, this 
study considers that human capital is the only variable directly related to technical 
change. The total length of the road network and area equipped with irrigation 
are variables more related to physical capital accumulation, even if that is by 
public investment. Therefore, this study only considers human capital in the model.  
This study measures human capital as the number of people graduated from 
secondary schools. This variable allows us to capture the impact of people with 
the highest level of education in rural areas on Colombia’s agricultural productivity. 
Recent figures suggest that only about half of students enrolled in rural schools 
finish secondary schooling (MINEDUCACION, 2012). Given that Colombia is a 
developing country, this figure was probably lower in previous decades. This study 
uses the number of people enrolled in tertiary education in Colombia in all 
programs released by UNESCO as a proxy for this variable, because data for the 
number of secondary school graduates is not available for Colombia. Accordingly, 
it is expected that the number of people enrolled in tertiary education is closely 
related to the number of people that previously completed secondary education.     
3. Economies to scale: economic openness indices are the most common 
variables used in economics literature to identify this determinant type (Ali et al., 








relation between economic openness and agricultural productivity, since greater 
openness allows farmers to increase their market size. Economics literature also 
shows that there is a positive relation between foreign competence and 
manufacturing productivity in the medium term, and this might have the same 
impact on agricultural productivity (Fernandes, 2007; Muendler, 2004; Olley & 
Pakes, 1996). This study considers economic openness indicators in the model as 
the ratio of agricultural exports to agricultural output and the ratio of agricultural 
imports to agricultural output. However, I include the ratio of agricultural imports 
to agricultural output only, because Colombia’s agricultural exports have 
historically been concentrated in a few products (e.g. coffee, flowers and banana), 
as is mentioned in Chapter 2. Thus, it is unlikely that Colombia's agriculture has 
experienced any significant broadly-based gains in productivity from agricultural 
exporting. These gains might have been concentrated on these few products. 
The foreign competence variable corresponds with the ratio of Colombian 
agricultural imports to agricultural GDP. The numerator includes the value of all 
agricultural imports, which FAOSTAT reports annually as a CIF value (FAO, 2015). 
Agricultural GDP is the value added of Colombia’s agriculture, released annually 
by the World Bank (World Bank, 2016).   
4. Miscellaneous factors: many other variables, such as commodities prices 
and weather, are frequently considered when agricultural productivity is analyzed 
and segmented into its main determinants. Empirical evidence shows that good 








commodity prices tend to increase agricultural productivity (Evenson, 2001; 
Henderson et al., 2011; Suphannachart & Warr, 2012). However, this study did not 
include these factors, since: i) the impact of weather on agricultural productivity 
varies for each crop; and ii) commodity prices are disaggregated by product and 
this study analyzes aggregate agricultural productivity in Colombia.  
 
7.3 Results and Discussion 
In order to identify the main determinants of agricultural productivity in Colombia, 
this study begins by corroborating those factors suggested by economics literature as 
exhibiting a direct and positive relationship with Colombia’s agricultural productivity 
during the period 1975-2013. To this end, this study calculated a simple correlation 
between these factors and Colombia’s agricultural productivity. The results of this 
exercise show that all factors exhibited a reasonably high and positive correlation with 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity during the period 1975-2013 (see Table 33). Human 
capital is the variable that displays the highest correlation (93%), followed by the 
correlation exhibited by foreign competence (86%), and last by the correlation shown by 
agricultural R&D investment (62%).  
Table 33: Correlation between Agricultural Productivity in Colombia and Key Explanatory 
Factors Suggested by Economics Literature during the Period (1975-2013) 
















As explained above, this study considers that all factors exhibited a cumulative 
impact on Colombia’s agricultural productivity during the period 1975-2013. Next, I used 
a moving average to estimate their impact. This study conducted sensitivity analysis to 
determine the optimal lag length to calculate the moving average for each variable, 
considering a maximum lag of 10 years. 
 This sensitivity analysis shows an excellent fit for all factors. In the case of human 
capital, the R2 for all models is approximately 0.99, and the Root MSE ranges from 0.030-
0.032 (see Table 34). No model shows heteroscedasticity, because all sensitivity analyses 
were estimated assuming robust standard errors. Also, an initial serial autocorrelation 
problem in all models was corrected by estimating each using the Prais-Winsten 
estimation procedure. In addition, all coefficients are statistically significant at 1% and 
vary between 0.12-0.14. The largest coefficient is estimated for the moving average of lag 
8 (0.137) and the smallest for lag 1 (0.121). Therefore, the difference between the 
maximum returns in terms of agricultural productivity when human capital increases on 
average by 1% during the last year versus when this increase happens on average during 
the last 10 years under similar conditions is insignificant. Agricultural productivity 
increases between 0.12% and 0.14% per year when average human capital increases by 
1% in the last year, last two years, three years, etc. This study selects the moving average 
calculated for human capital considering 8 years as the optimal lag, because that model 
exhibits an R2 of 0.99, the coefficient of this moving average is statistically significant at 








Table 34: Sensitivity Analysis for Determining Optimal Lag-Length for Human Capital 
  Coef Robust Std. Err. Root MSE R2 DW − Index 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(1)  0.1210***  0.013 0.0308 0.988 1.95 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(2)  0.1259***  0.014 0.0302 0.989 1.95 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(3)  0.1243***  0.015 0.0302 0.990 1.96 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(4)  0.1249***  0.016 0.0307 0.990 1.96 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(5)  0.1272***  0.017 0.0311 0.989 1.93 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(6)  0.1255***  0.019 0.0317 0.989 1.91 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(7)  0.1338***  0.020 0.0311 0.990 1.97 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(8)  0.1371***  0.024 0.0313 0.990 1.92 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(9)  0.1240***  0.019 0.0298 0.992 1.90 
Log(Human Capitalt) − MA(10)  0.1268***  0.022 0.0302 0.992 1.88 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*In all models, the natural logarithm of Colombia’s agricultural productivity for period t  
(Log(𝑇𝐹𝑃t)) is the dependent variable.  
 
 
In the case of foreign competence, the R2 for all models is 0.98-0.99 as well, and the 
Root MSE varies from 0.032-0.036 (see Table 35). Also, all coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1%, except for the moving average estimate for lag 1 (year). In addition, all 
coefficients vary from 0.009 to 0.013. The largest coefficient is estimated when the 
moving average is calculated for lag 8 (0.0130) and the smallest when it is only calculated 
for lag 2 (0.0089). This indicates that agricultural productivity increases by 0.89% per year 
when foreign competence in the domestic market increases on average by 1% of GDP 
during the last two years. Also, agricultural productivity increases somewhat more, by 1.3% 
per year, if average foreign competence increases on average by 1% of GDP during the 
last 8 years. This study selects the moving average calculated for foreign competence 
considering also 8 years as the optimal lag, because that model exhibits an R2 of 0.99, the 








foreign competence in Colombia’s domestic market in terms of agricultural productivity 
are the highest at this lag.    
Table 35: Sensitivity Analysis for Determining Optimal Lag-Length for Foreign 
Competence in Colombia’s Agricultural Market 




























































− MA(10) 0.0116*** 0.004 0.0332 0.991 1.81 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*In all models, the natural logarithm of Colombia’s agricultural productivity for period t  
(Log(𝑇𝐹𝑃t)) is the dependent variable.  
 
Finally, in the case of agricultural R&D investment, the R2 for all models also ranges 
from 0.98-0.99, and the Root MSE is around 0.035-0.037 (see Table 36). Unlike the 
sensitivity analysis carried out for human capital and foreign competence in Colombia’s 
agricultural market, this only shows two statistically significant coefficients.  These are the 
coefficients calculated for the moving averages of agricultural R&D investment, 
considering the lags of 6 and 7 (years). However, only the coefficient for the moving 








moving average lagged 6 (0.0845) is statistically significant only at 10%. This suggests a 
weak relation between agricultural R&D and agricultural productivity in Colombia during 
the last several decades, likely due to: i) lack of public resources for promoting Colombia’s 
agriculture competitiveness; ii) misallocation of resources for agricultural promotion; and 
iii) segmented and restricted funding for Colombian farmers (Cuevas et al., 2003; Junguito 
et al., 2014; Reina et al., 2011). This study selects the moving average calculated for 
agricultural R&D investment considering 7 years as the optimal lag, because that model 
exhibits an R2 of 0.99 and the coefficient of this moving average is statistically significant 
at 1%.  
 
Table 36: Sensitivity Analysis for Determining Optimal Lag-Length for Agricultural R&D 
Investment 
  Coef Robust Std. Err. Root MSE R2 DW − Index 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(1) -0.0121 0.024 0.0347 0.977 2.02 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(2) 0.0052 0.033 0.0356 0.980 2.13 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(3) -0.0207 0.039 0.0350 0.979 2.15 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(4) -0.0303 0.045 0.0352 0.979 2.09 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(5) 0.0511 0.055 0.0360 0.984 2.16 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(6) 0.0845* 0.046 0.0356 0.986 2.14 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(7) 0.1458*** 0.055 0.0350 0.988 2.15 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(8) 0.1442 0.086 0.0367 0.988 2.11 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(9) 0.0628 0.087 0.0346 0.989 1.94 
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(10) 0.1008 0.102 0.0354 0.989 1.91 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
*In all models, the natural logarithm of Colombia’s agricultural productivity for period t  










Next, I searched for the model that best explains Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity during the period 1975-2013, by using the optimal lags identified above in 
the sensitivity analysis for each factor. This allowed identifying that the optimal 
specification for this model involves the moving average lagged 8 years for human capital 
and foreign competence, as well as lagged 7 years for agricultural R&D investment.  
This model shows an excellent fit. Its R2 is 0.99, and its Root MSE is around 0.031 
(see Table 37). Also, this model indicates that human capital is apparently the only 
variable that exhibits a positive and statistically significant relation with agricultural 
productivity (see Table 37). An increase of 1% in their average exhibited during the last 8 
years explains an increase of almost 0.31% in Colombia’s agricultural productivity. In 
contrast, foreign competence exhibits the wrong sign, because its coefficient is negative 
and economics literature suggests that it should be positive, as did in the earlier sensitivity 
analysis to determine its optimal lag. In addition, agricultural R&D investment is not 
statistically significant at 10%, despite the positive relation shown by this variable in the 
sensitivity analysis. Evidently, the human capital variable has captured the effects seen 
earlier for foreign competence and investment in agricultural R&D, and dominates these 
other effects. Also, this reaffirms the weak relation between agricultural R&D in Colombia, 










Table 37: Model of Agricultural Productivity Regressed using the Moving Averages of 
Main Determinants 
VARIABLES Log(𝑇𝐹𝑃t) 








− MA(8) -0.0161** 
(0.00760) 








Root MSE 0.031 
R-squared 0.99 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This study evaluates whether this model exhibits collinearity issues among its 
variables, and this explains why human capital is the only variable that is statistically 
significant and shows the expected sign. To this end, I calculate a correlation matrix to 
determine if the correlation among pairs of these variables is equal or higher than 80%, 
since the rule of thumb recognizes this as evidence of collinearity problems (Montgomery, 
Peck, & Vining, 2001). This allows to us confirm this hypothesis (see Table 38). The model 
exhibits collinearity problems, because the correlation between the moving averages 
calculated for human capital and foreign competence is 95%. Also, the correlation 
between the moving averages calculated for human capital and investment in agricultural 
R&D is 72%, which is also close to this threshold. Therefore, this study estimates this 
model again, but it drops out the moving average of human capital to address this 
collinearity. The idea is to determine the marginal effect of agricultural R&D investment 








from the potential impact of human capital. In addition, it also estimates this model, 
considering human capital as the only factor to explain Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity (see Table 39).    
Table 38: Correlation Matrix among Factors that Explain Agricultural Productivity in 
Colombia from 1975-2013 








Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(7) 1.00   







0.53 0.95 1.00 
 
These models show excellent fits. Both exhibit an R2 of 0.99 and Root MSEs from 
0.031-0.034 (see Table 39). The model, for which human capital was not included, 
indicates that agricultural R&D investment and foreign competence are important drivers 
of Colombia’s agricultural productivity (see Table 39, column 1). These show that if the 
average agricultural R&D investment increases by 1% over the last 7 years, agricultural 
productivity increases by 0.11% per year. Also, if foreign competence in Colombia’s 
agricultural market increases by 1% of agricultural GDP over the last 8 years, agricultural 
productivity increases by 0.9% per year. Moreover, the results of the model in which 
human capital is the only determinant of Colombia’s agricultural productivity show that 
if the average human capital increases by 1% over the last 8 years, Colombia’s agricultural 









Table 39: Adjusted Model for Agricultural Productivity Regressed using the Moving 
Averages of Main Determinants 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Log(𝑇𝐹𝑃t) Log(𝑇𝐹𝑃t) 








− MA(8) 0.00944***  
(0.00327)  
Log(InvR&𝐷t) − MA(7) 
0.110*  
(0.0634)  
   
Constant 4.101*** 4.028*** 
 (0.326) (0.1330) 
   
Observations 31 31 
Root MSE 0.034 0.031 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In brief, this study finds evidence that agricultural R&D investment, human capital, 
and foreign competence in the domestic market are important drivers of Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity. Also, it finds that agricultural policy should be designed with a 
long-term perspective, because agricultural productivity will increase in Colombia if: i) 
average investment in R&D increases steadily during the previous 7 years; and ii) foreign 
competence increases over the last 2 to 7 years, since this determinant exhibits increasing 
returns in terms of productivity over this period and might lead productivity 
improvements in Colombia’s agriculture in order to face this increasing foreign 
competence. In addition, agricultural productivity might be boosted in the short term by 
increasing human capital, since its returns in terms of productivity in the short and long 








This suggests that agricultural policy in Colombia should consider mainly three 
elements for increasing agricultural productivity. First, it should promote a steady 
increase in agricultural R&D investment for developing new farming technologies and 
technical improvements. This increased investment should also consider funding 
agricultural extension programs, since these programs are possibly the most efficient way 
to ensure an effective dissemination of the technical knowledge developed for all 
Colombian farms. Second, Colombia’s agricultural policy should consider a gradual 
removal of all trade distortions, which have been very strong during last several decades, 
as explained in Chapter 2. This would imply a reduction of agricultural tariffs, which would 
raise foreign competence in the domestic market and might encourage Colombian 
farmers to adopt the new technical knowledge developed in the field. Finally, this 
agricultural policy should promote higher education levels in rural areas. This would 
ensure a good transmission of technical knowledge, since Colombian farmers will be able 
to comprehend the importance of these new farming technologies in improving the 
productivity of their farms.   
This study finds that Colombia will be able to raise its agricultural productivity in the 
next decades if it includes these elements in its agricultural policy. Also, success will 
depend on implementing a comprehensive policy that incorporate all three elements and 
is designed with a long term perspective. Otherwise, efforts to increase Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity will be in vain, and Colombia will continue exhibiting low 









8.1 Structural Issues of Colombia’s Agriculture 
Colombia’s agriculture exhibited only a moderate expansion during the agricultural 
commodity price booms from 2006 to 2011, and it has mainly encountered serious 
difficulties in recent decades (see Chapter 2). For instance, Colombia’s agriculture has 
remained stagnant since the 1990’s, growing just 1.5% on average in the 1990’s, and 1.9% 
in the 2000’s (World Bank, 2016). Many factors explain this weak performance, but 
economics literature explains that the following are the most important: i) the type of 
policies implemented in Colombia to boost its economic development, mainly promoting 
other sectors, such as finance, mining, and utilities (Junguito et al., 2014); ii) a 
misallocation of resources within the agricultural sector, despite the fact that Colombia’s 
government increased its investment during the 2000’s (Reina et al., 2011); iii) the 
accelerated and abrupt implementation of the second package of reforms associated with 
Colombia’s Structural Adjustment (SA) program during the 1990’s (Ocampo, 2000); and 
iv) a significant structural transformation of Colombia’s economy toward the services 
sector due to effects known as the Dutch Disease (Clavijo et al., 2013). Therefore, 








Furthermore, its share in Colombia’s total GDP decreased steadily from an average of 24% 
in the 1970’s to 6%-8% in the 2000’s. 
Colombia’s agricultural policy has been historically designed to face short-term 
problems, instead of being a long-term strategy for sectoral development (SAC, 2014). 
Colombia has executed a wide variety of policies to promote its agricultural performance, 
but most have in common the central role assigned to the government for carrying out 
constant market interventions (Guterman, 2007). Consequently, Colombia’s agriculture 
has been subject to many distortions during the last several decades, which have 
considerably limited its competitiveness (Anderson & Valdés, 2008).  
Finally, Colombia’s agriculture has exhibited a serious lack of public resources for 
improving its competitiveness. Public expenditure on agriculture has represented just 
0.2%-0.4% of overall GDP since the late 1990’s, while this figure has reached 1% in other 
emerging markets, and 4% in developed countries (Junguito et al., 2014). Also, Colombia 
has shown two types of bottlenecks that have discouraged agricultural investment in 
recent years (COMPITE, 2008). On the one hand, projects developed in this sector usually 
have low expected returns, due to the lack of human capital in the sector, land 
misallocation, limited exploitation of economies of scale, etc. On the other hand, 
Colombia’s agriculture has exhibited funding problems, because credit to this sector is 
segmented and restricted (Cuevas et al., 2003). These structural issues have surely had 
an impact on agricultural productivity growth in Colombia. 
A key issue in this weak performance exhibited by Colombia’s agriculture is stagnant 








agricultural productivity growth and analyses which are the most important factors that 
explain it. This study identifies those elements that Colombia’s government should 
consider in their agricultural policy to: i) boost productivity growth in this sector; ii) reach 
faster growth and development of its agriculture; and iii) take advantage of all available 
opportunities for Colombia’s agriculture in the following decades. 
 
8.2 Measuring Colombia’s Agricultural Productivity 
The principal objective of this research was to measure agricultural productivity and 
to analyze if it changed over time, due to changes in agricultural policy regimes and/or 
economic circumstances. This study estimates Colombia’s agricultural productivity using 
econometric techniques, with special emphasis on four aspects: i) agricultural 
productivity growth in Colombia, measured as TFP and assuming Hicks-Neutral technical 
change, in aggregate and also disaggregated for crops and livestock during this period; ii) 
whether or not Colombia’s agriculture exhibited biased technical change during this 
period; iii) whether Colombia’s agricultural productivity growth varied over time across 
periods established in Chapter 2; and iv) the contribution of scale effects to Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity. 
This study finds evidence that aggregate Colombia’s agricultural productivity grew 
on average between 0.6% and 1.4% during the period 1975-2013 (see Table 40). Also, it 
estimates that productivity growth varied between 0.8% and 1.3% per year during this 
period, when Colombia’s agricultural productivity is calculated as a weighted average 








livestock production value in total agricultural production value. I consider this weighted 
average estimate a more reliable indicator for Colombia’s agricultural productivity, since 
it represents more closely the different dynamics exhibited by crop productivity versus 
livestock productivity. Also, I find that agricultural TFP varied across the six periods 
established in Chapter 2. Accordingly, Colombia’s agricultural productivity is sensitive to 
significant changes in policy regimes and economic circumstances.  
 
Table 40: Average Agricultural Productivity in Colombia from 1975-2013 
 Cobb-Douglas CES Dual Cost 
Aggregate 0.6% 1.3% 1.4% 
Weighted Average 0.8% 1.3% 0.9% 
Crops 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 
Livestock 1.6% 2.2% 2.0% 
 
 
All methods used in this study – Cobb-Douglas and CES production function and 
Dual cost function -- estimate that Colombia’s agricultural productivity was mainly driven 
by livestock productivity. This grew on average at a rate between 1.6% and 2.2% during 
this period, probably due to: i) more efficient production practices in poultry sector; ii) 
higher investments in new herds and technology (mainly in dual-purpose cattle) in the 
late 1990’s; and iii) introduction of innovations for feeding and management of livestock, 
genetic improvements, and the purchase of highly productive species in the milk sector 
(Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; MADR, 2005b; Mojica & Paredes, 2005). In contrast, crop 
productivity expansion is unclear over this period. By assuming a Cobb-Douglas 








productivity growth was zero, whereas by assuming a CES production function, this grew 
on average by 0.8% per year.  
Historical evidence suggests crop productivity would have been low during the 
period 1975-2013, because farmers experienced difficult conditions: i) agricultural budget 
cuts during the 1980’s Latin American debt crisis; ii) a profitability crisis after Colombia 
executed the second package of reforms of its Structural Adjustment program in the early 
1990’s; iii) extreme weather conditions (i.e. severe droughts and severe floods); iv) 
misallocation of resources for agricultural promotion; v) decreased investment due to 
armed conflict; vi) lack of public resources for promoting Colombia’s agriculture 
competitiveness, and vii) the segmented and restricted funding for Colombian farmers 
(Cuevas et al., 2003; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; Junguito et al., 2014; Junguito, 1994; 
Kalmanovitz & López, 2003; Reina et al., 2011). However, some crops are exceptions and 
seemingly exhibited higher levels of productivity, for example: i) sugar cane, due to the 
introduction of mechanized harvesting practices, the modernization of production 
processes and equipment and machinery; ii) flowers, due to a reallocation of the varieties 
according to climate conditions; iii) banana, due to cultivating more productive varieties; 
and iv) recently cereals and vegetables, due to better farming practices, higher 
investment in research and development of genetically modified seeds (Arbeláez, 1993; 
Becerra, 2009; COMPITE, 2008; C. F. Jaramillo, 1998; La Republica, 2012; Montero & Casas, 
2012; Ramirez & Garcia, 2006; SIC, 2012). 
It worth noting that these agricultural productivity estimates are strongly consistent 








productivity results, estimated using each technique, varies between 70% to 95%. Also, 
the range of agricultural productivity estimates is small. All techniques predict that 
agricultural productivity grew on average between 0.8% and 1.3% between 1975 and 
2013, crop productivity increased between 0% and 0.8%, and livestock productivity rose 
between 1.6% and 2.2% (see Table 40).  
This study also finds that agricultural productivity was a crucial factor in determining 
agricultural production value growth in Colombia in recent decades, and especially during 
periods of stronger growth. Agricultural production growth always accelerated to more 
than 2% per year when agricultural productivity growth increased its pace (e.g. in the late 
1980’s and in recent years). Moreover, it finds evidence that the pace of agricultural 
productivity was strongly dependent on policy regimes and economic circumstances. 
Thus, agricultural policy in Colombia must give priority to boosting productivity, because 
this is a crucial factor for promoting agricultural growth. However, this policy should be 
carefully designed in order to avoid any unexpected results and to boost Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity growth in the proper way.  
Finally, this study finds evidence that Colombia’s agriculture exhibited biased 
technical change during the period 1975-2013 (see Table 41). Using a CES production 
function, it determines that technical change was capital augmenting in crop production, 
and animal feed augmenting in livestock production. However, using the dual-cost 
approach, technical change was capital saving in crop production, but unclear in livestock 
production. In this case in particular, there was an inconsistency between results when 








non-homothetic. Either way, these results indicate that changes in input efficiency in 
Colombia’s agriculture was different across agricultural activities during 1975-2013. Also, 
technical change tended to improve more the marginal productivity of capital in crop 
production relative to other inputs, and the marginal productivity of animal feed in 
livestock production relative to other inputs. 
 
Table 41: Biased Technical Change by Agricultural Activity in Colombia 
 































8.3 Comparison with Other Literature 
The focus of this discussion so far has been the analysis of results obtained by the 
different econometric techniques for the measurement of agricultural productivity in 
Colombia. The objective of this section is to compare the results with other studies (Avila 
et al., 2010; USDA, 2015). For this purpose, I use the estimates of agricultural productivity 
derived assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, since these exhibit the fewest 








agricultural productivity growth estimates from all studies, since this allows one to more 
comprehensively analyze the predictive power of each approach71.  
By comparing agricultural productivity growth estimates from this study versus 
USDA calculations, I find that our estimates are on average lower than the USDA’s (0.8% 
versus 1.4%) for the period 1975-2013. Also, there exists a large discrepancy between the 
smoothed trends (see Figure 40) (USDA, 2015). First, USDA estimates do not predict a 
sharp fall in agricultural productivity during the 1990’s as our estimates indicate and 
historical evidence suggests. The USDA only predicts a moderate slowdown of Colombia’s 
agricultural productivity growth during this decade, which bottomed out in 1998. Second, 
USDA estimates indicate that agricultural productivity remained stable until 2007, 
whereas our estimates predict that agricultural productivity started to decline in the 
2000’s and agricultural growth was mainly explained by higher input accumulation during 
this period. Finally, USDA estimates predict that agricultural productivity contracted in 
2010-2011. In contrast, our estimates forecast that this occurred earlier during the period 
2009-2010, which is more plausible since Colombia’s agriculture plunged into a crisis in 
2009 (see Chapter 2). Agricultural productivity estimated by the USDA has a low 
correlation with our estimates (only 50%). 
This study finds two possible reasons for these discrepancies. On the one hand, the 
USDA estimates agricultural productivity as a residual variable using an accounting 
technique, including cost shares from Brazil’s agriculture, and assuming that these figures 
                                                     
71 I applied the Hodrick-Prescott filter to all estimates of Colombia’s agricultural productivity in order to remove their 








are similar for both countries (USDA, 2016). However, as explained in Chapter 3, this is 
not true. This confirms the suspicions of this study: agriculture in Colombia and Brazil are 
very different. Brazil’s agriculture is developed on large and flat lands, and it has been 
supported by a long-term agricultural policy. In contrast, Colombia’s agriculture is 
developed on hillsides, and its agricultural policy has mainly been executed to solve short-
term issues (see Chapter 2). Moreover, since the USDA uses an accounting technique for 
measuring Colombia’s agricultural TFP, this might be biased due to omitting important 
regressors unrelated to productivity. For instance, the USDA does not include variables to 
control for the impact on changes in policy regimes and in economic circumstances on 
Colombia’s agricultural productivity.   
A comparison of our results and those estimated by Avila et al. (2010) also shows 
significant discrepancies (see Figure 40). On the one hand, Avila et al. (2010) predict that 
agricultural productivity in Colombia exhibits a different trend than the one estimated by 
this study in the 1980’s. Avila et al. (2010) estimate that agricultural productivity fell 
during that decade, whereas our estimates predict that it increased. Avila et al. (2010) 
also estimate that Colombia’s agricultural productivity fell in the late 1990’s, while our 
estimates suggest that this occurred in the early 1990’s. The correlation between their 
results and ours is -54%.  
A possible reason for this discrepancy is the methodology used by Avila et al. (2010) 








which also measures agricultural productivity as a residual variable72. This means that the 
agricultural productivity estimated by Avila et al. (2010) might include omitted but 
important regressors unrelated to productivity. In contrast, I estimate agricultural 
productivity assuming a Cobb-Douglas function, which is similar to Tornqvist- Theil Index, 
but I specified a model that allows for variation in technical change over time, which our 
results show to be important.  
Finally, this study also finds a significant discrepancy regarding the results obtained 
by Ludena (2010). Although that study does not reveal details on their Colombian TFP 
estimates, it does indicate that agricultural productivity in Colombia grew on average by 
2.4% during the 1980’s, 2.5% during the 1990’s, and only 0.2% between 2000-2007. In 
contrast, the present study finds that agricultural productivity grew by an average of 1.0% 
during the 1980’s, 0.7% during the 1990’s, and 1.1% from 2000-2007. Also, Ludena (2010) 
predicts that agricultural productivity exhibited a strong decline during the 2000’s, which 
we do not find.  
A possible reason for this discrepancy is that Ludena (2010) used the Malmquist 
index methodology for measuring agricultural productivity, which exhibits two serious 
problems: i) it requires a very accurate estimation of the frontier production function, as 
do other frontier techniques, which is not always possible due to gaps in data for certain 
sectors (Sena, 2003); and ii) its results are very sensitive to the chosen period, data quality, 
and outliers (Thirtle et al., 2008). Thus, it is believed that the measurement of this frontier 
                                                     
72 This is a discrete approximation of the growth accounting technique, using the economic theory of index numbers 








production function could have exhibited problems, since agriculture in Colombia (as in 
other countries) is a volatile activity constantly impacted by commodity price volatility, 
weather, and policy. In addition, it is possible that data availability, which this study found 
to be problematic for Colombia, could have also affected the measurement of this frontier 
production function.     
 
Figure 40: Estimated TFP of Colombia’s Agriculture using Econometric Techniques 




In brief, this analysis suggests that agricultural productivity in Colombia estimated 
by this study is very consistent across econometric techniques. Also, our estimates of 
agricultural productivity seem to accurately reflect the performance exhibited by 
Colombia’s agriculture during the sub-periods established in chapter 2 for the overall 


























































































































































agriculture might have exhibited biased technical change, something that other studies 
have not yet considered for Colombia. Likewise, it measures the contribution of scale 
effects on Colombia’s agricultural productivity.  
 
8.4 Determinants of Colombia’s Agricultural Productivity  
This study uses agricultural productivity estimates obtained by assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function and a time-varying trend specification to test whether those 
determinants suggested by economics literature, such as the typical drivers of agricultural 
productivity, exhibit a direct impact on Colombia's agricultural productivity. It finds that 
agricultural productivity will increase by 0.11% per year if the average agricultural R&D 
investment increases by 1% over the last 7 years; it will increase by 0.9 per year if foreign 
competence in Colombia’s agricultural market increases by 1% of agricultural GDP over 
the last 8 years; or between 0.12% and 0.14% if human capital increases by 1%. Thus, it 
finds evidence that agricultural policy in Colombia should mainly consider three elements 
for increasing agricultural productivity. First, it should promote a steady increase in 
agricultural R&D investment for developing new farming technologies and technical 
improvements. This increased investment should also consider funding agricultural 
extension programs, since these programs are possibly the most efficient way to ensure 
an effective dissemination of the technical knowledge developed for all Colombian farms. 
This way, crop productivity might be boosted, since this study finds that it has been 
stagnant in recent decades. Second, Colombia’s agricultural policy should consider a 








several decades. This would imply a reduction of agricultural tariffs, which would raise 
foreign competence in the domestic market and indirectly encourage Colombian farmers 
to adopt the new technical knowledge developed in the field. Finally, this agricultural 
policy should promote higher education levels in rural areas. This would ensure good 
transmission of technical knowledge, since Colombian farmers will be able to 
comprehend the importance of these new farming technologies in improving their farms’ 
productivity.   
Colombia will be able to raise its agricultural productivity in the next decades if it 
includes these elements in its agricultural policy. Success will depend on implementing a 
comprehensive policy that incorporates all three elements and is designed with a long-
term perspective in mind. Otherwise, efforts to increase Colombia’s agricultural 
productivity will be in vain, and Colombia will continue exhibiting low agricultural 
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